IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
JAHQUELL DAVIS,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D17-745
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed August 31, 2018
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County, John H. Adams, Sr., Judge.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Thomas J. Lukashow, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock Mcguigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
EDWARDS, J.
This case deals with the application of the Melton1 elements to Appellant’s claim
that his transport to and lengthy detention at the sheriff’s office constituted an “arrest” for
purposes of Florida’s speedy trial rule, which requires a person charged with a felony to
1 Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1954). be tried within 175 days of arrest. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(a), (d).2 Appellant, Jahquell
Davis, argues that he was “arrested” on May 29, 2014, when he and several others were
transported to the sheriff’s office. Over a period of several hours, each was questioned
in turn by a single detective as part of an investigation into a violent robbery that occurred
earlier that day at a metal recycling facility.
When it was Appellant’s turn to be interviewed he agreed to talk with the detective
and voluntarily submitted to DNA and gunshot residue testing at the station. Following a
pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s speedy trial-based motion
for discharge. Appellant was tried, found guilty of attempted first-degree murder with a
firearm, robbery with a firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon,
and sentenced to forty years in the Department of Corrections. We agree with the trial
court’s factual findings and its legal conclusion that an investigatory detention took place
on May 29, 2014, which did not constitute an arrest for speedy trial purposes. For the
reasons set forth in more detail below, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s
motion for discharge.
A trial court’s ruling on a speedy trial-based motion for discharge presents mixed
questions of fact and law. See State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001).
The trial court’s factual findings must be sustained if supported by competent, substantial
evidence, but its legal conclusions are subject to de novo review. Id.
2The Florida Supreme Court adopted rule 3.191 in 1971 to provide a procedural mechanism for ensuring that the constitutional right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is enforced in this state. State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1973).
2 BACKGROUND FACTS
On May 29, 2014, sheriff’s deputies responded to a robbery and shooting at OU
Metal Recycling. Video surveillance was used to identify the getaway vehicle involved in
the robbery; it was later found outside a house. Using a loudspeaker, deputies ordered
the occupants out of the house. When nobody responded to that command, the S.W.A.T.
team was deployed to the scene. The stand-off ended approximately ninety minutes later,
when Appellant, four other males, and two females exited the house. The males were
instructed to stand along the curb near the house while a show-up was conducted, during
which one victim recognized one of the men—not Appellant—as the driver of the getaway
vehicle.
Deputies believed that it would be impractical to interview the five males at the
house because it was in a high crime area, the S.W.A.T. team and news media
surrounded the area, and the detective handling the investigation had multiple people to
interview. Accordingly, the males were handcuffed, placed into individual squad cars,
transported to the sheriff’s department, and placed in separate rooms in a secured area
of the building, where their handcuffs were removed. After being read their Miranda3
rights, they were sequentially interviewed by the same detective. All the males were
eventually swabbed for gunshot residue and DNA.
The detective, who referred to Appellant’s status as “investigative detention,”
began his interview of Appellant by apologizing for the delay in getting to him. Appellant
testified at his evidentiary hearing that he agreed to speak to the detective and consented
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 to the gunshot residue and DNA testing because he wanted to help and also wanted to
clear his name. During this time, Appellant was not informed he was free to leave.
Indeed, outside the door of his interview room was a uniformed deputy who would not
have permitted him to leave. During the approximately four to six hours that Appellant
was at the sheriff’s department, he was never told he was under arrest, that he was
suspected of committing the robbery, or that he was charged with any crime.
The detective ended his interview of Appellant by advising him that he was not
under arrest and that he was free to leave. The detective offered Appellant transportation,
which Appellant declined. At the time Appellant was released, there was no information
connecting him to the robbery or shooting beyond his presence at the house where the
getaway vehicle was found.
Appellant was not formally arrested until June 17, 2015, after the investigation was
essentially completed and after two different witnesses identified Appellant as one of the
robbers. The information charging Appellant was filed on June 19, 2015. Appellant
moved for discharge, arguing that his prosecution was barred by Florida’s speedy trial
rule as far more than 175 days had passed since his May 29, 2014 detention.
