2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT TACOMA 7 JACQUELINE BUCKHOLZ, Case No. 3:25-cv-05170-TLF 8 Plaintiff, v. ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ JOINT 9 MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT KELSO HOUSING AUTHORITY, 10 Defendant. 11
12 The matter before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion to Amend Judgment. Dkt. 13 47. The parties cite the Court “declin[ing] to sign and enter the Consent Decree 14 negotiated by the parties.” Dkt. 47 at 1 (citing Dkts. 45-46). The parties now “request 15 that the court amend its judgment by entering the consent decree . . .” Dkt. 47 at 1-2 16 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). 17 The parties consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge (Dkt. 8) and the 18 parties presented argument on this joint motion on June 26, 2026. Dkt. 49. 19 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion IN PART. The Court 20 declines to enter the consent decree as currently proposed (Dkt. 44-1 at 1-4). However, 21 the Court rescinds its dismissal (Dkts. 45-46) to permit the parties to address the 22 Court’s concerns as discussed at the hearing and the Order below, and present a new 23 proposed Consent Decree. 24 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 In February 2025, plaintiff Jacqueline Buckholz filed a complaint against 3 defendant Kelso Housing Authority (“KHA”). Dkt. 1. Ms. Buckholz alleged KHA 4 improperly “terminated [her] voucher for allegedly failing to comply with a request to
5 inspect the unit for Housing Quality Standards.” Dkt. 1 at 1. Following the termination, 6 Ms. Buckholz’s attorney sent a letter to KHA which, in pertinent part, requested an 7 accommodation “‘by granting an informal hearing to get [her] voucher back, or in the 8 alternative, extending her tenancy until she is able to secure new housing . . .’” Dkt. 1 at 9 5. 10 The complaint presented two primary claims. First, she asserted a housing 11 discrimination claim, alleging KHA unlawfully failed to accommodate her disability under 12 the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), the federal Fair Housing Act 13 (“FHA”), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Dkt. 1 at 6. Second, she 14 asserted a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging KHA’s
15 informal hearing process was inadequate. Dkt. 1 at 7. She requested both injunctive 16 and monetary relief. Dkt. 1 at 8. 17 In April 2026, the parties reached a settlement, in which the parties jointly 18 proposed a Consent Decree, with the following relevant provisions. Dkt. 44-1 at 1-4. 19 The proposed Decree enjoined KHA from ignoring a reasonable accommodation 20 request, refusing to grant a reasonable accommodation on the basis it previously 21 accommodated that person, and from refusing to grant an accommodation that would 22 require a waiver or modification of KHA policy. Dkt. 44-1 at 2. The terms of the 23 proposed Decree “shall be enforceable by any applicant, recipient, or tenant of the
24 1 Housing Authority” who are “intended third party beneficiar[ies] of this Decree.” Dkt. 44- 2 1 at 2-3. A party seeking to enforce the proposed Decree could do so through a motion 3 for contempt. Dkt. 44-1 at 3. The proposed Decree would last for at least five years, 4 unless modified or terminated by the Court for good cause shown. Dkt. 44-1 at 4.
