1 O 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAIME AGUIRRE , ) Case No. CV 22-06676 DDP (MRWx) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ) TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 KATHRYN BARGER, ET AL., ) ) [Dkt. 33] 15 Defendants. ) ___________________________ ) 16 17 Presently before the court is Defendants Kathryn Barger, 18 Janice Hahn, Holly Mitchell, and Hilda Solis’ Motion to Strike and 19 to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 33). Having 20 considered the submissions of the parties, the court grants the 21 motion and adopts the following Order.1 22 I. Background 23 Plaintiffs initially filed a Complaint alleging, on behalf of 24 a putative class, that while incarcerated in “the Los Angeles 25 1 The court, preferring to decide issues on the merits where 26 possible, has considered both of Plaintiffs’ oppositions and both of Defendants’ replies. (Dkts. 35, 36, 37, 39.) The court 27 reiterates that it expects counsel for all parties to work professionally, collaboratively, and in full accordance with the 28 letter and spirit of all applicable rules of procedure, including 1 County jail,” they “were forced to sleep on and inhabit the floors 2 and to exist in filthy and intolerable physical and mental 3 conditions.” (Complaint ¶¶ 12,13.) 4 Plaintiffs’ original Complaint named Defendants Kathryn 5 Barger, Janice Hahn, Holly Mitchell, and Hilda Solis (collectively, 6 “Defendants”) in both their official and individual capacities. 7 (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 16.) Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint 8 (Dkt. 19), and this Court granted the motion (Dkt. 26). The court 9 explained that Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims were barred 10 by legislative immunity, and dismissed those claims with prejudice. 11 (Dkt. 26 at 4.) The court further concluded that (1) Plaintiffs’ 12 Monell claims were conclusory and (2) Plaintiffs’ official capacity 13 claims were duplicative and redundant, and dismissed those claims 14 with leave to amend. (Id. at 4, 6-7.) The court explicitly stated 15 that leave to amend was limited to the scope of the court’s Order. 16 (Id. at 8.) 17 Plaintiffs then timely filed the FAC (Dkt. 29.) Defendants 18 now contend that the FAC violates this Court’s earlier Order and 19 should be stricken, or, in the alternative, repeats the pleading 20 deficiencies of the original Complaint and should be dismissed for 21 the same reasons. The court agrees. 22 II. Discussion 23 A. Newly-named Defendants 24 This Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims 25 with prejudice and, accordingly, struck Plaintiffs’ punitive 26 damages claim. (Dkt. 26 at 4 n.1) Although the FAC does not re- 27 allege individual and punitive damage claims against Defendants, it 28 does allege such claims as to two entirely new Defendants: former 1 Los Angeles County Sheriff Alejandro Villanueva and current Sheriff 2 Robert Luna.2 (FAC ¶¶ 3, 6). Plaintiffs never, however, sought 3 leave to amend the Complaint to add new defendants, and this 4 Court’s grant of leave to amend was limited to the scope of the 5 issues discussed in the Order. Plaintiffs’ Opposition appears to 6 suggest that Robert Luna and Lindsey Horvath were properly added as 7 Defendants because the FAC preserves the “right to amend to add 8 true names of fictitiously-named defendants.”3 (Opposition at 9 21.)4 Indeed, the FAC does identify “10 UNKNOWN NAMED DEFENDANTS, 10 whose true identities presently are unknown,” and alleges that 11 these unknown names “will be replaced by their true identities when 12 those true identities are learned.” (FAC ¶ 3.) The thrust of 13 Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is not clear to the court.5 As an 14 initial matter, Defendants Luna and Villanueva are named in the 15 same paragraph that also names the ten unknown defendants, and 16 therefore cannot be included among those ten. More importantly, 17 Plaintiffs’ original Complaint gave no indication that Plaintiffs 18 sought to name, but were unable to identify, the Los Angeles County 19 Sheriff, past or present. Indeed, although the original Complaint 20 did also name ten unknown Defendants, it stated that “Defendants 21 2 The caption of the FAC also now names Lindsey Horvath as a 22 Defendant, although Horvath is not identified or mentioned anywhere in the body of the FAC. The FAC also brings an official capacity 23 claim against Sheriff Luna. (FAC ¶ 6.) 