Appellant preserved this speedy trial issue by making a pre-trial motion, seeking a
writ of prohibition, renewing his motion during trial, and pursuing this timely appeal
following his jury trial and conviction.
ANALYSIS
The only disputed legal issue is whether Appellant’s detention on May 29, 2014,
constituted an arrest for speedy trial purposes. If it was an arrest for speedy trial
purposes, then he was entitled to a permanent discharge as requested because of the
4 time that passed between detention and trial. However, as the trial court did below and
as we do now, employing the four Melton elements to analyze Appellant’s May 29, 2014
detention leads to the conclusion that the detention was not an arrest for speedy trial
purposes.
Before we begin our analysis of whether this was an “arrest,” it is important to
recognize and acknowledge that a person may be “in custody” for purposes of requiring
Miranda warnings, yet not have been “arrested” for purposes of the speedy trial rule.
Williams v. State, 757 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (citing Griffin v. State, 474
So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1985)). Likewise, police “seizure” of an individual may trigger Fourth
Amendment protection and yet not constitute an arrest for purposes of speedy trial. Id.
The rights listed in the Miranda warnings and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable search and seizure are triggered when a person is taken into custody or
seized, regardless of whether any criminal charges are contemplated or levied.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a speedy trial to limit the duration
of possible public scorn, adverse impact on employment, and other consequences
brought about by arrest or indictment that can only be cleared by a verdict of not guilty or
permanent dismissal of the charges. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222
(1967). “This guarantee [of a speedy trial] is an important safeguard to prevent undue
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying
public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an
accused to defend himself.” United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); see also
State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1973) (quoting Ewell with approval). Given that
the speedy trial rule is designed to protect against the adverse impacts of arrest or
5 indictment pursuant to criminal charges, it follows that the right to a speedy trial is
triggered only “(1) when the person is arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal
episode that gave rise to the crime charged or (2) when the person is served with a notice
to appear in lieu of physical arrest.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d).
Appellant, the State, the trial court, and this court all agree that the seminal case
on what constitutes an arrest under the speedy trial rule is Melton v. State. In that case,
the Florida Supreme Court defined an arrest as follows:
It is uniformly held that an arrest, in the technical and restricted sense of the criminal law, is “the apprehension or taking into custody of an alleged offender, in order that he [or she] may be brought into the proper court to answer for a crime.” When used in this sense, an arrest involves the following elements: (1) A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested by a person having present power to control the person arrested; (3) A communication by the arresting officer to the person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him.
Melton, 75 So. 2d at 294 (internal citations omitted).4 All four Melton elements must be
present to conclude that an arrest has occurred. Brown v. State, 623 So. 2d 800, 802
(Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
The first Melton element is “[a] purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real
or pretended authority.” 75 So. 2d at 294. Here, the detective testified that it was not his
purpose or intent to arrest Appellant on May 29, 2014, because Appellant was not
suspected of having committed any crime at that point. Thus, the trial court’s pretrial
factual finding that there was no purpose or intent to effect an arrest on May 29, 2014, is
4 Although Melton was decided in 1954, it remains the benchmark for defining “arrest” and has been repeatedly cited for that purpose, including as recently as 2012 by our court. See Ehmke v. State, 86 So. 3d 591, 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
6 supported by competent, substantial evidence. The trial court received additional
evidence as the case progressed which confirmed that there was initially no probable
cause to support a legal arrest, and that Appellant was not a suspect on May 29, 2014.
The DNA testing was inconclusive as to Appellant, and the deputy who performed the
gunshot residue testing could not recall the outcome of the test performed on Appellant.
The testimony at trial established that he only became a suspect much later, when a co-
defendant identified Appellant as the shooter in exchange for a plea. As another result
of their ongoing investigation, the police located somebody who was very familiar with
Appellant and testified that Appellant was one of the robbers in the surveillance video,
based on his physical traits, clothing, and other mannerisms. This additional evidence
was relevant to Appellant’s repeated renewal of his motion for discharge.