5 The Court declined to enter the proposed Consent Decree when dismissing the 6 case and entering judgment. Dkts. 45-46. The parties now jointly move to amend the 7 Court’s judgment. Dkt. 47. 8 II. DISCUSSION 9 “A consent decree is ‘essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued 10 judicial policing.’” United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting 11 Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983)); see also Brown v. Neeb, 664 12 F.2d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting consent decrees are a “hybrid” between contracts 13 and injunctions). And, unlike a stipulated motion to dismiss, a consent decree is a final 14 judgment on the merits. Lily & Co. v. Alderwood Surgical Ctr. LLC, No. 2:24-cv-00878-
15 LK, 2026 WL 1584704, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 3, 2026). 16 Before approving a consent decree, the Court must ensure it “is fair, reasonable 17 and equitable” under various non-exclusive factors,1 “and does not violate the law or 18 public policy.” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th 19 Cir. 1990); see also Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Employees’ Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 20 U.S. 642, 651 (1961) (“The parties cannot, by giving each other consideration, purchase 21
22 1 “[T]he district court must balance several factors, including but not limited to: strength of the plaintiffs’ case; risk, expense, complexity and possible duration of continued litigation; relief offered in settlement; 23 extent of discovery already completed; stage of proceedings; experience and views of counsel; governmental participation; and reaction of the class members.” Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 24 890 F.2d 1438, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989). 1 from a court of equity a continuing injunction.”). A consent decree is presumptively 2 reasonable when a government agency negotiated and submitted the proposal. See 3 S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984). 4 Here, and as discussed at the hearing, the Court’s greatest concern is the
5 proposed Decree’s expansion of the scope of the claims raised in the complaint. 6 Allegations in the complaint focused on acts and omissions of the defendant relating to 7 plaintiff’s own situation (Dkt. 1), but the proposed Decree expressly encompasses “any 8 applicant, recipient, or tenant of the Housing Authority” Dkt. 44-1 at 2-3. 9 Intended third-party beneficiaries may enforce consent decrees. U.S. v. FMC 10 Corp., 531 F.3d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 2008). The scope of the decree must still “spring from 11 and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction” and “‘com[e] 12 within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings’ . . . and must further the 13 objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.” Local No. 93, Intern. Ass’n 14 of Firefighters, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (quoting Pacific R.R.. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S.
15 289, 297 (1880)). 16 Consent decrees must be “limited to reasonable and necessary implementations 17 of federal law,” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 443, 450 (2009) (citation and quotation marks 18 omitted), and, like any equitable relief, be “no more burdensome . . . than necessary.” 19 Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citation and 20 quotation marks omitted); see also Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332, 21 341 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Every hour consumed administering a consent decree is an hour 22 taken from other litigants, who must wait in a longer queue.”). “In other words, proper 23 decrees follow the ‘settled rule that in federal equity cases the nature of the violation
24 1 determines the scope of the remedy.’” Lilly & Co., 2026 WL 1584704, at *5 (quoting 2 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976)).
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2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT TACOMA 7 JACQUELINE BUCKHOLZ, Case No. 3:25-cv-05170-TLF 8 Plaintiff, v. ORDER ON THE PARTIES’ JOINT 9 MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT KELSO HOUSING AUTHORITY, 10 Defendant. 11
12 The matter before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion to Amend Judgment. Dkt. 13 47. The parties cite the Court “declin[ing] to sign and enter the Consent Decree 14 negotiated by the parties.” Dkt. 47 at 1 (citing Dkts. 45-46). The parties now “request 15 that the court amend its judgment by entering the consent decree . . .” Dkt. 47 at 1-2 16 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). 17 The parties consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge (Dkt. 8) and the 18 parties presented argument on this joint motion on June 26, 2026. Dkt. 49. 19 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motion IN PART. The Court 20 declines to enter the consent decree as currently proposed (Dkt. 44-1 at 1-4). However, 21 the Court rescinds its dismissal (Dkts. 45-46) to permit the parties to address the 22 Court’s concerns as discussed at the hearing and the Order below, and present a new 23 proposed Consent Decree. 24 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 In February 2025, plaintiff Jacqueline Buckholz filed a complaint against 3 defendant Kelso Housing Authority (“KHA”). Dkt. 1. Ms. Buckholz alleged KHA 4 improperly “terminated [her] voucher for allegedly failing to comply with a request to
5 inspect the unit for Housing Quality Standards.” Dkt. 1 at 1. Following the termination, 6 Ms. Buckholz’s attorney sent a letter to KHA which, in pertinent part, requested an 7 accommodation “‘by granting an informal hearing to get [her] voucher back, or in the 8 alternative, extending her tenancy until she is able to secure new housing . . .’” Dkt. 1 at 9 5. 10 The complaint presented two primary claims. First, she asserted a housing 11 discrimination claim, alleging KHA unlawfully failed to accommodate her disability under 12 the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), the federal Fair Housing Act 13 (“FHA”), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Dkt. 1 at 6. Second, she 14 asserted a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging KHA’s
15 informal hearing process was inadequate. Dkt. 1 at 7. She requested both injunctive 16 and monetary relief. Dkt. 1 at 8. 17 In April 2026, the parties reached a settlement, in which the parties jointly 18 proposed a Consent Decree, with the following relevant provisions. Dkt. 44-1 at 1-4. 19 The proposed Decree enjoined KHA from ignoring a reasonable accommodation 20 request, refusing to grant a reasonable accommodation on the basis it previously 21 accommodated that person, and from refusing to grant an accommodation that would 22 require a waiver or modification of KHA policy. Dkt. 44-1 at 2. The terms of the 23 proposed Decree “shall be enforceable by any applicant, recipient, or tenant of the
24 1 Housing Authority” who are “intended third party beneficiar[ies] of this Decree.” Dkt. 44- 2 1 at 2-3. A party seeking to enforce the proposed Decree could do so through a motion 3 for contempt. Dkt. 44-1 at 3. The proposed Decree would last for at least five years, 4 unless modified or terminated by the Court for good cause shown. Dkt. 44-1 at 4.