24 3 See note 2, above. 25 4 Here, and hereinafter, “Opposition” refers to Plaintiff’s second opposition, at Dkt. 37. 26 5 The court also notes that Plaintiffs’ opposition does not 27 accurately quote the FAC. For example, extensive excerpts, ostensibly spanning seven different paragraphs of the FAC, are in 28 fact drawn from Plaintiffs’ original Complaint. (Opp. at 15-16). 1 all are County of Los Angeles supervisors,” and that “[t]he other 2 unknown named defendants are or will be County supervisors.” 3 (Compl. ¶¶ 4-5.) The court therefore rejects any contention that 4 Defendants Luna or Villanueva have been properly substituted in for 5 previously named unknown Defendants. 6 Moreover, Plaintiffs present no other argument as to how the 7 addition of new Defendants falls within the scope of this Court’s 8 leave to amend. Instead, Plaintiffs assert that “no authorization 9 was needed because . . . a plaintiff is the master of his 10 complaint.” (Opp. at 21:8-9.) Masters though they may be, 11 Plaintiffs are not free to simply disregard this Court’s Orders, 12 and courts regularly strike new claims that exceed the scope of 13 leave to amend. See, e.g., Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 14 116 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Bassam v. Bank of Am., 15 No. CV1500587MMMFFMX, 2015 WL 12697873, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 16 2015); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Accordingly, all claims 17 against newly-named Defendants are hereby stricken from the FAC.6 18 B. Official Capacity Claims 19 This Court’s earlier Order explained that official capacity 20 suits are another way of suing a governmental entity. (Dkt. 26 at 21 6-7.) The court therefore dismissed, with leave to amend, 22 Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against multiple County 23 supervisors as duplicative and redundant. (Id. at 7-8.) 24 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ FAC again alleges official capacity 25 claims against several County supervisors, in clear disregard of 26 this Court’s Order. Indeed, Plaintiffs repeat, verbatim, arguments 27 6 For the same reason, Plaintiffs’ new prayer for injunctive 28 relief is also stricken. 1 that this Court has explicitly rejected. For example, 2 notwithstanding this Court’s conclusion that “Plaintiffs’ desire to 3 get attention from particular elected officials is not sufficient 4 to justify the maintenance of duplicative and redundant claims,” 5 Plaintiffs’ opposition repeats the prior assertion that multiple 6 official capacity claims should be allowed to proceed because 7 “attention needs to be gotten from each of the [] supervisor 8 defendants.” (Opp. at 23:3-4.) (compare Dkt. 21 at 16:9-10 (“The 9 attention needs to be gotten from each of the [] supervisor 10 defendants.”).) Plaintiffs’ repeated, duplicative official 11 capacity claims are hereby stricken. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 12 C. Monell Claims 13 The original Complaint alleged that “[e]ach defendant in 14 his/her official capacity knowingly, or grossly negligently, or 15 with deliberate indifference . . . caused to come into being, 16 maintained, fostered, condoned, approved of, . . .
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1 O 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAIME AGUIRRE , ) Case No. CV 22-06676 DDP (MRWx) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) 13 v. ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION ) TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 KATHRYN BARGER, ET AL., ) ) [Dkt. 33] 15 Defendants. ) ___________________________ ) 16 17 Presently before the court is Defendants Kathryn Barger, 18 Janice Hahn, Holly Mitchell, and Hilda Solis’ Motion to Strike and 19 to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 33). Having 20 considered the submissions of the parties, the court grants the 21 motion and adopts the following Order.1 22 I. Background 23 Plaintiffs initially filed a Complaint alleging, on behalf of 24 a putative class, that while incarcerated in “the Los Angeles 25 1 The court, preferring to decide issues on the merits where 26 possible, has considered both of Plaintiffs’ oppositions and both of Defendants’ replies. (Dkts. 35, 36, 37, 39.) The court 27 reiterates that it expects counsel for all parties to work professionally, collaboratively, and in full accordance with the 28 letter and spirit of all applicable rules of procedure, including 1 County jail,” they “were forced to sleep on and inhabit the floors 2 and to exist in filthy and intolerable physical and mental 3 conditions.” (Complaint ¶¶ 12,13.) 