There are many similarities between the subject case and State v. Lail, in which
detectives went to Lail’s house and told him they received a complaint that he sexually
abused his stepdaughter. 687 So. 2d 873, 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Lail agreed to go
with them to further the investigation. Id. After reading Lail his Miranda rights, they placed
him in a police car and drove him to the station where he remained for seven hours. Id.
at 873-74. Initially, Lail was left alone in a holding cell for two hours while an officer went
to the hospital to interview the victim. Id. at 874. After Lail again confirmed his willingness
to talk and executed a Miranda-rights waiver form, a detective from the sex crimes unit
interviewed Lail for approximately an hour and a half. Id. When his interview was
completed, Lail stayed two more hours at the police station in order to voluntarily submit
to a physical body inspection during which he provided hair and blood samples. Id. The
detective testified that at that time the evidence was insufficient to establish probable
7 cause to justify an arrest. Id. Lail was released. Fifteen months later, Lail was arrested
on a warrant and formally charged with sexual battery. Id. The trial court ordered Lail
discharged, ruling that he had been arrested for speedy trial purposes when he was
detained initially for questioning. Id. The Second District reversed, finding that the
detention was an investigatory detention that did not trigger the running of the speedy trial
time period. Id. at 875.
We note that there are two factual distinctions between Lail and this case. First, it
is unclear from the opinion whether Lail was handcuffed, whereas here Appellant was
cuffed for several hours on the day of his initial interview.5 However, the fact that a
defendant was handcuffed does “not convert [a] detention for questioning into an arrest.”
Id. (quoting State v. Christian, 442 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)). Second, Lail
voluntarily accompanied the police to the station, whereas here Appellant was taken there
involuntarily, although he testified that he voluntarily remained there to “help” and to “clear
his name.” In Christian, the Second District rejected the trial court’s reasoning “that
involuntary custodial interrogation by the police at the station was equivalent to an arrest
which began the running of the speedy trial time.” 442 So. 2d at 989–90. Therefore,
those two factual differences do not change the applicability of Lail or the analysis of the
first Melton element—there was no evidence of an intent to arrest on May 29, 2014.
According to Brown, the May 29 detention cannot constitute an arrest because
one of the Melton elements was not present. 623 So. 2d at 802. Therefore, the trial
court’s decision that the speedy trial rule was not triggered can be affirmed based on the
5The trial court stated that Lail had been placed in a holding cell and handcuffed, while the court of appeal simply stated that there was no evidence that Lail was ever handcuffed. Lail, 687 So. 2d at 875.
8 absence of the first element alone. Nevertheless, for the purpose of completeness, we
will look at the presence or absence of the other three elements.
The second Melton element is “[a]n actual or constructive seizure or detention of
the person arrested by a person having present power to control the person arrested.”
Melton, 75 So. 2d at 294. It is undisputed that Appellant was actually seized and detained
by the sheriff’s deputies and the detective. Thus, the trial court’s finding that the second
Melton factor was satisfied is supported by competent, substantial evidence and is legally
correct.
The third Melton element is “[a] communication by the arresting officer to the
person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an
arrest.” Id. On May 29, 2014, Appellant was not formally arrested, in the sense that no
booking report was prepared, no booking photos were taken, and Appellant was not
fingerprinted. When initially denying Appellant’s motion for discharge, the trial court found
that there had been no actual communication from the detective to Appellant that he was
under arrest or that the detective intended to arrest him. In fact, Appellant was not told
on May 29, 2014, that he was under arrest. Following Appellant’s voluntary submission
to testing that day, the detective told Appellant that he was free to walk out of the sheriff’s
office, which is exactly what he did. Appellant’s unconditional release parallels Lail, where
that defendant was released following his lengthy detention. See Lail, 687 So. 2d at 874.
