Jacquelyne Zuercher v. Janina Hoskins

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 9, 2024
• Docket: 22-15550
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 9 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JACQUELYNE ZUERCHER, No. 22-15550

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:21-cv-05142-YGR

v. MEMORANDUM* JANINA M. HOSKINS; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 5, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH, HURWITZ, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Jacquelyne Zuercher appeals the dismissal of her complaint against two

bankruptcy trustees, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the U.S. Marshals

Service (“USMS”), and various federal agents. The complaint alleged that Zuercher

received a Mercedez-Benz McLaren from her mother, Monica Hujazi, on her

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). sixteenth birthday as a gift, and that the defendants wrongfully seized the automobile

in connection with Hujazi’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

1. Zuercher’s claims against bankruptcy trustees Janina Hoskins and Lynn

Schoenmann are foreclosed by the Barton doctrine, under which “a party must first

obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before it initiates an action in another forum

against a bankruptcy trustee or other officer appointed by the bankruptcy court for

acts done in the officer’s official capacity.” In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d

963, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2005); see Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881).

Zuercher’s allegations against Hoskins and Schoenmann arise from official-

capacity acts “that affect the administration of” bankruptcy estates. In re Crown

Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d at 971. The bankruptcy court approved an agreement

between Hoskins and Hujazi requiring litigation about the McLaren to be conducted

in that court. Schoenmann later received permission from the bankruptcy court to

treat the McLaren as abandoned; her only other involvement with the car was turning

it over to federal authorities, who had a warrant to seize it. Zuercher was therefore

required to seek leave from the bankruptcy court before bringing her claim against

Hoskins and Schoenmann in the district court. See In re Yellowstone Mountain Club,

LLC, 841 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A district court is considered to be

‘another forum,’ requiring leave of the bankruptcy court before a lawsuit can be

2 brought.”).

Zuercher’s claim that the Barton doctrine does not apply because the McLaren

was not a bankruptcy asset and she was not a party in Hujazi’s bankruptcy

proceedings is not persuasive. And, even if Zuercher actually owned the McLaren,

the Barton doctrine would apply. See, e.g., In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d at

969, 977 (applying the Barton doctrine to claims brought by a third-party law firm

against a trustee).1

2. The district court did not err in dismissing the claims against Stephen

Jobe, the FBI Legal Forfeiture Unit Chief, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Zuercher

argues that Jobe had the required minimum contacts with California because he sent

Zuercher letters refusing to release the McLaren to her after it was seized pursuant

to a warrant. But this alone does not show “purposeful availment” of California law,

see Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199,

1206, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2006), and Zuercher does not allege that Jobe played any

role in securing the warrant, seizing the McLaren, or supervising the federal agents

who did.

1 Zuercher’s claim that Hoskins illegally notified the U.S. Trustee’s Office that the McLaren was an unreported bankruptcy asset is similarly unavailing. Hoskins simply complied with her statutory duty to report suspected bankruptcy fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a).

3 3. The district court also did not err in dismissing the claims against the

remaining federal defendants for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) requires that a tort claim against the United

States or a federal employee acting within the scope of employment must previously

have been “presented [] to the appropriate Federal agency” and “finally denied by

the agency in writing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Section 2675(a), which is

jurisdictional, requires a claim to contain “(1) a written statement sufficiently

describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a

sum certain damages claim.” Warren v. U.S. Dep't of Interior Bureau of Land

Mgmt., 724 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1984). Zuercher failed to show that her petitions

to the FBI satisfied these requirements.

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend

the complaint. Leave to amend may be denied if “the proposed amendment is futile

or would be subject to dismissal.” Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046,

1059 (9th Cir. 2018). Zuercher does not explain how amendment would cure the

numerous jurisdictional defects in her complaint—failure to seek leave from the

bankruptcy court, failure to comply with the FTCA, and failure to establish personal

jurisdiction over Jobe.2

2 Zuercher argues that she alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against the federal defendants. We do not address that argument because the district court did not dismiss for failure to state a claim. Zuercher fails to challenge the district court’s

4 AFFIRMED.

findings that (1) Zuercher’s tort claims against the federal defendants are barred by sovereign immunity, and (2) her claims against the USMS and FBI agents who seized the McLaren are barred by quasi-judicial immunity. She has thus waived those issues. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994).