Jacquelyn Miller v. Dylan Farris

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 23-55717
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 16 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JACQUELYN MILLER, No. 23-55717

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-09551-SSS-AS v.

DYLAN FARRIS, TUSD Chief Personnel MEMORANDUM* Officer of Human Resources; KEITH BUTLER, TUSD Chief Business Officer of the Business Office; JEREMY GERSON, Vice President of the TUSD Board of Education; JAMES HAN, President of the Board; BETTY LIEU, Member of the Board; ANIL MUHAMMED, Member of the Board; JAMES PARK, Clerk of the Board; TIMOTHY STOWE, Superintendent of TUSD,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

UNKNOWN; TORRANCE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendants.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sunshine Suzanne Sykes, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 16, 2025 **

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Jacquelyn Miller appeals the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal

of her Fourth Amended Complaint alleging civil rights and state law claims.

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the defendants’ implementation of the 2021

California Department of Public Health order requiring that schools verify the

COVID-19 vaccination status of all school workers. We have jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the dismissal de novo and denial of leave to

amend for an abuse of discretion. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

656 F.3d 1034, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

Contrary to plaintiff’s belief, both the district judge and magistrate judge

preside in the same court, the United States District Court for the Central District

of California. Neither the assignment to the magistrate judge nor reassignment to

the district judge was improper.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2 Plaintiff argues that she did not consent to proceed before the magistrate

judge. However, the magistrate judge’s authority to rule on nondispositive pretrial

matters and make recommendations “is not contingent on litigant consent.”

Anderson v. Woodcreek Venture Ltd., 351 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 2003). The

district judge complied with the statute by dismissing the action after conducting a

de novo review of the report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff argues that the judges were biased. But she has not identified any

extrajudicial source of bias. Bias does not exist merely because a judge rules

against a party. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999).

The district court properly applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint. The district court considered the facts

alleged in the complaint and attached documents to be true when it dismissed the

Fourth Amended Complaint. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th

Cir. 2003) (the court may consider documents attached to the complaint and

assume that the contents of documents are true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6)).

Plaintiff argues that she stated a procedural due process claim by alleging

that the defendants did not respond to her concerns about the state policy or

provide notice of the consequences of not complying with that policy. However,

even if plaintiff identified a protected interest, plaintiff’s own allegations and the

3 documents attached to the Fourth Amended Complaint establish that the

defendants responded to plaintiff’s objections and repeatedly advised plaintiff

about the requirements of the policy and the consequences of failing to comply

with that policy. The district court was not required to accept as true conclusory

allegations that were “contradicted by documents” that plaintiff attached to the

complaint. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.

2003).

Plaintiff’s equal protection claim failed because she did not identify any

other individuals who were similarly-situated in all material respects.

SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Tippins, 31 F.4th 1110, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2022) (setting

forth the elements of the claim). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the

defendants violated her rights do not state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (conclusory allegations listing the elements of a claim do not state

a plausible claim).

In any event, plaintiff could not establish that the school district’s COVID-

19 policy was not rationally related to the school district’s stated legitimate public

interest of protecting the health and safety of its employees and students. See

Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho, 148 F.4th 1020, 1031-33 (9th

Cir. 2025) (en banc).

4 Plaintiff waived her remaining claims in her opening brief. See Martinez-

Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that issues not

discussed in the body of the opening brief have been waived).

The district court acted within its discretion by dismissing the Fourth

Amended Complaint with prejudice. Despite being allowed multiple opportunities

to amend, plaintiff failed to allege facts to state plausible claims. The district court

had “particularly broad” discretion to deny leave to amend in light of the previous

multiple attempts to amend to state a claim. Chodos v. W. Publ'g Co., 292 F.3d

992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.