Thus, the trial court’s finding here that the third Melton element was absent is supported
by competent, substantial evidence and is legally correct as well.
The fourth and final Melton element is “[a]n understanding by the person whose
arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and
9 detain him.” Melton, 75 So. 2d at 294. Appellant argues that he had a reasonable belief
that he had been arrested because he was forced from the house, handcuffed,
involuntarily taken to the police station in a police car, and locked in the interview room
for several hours. Although nobody told him he was under arrest, nobody told him until
the end of the day that he was free to leave. These facts could support a finding that the
detective’s actions reasonably led Appellant initially to believe that he was under arrest,
but Appellant’s belief as to whether he was under arrest was not static. As part of its
reason for denying the motion for discharge, the trial court noted Appellant testified that
after being at the sheriff’s office for a period of time, he was cooperative in the interview
and voluntarily submitted to testing. The trial court stated that Appellant presented no
evidence that an arrest was contemplated, and further found the fact that Appellant was
released rather than arrested would have led to the understanding that the police did not
intend to arrest him then and there. Thus, the trial court’s determination that the fourth
Melton element was lacking is supported by competent, substantial evidence and is
legally correct.
Appellant relies heavily on this court’s opinion in Griggs v. State, 994 So. 2d 1198
(Fla. 5th DCA 2008), to argue that the deputies’ actions and what happened to him during
his four- to six-hour detention amounted to a de facto arrest that triggered the speedy trial
rule on May 29, 2014. First of all, Appellant’s reliance on Griggs is misplaced because of
significant factual differences between the two cases. In Griggs, the police performed a
traffic stop of Griggs because they already had information of his involvement in a drug
transaction. Id. at 1199. While at the scene of the traffic stop, a K-9 unit alerted to
methamphetamines in Griggs’s car and the drugs were removed from the vehicle by one
10 of the ten police officers present. Id. A police investigator then asked Griggs if he wanted
to “come down to my office and talk about it.” Id. Thus, unlike in the instant case, the
police in Griggs had every reason to suspect that Griggs had committed a crime before
they began their encounter and certainly as they took him in. While Griggs agreed to go
to the station where he was questioned, our court predicted that had Griggs refused the
invitation, “[h]e would instead have been taken directly to jail.” Id. at 1201. In fact, the
investigator told Griggs he would only let him go if he agreed to act as a drug informant
for the investigator. Id. at 1199. After agreeing to be an informant, Griggs was released.
Id. The investigator testified that if Griggs had not agreed at that time to act as an
informant, he would have been immediately booked and jailed. Id. That testimony
established an intent to effect an arrest which would not be carried out only if, first, Griggs
spoke with them and, second, he agreed to be an informant. In both cases the police
officers denied they ever used the word “arrest.” Id. Importantly, Griggs “testified that he
thought he was under arrest because he had been told by police officers on two occasions
that he occupied that unfortunate status.” Id. On the other hand, here, Appellant never
claimed that an officer told him he was under arrest.
In Griggs, our court analyzed the facts using the Melton elements and concluded
that all four elements were present, meaning that Griggs had been arrested for speedy
trial purposes and was entitled to discharge because he had not been charged or tried
until more than a year after the traffic stop and custodial questioning. Id. at 1201.
Somewhat confusingly, although this court acknowledged that the right to a speedy trial
was a Sixth Amendment right codified in a rule of criminal procedure, the opinion
discusses Florida’s stop and frisk law, which protects the Fourth Amendment rights to be
11 free from unreasonable search and seizure. However, Griggs did not raise any Fourth
Amendment issues. Continuing down that same path, the Griggs opinion then cites to
and quotes from several cases that each dealt with Fourth Amendment search and
seizure issues, but none of which dealt with speedy trial issues. Similarly here, Appellant
claimed no violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, Appellant erroneously relies
upon the discussion of Fourth Amendment law in Griggs to argue that the Melton
elements are trumped by involuntary, custodial questioning.