4 Plaintiffs’ original Complaint named Defendants Kathryn 5 Barger, Janice Hahn, Holly Mitchell, and Hilda Solis (collectively, 6 “Defendants”) in both their official and individual capacities. 7 (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 16.) Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint 8 (Dkt. 19), and this Court granted the motion (Dkt. 26). The court 9 explained that Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims were barred 10 by legislative immunity, and dismissed those claims with prejudice. 11 (Dkt. 26 at 4.) The court further concluded that (1) Plaintiffs’ 12 Monell claims were conclusory and (2) Plaintiffs’ official capacity 13 claims were duplicative and redundant, and dismissed those claims 14 with leave to amend. (Id. at 4, 6-7.) The court explicitly stated 15 that leave to amend was limited to the scope of the court’s Order. 16 (Id. at 8.) 17 Plaintiffs then timely filed the FAC (Dkt. 29.) Defendants 18 now contend that the FAC violates this Court’s earlier Order and 19 should be stricken, or, in the alternative, repeats the pleading 20 deficiencies of the original Complaint and should be dismissed for 21 the same reasons. The court agrees. 22 II. Discussion 23 A. Newly-named Defendants 24 This Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims 25 with prejudice and, accordingly, struck Plaintiffs’ punitive 26 damages claim. (Dkt. 26 at 4 n.1) Although the FAC does not re- 27 allege individual and punitive damage claims against Defendants, it 28 does allege such claims as to two entirely new Defendants: former 1 Los Angeles County Sheriff Alejandro Villanueva and current Sheriff 2 Robert Luna.2 (FAC ¶¶ 3, 6). Plaintiffs never, however, sought 3 leave to amend the Complaint to add new defendants, and this 4 Court’s grant of leave to amend was limited to the scope of the 5 issues discussed in the Order. Plaintiffs’ Opposition appears to 6 suggest that Robert Luna and Lindsey Horvath were properly added as 7 Defendants because the FAC preserves the “right to amend to add 8 true names of fictitiously-named defendants.”3 (Opposition at 9 21.)4 Indeed, the FAC does identify “10 UNKNOWN NAMED DEFENDANTS, 10 whose true identities presently are unknown,” and alleges that 11 these unknown names “will be replaced by their true identities when 12 those true identities are learned.” (FAC ¶ 3.) The thrust of 13 Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is not clear to the court.5 As an 14 initial matter, Defendants Luna and Villanueva are named in the 15 same paragraph that also names the ten unknown defendants, and 16 therefore cannot be included among those ten. More importantly, 17 Plaintiffs’ original Complaint gave no indication that Plaintiffs 18 sought to name, but were unable to identify, the Los Angeles County 19 Sheriff, past or present. Indeed, although the original Complaint 20 did also name ten unknown Defendants, it stated that “Defendants 21 2 The caption of the FAC also now names Lindsey Horvath as a 22 Defendant, although Horvath is not identified or mentioned anywhere in the body of the FAC. The FAC also brings an official capacity 23 claim against Sheriff Luna. (FAC ¶ 6.) 24 3 See note 2, above. 25 4 Here, and hereinafter, “Opposition” refers to Plaintiff’s second opposition, at Dkt. 37. 26 5 The court also notes that Plaintiffs’ opposition does not 27 accurately quote the FAC. For example, extensive excerpts, ostensibly spanning seven different paragraphs of the FAC, are in 28 fact drawn from Plaintiffs’ original Complaint. (Opp. at 15-16). 1 all are County of Los Angeles supervisors,” and that “[t]he other 2 unknown named defendants are or will be County supervisors.” 3 (Compl. ¶¶ 4-5.) The court therefore rejects any contention that 4 Defendants Luna or Villanueva have been properly substituted in for 5 previously named unknown Defendants. 