Jaffer v. Goldstein

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Jaffer v. Goldstein

25 A.D.3d 656, 807 N.Y.S.2d 316

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 24, 2006

StatusPublished

This text of 25 A.D.3d 656 (Jaffer v. Goldstein) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jaffer v. Goldstein, 25 A.D.3d 656, 807 N.Y.S.2d 316 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).

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Opinion

In action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corp. appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), entered October 27, 2004, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs

The defendant Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corp. (hereinafter Chase) made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). However, the evidence submitted in [657]*657opposition to Chase’s cross motion raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff sustained a serious injury (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., supra). Cozier, J.P., Luciano, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.

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In action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corp. appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), entered October 27, 2004, as denied its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs

The defendant Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corp. (hereinafter Chase) made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). However, the evidence submitted in [657]*657opposition to Chase’s cross motion raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff sustained a serious injury (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., supra). Cozier, J.P., Luciano, Fisher and Covello, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

25 A.D.3d 656, 807 N.Y.S.2d 316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jaffer-v-goldstein-nyappdiv-2006.

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