Notably, eight years before deciding Griggs, we decided Williams v. State, in which
we explicitly stated that it was possible to be seized for Fourth Amendment purposes
without being arrested for speedy trial purposes. 757 So. 2d 597, 599 (Fla. 5th DCA
2000). Twenty-seven years before Griggs, we decided State v. Naughton, in which we
noted that even an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested
would not constitute being “in custody” for speedy trial purposes. 395 So. 2d 581, 582–
83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Our opinion in Griggs makes no mention of the Williams or
Naughton cases, nor does it mention any of the many other cases that noted the
importance of distinguishing between an “arrest” for speedy trial purposes and a “seizure”
for Fourth Amendment situations or being placed in “custody” for Miranda rights
purposes.6 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a speedy trial. As the
6 See Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1985) (noting that a seizure may trigger Fourth Amendment protections without being a technical arrest, and that a person may be “in custody” for Miranda but not speedy trial purposes); Christian, 442 So. 2d at 989 (noting that “[a] person may be deemed ‘in custody’ for purposes of his Miranda rights, yet not ‘in custody’ for purposes of the speedy trial rule”); Dean v. Booth, 349 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (holding that although defendant taken to the police station for questioning was “in custody” for Miranda purposes, he was not “in custody” within the meaning of the speedy trial rule); Snead v. State, 346 So. 2d 546, 547–48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (finding that defendant taken to station for questioning and released
12 discussion of Fourth Amendment seizure has no bearing on being arrested for speedy
trial purposes, Appellant’s reliance on that portion of the Griggs opinion is unavailing.
We find that the trial court’s factual conclusions are supported by competent,
substantial evidence, and its legal conclusion—that Appellant was not arrested on May
29, 2014, for speedy trial purposes based on the Melton elements—is also correct.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Appellant’s motion for discharge.
We agree with the Fourth District’s conclusion in Brown, 623 So. 2d at 802, that
under the present state of the law all four Melton elements must be present for a custodial
detention to constitute an arrest. In our opinion, requiring the presence of all four
elements demands a level of clarity and certainty that is often lacking in these situations.
It places too much emphasis on the presence or absence of any single element.
Furthermore, two elements in the current test require the trial court to perform very
subjective analysis. For element one, the court must somehow determine whether the
officer subjectively intended to effect an arrest, and for element four, the court must divine
the defendant’s subjective understanding of whether the officer subjectively intended to
effect an arrest. We believe that all concerned would be better served when considering
speedy trial issues if a “totality of the circumstances” standard were employed, using more
objective factors. Under the proposed changes no one element would be determinative,
the need for analyzing predictable testimony regarding the subjective intent or
understanding of the police or defendant would be minimized, and a proper balance could
be struck between (1) giving the State leeway to investigate and build a case and (2)
without being charged was not in custody for speedy trial rule purposes, while declining to discuss whether in custody for Fourth Amendment purposes).
13 protecting the accused from unreasonably prolonged subjection to the potential personal,
social, and economic harm attendant to being arrested for or charged with a crime. We
recognize that under Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), we are not authorized
to make these changes; so, we certify the following question to be of great public
importance:
Should the determination of whether an arrest has occurred for speedy trial purposes be based on an objective consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to: (1) whether the person was detained with the intent to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2) whether there was an actual or constructive seizure or detention by someone with the present power to control the person detained; (3) whether there was a communication by the detaining officer to the person whose detention is sought of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an arrest; and (4) whether a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would have understood that he or she was under arrest?
AFFIRMED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.
SAWAYA, J., concurs. ORFINGER, J., concurring in result with opinion.
14 ORFINGER, J., concurring in result with opinion. CASE No. 5D17-745
Because I am bound by our supreme court’s decision in Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d
291 (Fla. 1954), I concur, albeit reluctantly, with the result reached by the majority.
However, I believe the four-part test established in Melton to determine when an arrest
occurs is overly formalistic and relies too heavily on the subjective intent of the law
enforcement officer who is questioning or detaining the individual.