5 The Court declined to enter the proposed Consent Decree when dismissing the 6 case and entering judgment. Dkts. 45-46. The parties now jointly move to amend the 7 Court’s judgment. Dkt. 47. 8 II. DISCUSSION 9 “A consent decree is ‘essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued 10 judicial policing.’” United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting 11 Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983)); see also Brown v. Neeb, 664 12 F.2d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting consent decrees are a “hybrid” between contracts 13 and injunctions). And, unlike a stipulated motion to dismiss, a consent decree is a final 14 judgment on the merits. Lily & Co. v. Alderwood Surgical Ctr. LLC, No. 2:24-cv-00878-
15 LK, 2026 WL 1584704, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 3, 2026). 16 Before approving a consent decree, the Court must ensure it “is fair, reasonable 17 and equitable” under various non-exclusive factors,1 “and does not violate the law or 18 public policy.” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th 19 Cir. 1990); see also Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Employees’ Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 20 U.S. 642, 651 (1961) (“The parties cannot, by giving each other consideration, purchase 21
22 1 “[T]he district court must balance several factors, including but not limited to: strength of the plaintiffs’ case; risk, expense, complexity and possible duration of continued litigation; relief offered in settlement; 23 extent of discovery already completed; stage of proceedings; experience and views of counsel; governmental participation; and reaction of the class members.” Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 24 890 F.2d 1438, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989). 1 from a court of equity a continuing injunction.”). A consent decree is presumptively 2 reasonable when a government agency negotiated and submitted the proposal. See 3 S.E.C. v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984). 4 Here, and as discussed at the hearing, the Court’s greatest concern is the
5 proposed Decree’s expansion of the scope of the claims raised in the complaint. 6 Allegations in the complaint focused on acts and omissions of the defendant relating to 7 plaintiff’s own situation (Dkt. 1), but the proposed Decree expressly encompasses “any 8 applicant, recipient, or tenant of the Housing Authority” Dkt. 44-1 at 2-3. 9 Intended third-party beneficiaries may enforce consent decrees. U.S. v. FMC 10 Corp., 531 F.3d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 2008). The scope of the decree must still “spring from 11 and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction” and “‘com[e] 12 within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings’ . . . and must further the 13 objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.” Local No. 93, Intern. Ass’n 14 of Firefighters, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (quoting Pacific R.R.. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S.
15 289, 297 (1880)). 16 Consent decrees must be “limited to reasonable and necessary implementations 17 of federal law,” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 443, 450 (2009) (citation and quotation marks 18 omitted), and, like any equitable relief, be “no more burdensome . . . than necessary.” 19 Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citation and 20 quotation marks omitted); see also Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332, 21 341 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Every hour consumed administering a consent decree is an hour 22 taken from other litigants, who must wait in a longer queue.”). “In other words, proper 23 decrees follow the ‘settled rule that in federal equity cases the nature of the violation
24 1 determines the scope of the remedy.’” