Jahnke v. Jahnke

253 P. 752, 81 Cal. App. 387, 1927 Cal. App. LEXIS 919
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 17, 1927
DocketDocket No. 3176.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 253 P. 752 (Jahnke v. Jahnke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jahnke v. Jahnke, 253 P. 752, 81 Cal. App. 387, 1927 Cal. App. LEXIS 919 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927).

Opinion

PRESTON, J., pro tem.

This is an appeal by the intervener, Title Insurance & Trust Company, a corporation.

The facts are these: On March 15, 1915, one M. Lissner executed a lease to Adolph Jahnke for certain real property situate at 524 South Spring Street in the city of Los Angeles, known as £< Jahnke’s Tavern, ’' for a period of approximately seven years; said lease expiring on March 31, 1922. Immediately after the execution of the lease, the said lessee, Adolph Jahnke, proceeded to fit up, alter, and remodel the *389 leased premises (Jahnke’s Tavern) for the purpose of conducting a restaurant and cafe business therein, and installed therein certain property which forms the subject matter of this action.

On June 7, 1917, the said M. Lissner and the other owners of the building conveyed the “Lissner Building,” of which “Jahnke’s Tavern” was a part, to the said Title Insurance & Trust Company, the intervener and appellant in this action. Prior to the expiration of said lease the said Adolph Jahnke sold the said “ Jahnke’s Tavern” and assigned the lease and all rights thereunder to the defendant Carl Jahnke and one George Kohn, and on or about March 13, 1922, Kohn sold all his interest to the said Carl Jahnke. On March 13, 1922, and before the expiration of the lease, a chattel mortgage was executed by Carl Jahnke to the said Adolph Jahnke. Said chattel mortgage was given as security for fifteen (15) $1,000 promissory notes, and said mortgage included certain property in the said “Jahnke Tavern,” and included the property claimed by said intervener, Title Insurance & Trust Company.

The said Adolph Jahnke died testate in the city of Los Angeles on the eighteenth day of March, 1923, and thereafter his will was duly admitted to probate, and on the 25th of April, 1923, letters testamentary were issued to Magdelene Jahnke, the plaintiff in this action.

None of the notes or any interest thereon was paid, and on the 21st of June, 1923, the said Magdelene Jahnke, as executrix of the estate of Adolph Jahnke, brought this action to foreclose said chattel mortgage.

On the 16th of July, 1923, said Title Insurance & Trust Company intervened in said action and filed its complaint in intervention against the plaintiff herein, claiming to own certain property located in the said “Jahnke Tavern,” a portion of which is included within said chattel mortgage. A trial was had before the court sitting without a jury, and the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, and that the said chattel mortgage be foreclosed as to the following chattels enumerated therein, and located at 524 South Spring Street in the city of Los Angeles, in what is known as the “Jahnke Tavern,” to wit: Sixteen windows and window insets, two hardwood floors, one in basement and *390 one in grill-room, Viking ship, woodwork in grill-room, two plaster of paris boats, sixteen reflectors for windows, one galvanized iron range hood, all looking-glasses.

From this portion of the judgment the intervener appeals. Title Insurance & Trust Company was declared to be the owner of certain other personal property described in the mortgage.

The said defendant Carl Jahnke, remained in possession of the premises known as “Jahnke Tavern” as a month to month tenant, until on or about the 28th of June, 1923, and about said time he was halted in his attempt to remove said property heretofore mentioned by an injunction from the intervener.

The appellant, Title Insurance & Trust Company, urges a number of grounds for a reversal of that part of the judgment appealed from.

The principal contention of appellant is that the above-enumerated articles must be classed as either “fixtures” or “trade fixtures.”

It seems to us, however, that we must first determine whether the articles of property involved are fixtures or more personal property, for unless said articles are affixed to the realty, the question of fixtures, or trade fixtures, becomes immaterial.

Section 658 of the Civil Code provides: “Real or immovable property consists of: 1. Land; 2. That which is affixed to land; 3. That which is incidental or appurtenant to land; 4. That which is immovable by law.”

Section 663 of the same code provides: “Every kind of property that is not real is personal.”

Therefore, the articles in question in this case were personalty unless they were affixed to the land, for it is only in that sense that they can be brought within the above classification of real property.

Section 660 of the Civil Code also provides: “A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when it is attached to it by roots, as in the case of trees, vines or shrubs; or imbedded in it, as in the case of walls; or permanently resting upon it, as in the case of buildings; or permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as by means' of cement, plaster, nails, bolts, or screws.”

*391 It has been held that this section is simply a rule for general guidance, concerning itself more with ultimate than probative facts. (Gosliner v. Briones, 187 Cal. 557 [204 Pac. 19].)

Whether the articles involved in this case were so affixed to the building as to become a part thereof and thereby become realty was a question of fact to be determined by the trial court upon the evidence presented. (Gosliner v. Briones, supra; Pennybecker v. McDougal, 48 Cal. 160; Miller v. Waddingham, 91 Cal. 377 [13 L. R. A. 680, 27 Pac. 750].)

As a general rule, the intent of the parties is a controlling criterion in ascertaining whether property is permanently attached to the land or retains its identity as personalty; the character of the annexation to the land or other realty and the use made of the property are important considerations, but in most cases are subsidiarily employed for the purpose of testing the intention of the parties. (Hendy v. Dinkerhoff, 57 Cal. 3 [40 Am. Rep. 107]; Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245 [13 Am. St. Rep. 147, 22 Pac. 184]; Jordan v. Myres, 126 Cal. 565 [58 Pac. 1061]; Western etc. Tel. Co. v. Modesto Irr. Co., 149 Cal. 662 [9 Ann. Cas. 1190, 87 Pac. 190]; Dutton v. Ensley, 21 Ind. App. 46 [69 Am. St. Rep. 340, 51 N. E. 380]; Gosliner v. Briones, supra.)

In the case at bar the trial court found by implication at least that the articles of property here involved were not affixed to the building so as to become a part thereof, and thereby constitute a part of the realty, and the findings of the court in this regard seem amply supported by the evidence.

Arthur S. Heineman, a witness called by the intervener, testified in substance, as follows: “That he drew the plans and specifications for the fixtures in controversy; that he received all of his instructions concerning the drawing of the blue-prints and work from Mr. A.

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Bluebook (online)
253 P. 752, 81 Cal. App. 387, 1927 Cal. App. LEXIS 919, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jahnke-v-jahnke-calctapp-1927.