The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to discharge based on the first Melton
element—“[a] purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority,”
75 So. 2d at 294—and concluded that the detective had no purpose or intent to arrest
Appellant. In affirming that decision, the majority places great weight on both the first
Melton element as well as the fourth Melton element—“[a]n understanding by the person
whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to
arrest and detain him,” id.—in concluding that the officer never communicated an intent
to arrest Appellant. Both of these conclusions depend on the subjective intent of the
police officer.
In my opinion, the subjective views of a police officer who detains an individual
should have little bearing on whether the detention constitutes an arrest. Rather, an arrest
should be determined using an objective standard—whether the individual’s freedom of
action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest, Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d
843, 850 (4th Cir. 2001), and how a reasonable person in the individual’s position would
have understood his or her position, Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 423 (Fla. 1988). The
objective standard assesses the coercive effect of the police conduct, as a whole, and
not the isolated details of the conduct. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrests § 5 (2018). In making this
15 assessment, the objective standard examines the totality of the circumstances, including
the particular police conduct and the setting in which the conduct occurs. Id. Such an
examination involves exploring, among others, the length of the detention; the restrictions
placed on the individual’s personal movement; the force, if any, that was exerted; the
information conveyed to the individual; and the severity of the intrusion. United States v.
Rasberry, 882 F.3d 241, 247 (1st Cir. 2018).
In this case, the detective described Appellant as being held in “investigative
detention.” One court defined “investigative detention” as
a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment but, unlike an arrest, it need not be supported by probable cause. . . . An officer can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause. Cortez [v. McCauley], 478 F.3d [1108,] 1115 [(10th Cir. 2007)] (quotations omitted). An investigative detention evolves into an arrest when the scope of police conduct is no longer reasonably related to the circumstances initially justifying the seizure. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1051 (10th Cir. 1994). “An arrest is distinguished by the involuntary, highly intrusive nature of the encounter.” Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115 (quotation omitted).
Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir. 2009). Here, Appellant was
handcuffed and detained for four to six hours. The duration of detention alone provides
strong evidence that Appellant was under arrest rather than merely subject to an
investigative detention. Id. (indicating that detention of 90 minutes or longer constitutes
arrest, rather than investigative detention).
Further, it is well-established that an officer may temporarily detain an individual
and investigate if the circumstances reasonably indicate that the detained individual has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2014);
16 see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968). However, the detention “shall not extend
beyond the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.” §
901.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2014). “Where . . . the detained individual is physically removed
from the scene and involuntarily transported to the police station for questioning and/or
investigation, the courts have had little difficulty in construing such a detention to be a de
facto arrest . . . .” Griggs v. State, 994 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (quoting
Saturnino–Boudet v. State, 682 So. 2d 188, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)). Here, Appellant
was handcuffed, placed in a squad car, and transported away from the scene and to the
sheriff’s office where he remained under guard and not free to leave for the next four to
six hours. This is further evidence that Appellant was under arrest rather than simply
subject to an investigative detention.7
The majority holds the Appellant was not under arrest. But if not under arrest, what
was his status? Is there something between a Terry stop and an arrest? I think not. To
effectuate a Terry stop, the detention must be temporary, based on reasonable suspicion,
and at the location of the stop. See § 901.151(3), Fla. Stat. (2014). To make an arrest,
law enforcement needs probable cause. Here, the detective admittedly had neither and
yet Appellant was detained for four to six hours. The majority never states what
Appellant’s status was while being detained. And if law enforcement needed more time
to investigate, could Appellant’s detention have been extended indefinitely?
To view the detention here as authorized creates a new level of citizen encounter
not countenanced by Terry, a case decided well after Melton. I believe that we would be
7While the cases that I rely on are either search and seizure or Miranda cases, I believe they are applicable to the analysis here because an objective test is easier to apply and less influenced by the subjective views of the investigating officer.
17 well served by adopting an objective, totality of the circumstances test to determine if an
arrest has taken place for speedy trial purposes. However, because Melton continues to
be controlling, I concur in the result reached by the majority.