6 Moreover, Plaintiffs present no other argument as to how the 7 addition of new Defendants falls within the scope of this Court’s 8 leave to amend. Instead, Plaintiffs assert that “no authorization 9 was needed because . . . a plaintiff is the master of his 10 complaint.” (Opp. at 21:8-9.) Masters though they may be, 11 Plaintiffs are not free to simply disregard this Court’s Orders, 12 and courts regularly strike new claims that exceed the scope of 13 leave to amend. See, e.g., Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 14 116 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Bassam v. Bank of Am., 15 No. CV1500587MMMFFMX, 2015 WL 12697873, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 16 2015); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Accordingly, all claims 17 against newly-named Defendants are hereby stricken from the FAC.6 18 B. Official Capacity Claims 19 This Court’s earlier Order explained that official capacity 20 suits are another way of suing a governmental entity. (Dkt. 26 at 21 6-7.) The court therefore dismissed, with leave to amend, 22 Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against multiple County 23 supervisors as duplicative and redundant. (Id. at 7-8.) 24 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ FAC again alleges official capacity 25 claims against several County supervisors, in clear disregard of 26 this Court’s Order. Indeed, Plaintiffs repeat, verbatim, arguments 27 6 For the same reason, Plaintiffs’ new prayer for injunctive 28 relief is also stricken. 1 that this Court has explicitly rejected. For example, 2 notwithstanding this Court’s conclusion that “Plaintiffs’ desire to 3 get attention from particular elected officials is not sufficient 4 to justify the maintenance of duplicative and redundant claims,” 5 Plaintiffs’ opposition repeats the prior assertion that multiple 6 official capacity claims should be allowed to proceed because 7 “attention needs to be gotten from each of the [] supervisor 8 defendants.” (Opp. at 23:3-4.) (compare Dkt. 21 at 16:9-10 (“The 9 attention needs to be gotten from each of the [] supervisor 10 defendants.”).) Plaintiffs’ repeated, duplicative official 11 capacity claims are hereby stricken. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 12 C. Monell Claims 13 The original Complaint alleged that “[e]ach defendant in 14 his/her official capacity knowingly, or grossly negligently, or 15 with deliberate indifference . . . caused to come into being, 16 maintained, fostered, condoned, approved of, . . . ratified, took 17 no action to correct, an official policy, practice, procedure, or 18 custom of permitting the occurrence of the categories of wrongs set 19 forth in this pleading,. . . so that each one of them is legally 20 responsible for all of the injuries and/or damages sustained by any 21 plaintiff pursuant to the principles set forth in Monell v. New 22 York City Dept. of Social Services and its progeny.” (Compl. ¶ 23 11.) This Court dismissed the claims as conclusory, with leave to 24 amend. (Dkt. 26 at 6.) 25 The FAC’s Monell allegations, however, are virtually 26 indistinguishable from those in the original Complaint. Indeed, 27 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the instant motion, purporting to quote 28 portions of the FAC, in fact repeats the very same allegations of the original Complaint that this Court already found to be impermissibly conclusory.’ (Opp. at 15-16.) Because Plaintiffs’ amended Monell allegations do no more than repeat claims that have 4ll already been dismissed, the amended claims are stricken.® See Fed. 5] R. Civ. P. 12(f£). IIIT. Conclusion 7 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Strike is GRANTED. Having stricken all of the claims in the FAC, the court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend one final time. Once again, the 10} scope of the court’s leave to amend is limited to the issues addressed in this Court’s Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ original Complaint. Plaintiffs are cautioned that any further amendments 13] directly contrary to this Court’s Orders may result not only in 14] dismissal of all claims with prejudice, but in possible sanctions 15]/as well. Any Second Amended Complaint shall be filed within 16] fourteen days of the date of this Order. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: July 28, 2023 DEAN D. PREGERSON 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 | 25 See note 5, above. 26 To the extent Defendants contend that any reference to Sheriff’s Department policies are “new subject matter,” the court 27 does not necessarily agree. Plaintiffs’ original Complaint did include allegations, albeit conclusory ones, of Defendants’ 28 wrongful action (or inaction) “with respect to the police” and “supervision of the Sheriff’s Department.” (Compl. FI 11, 21.)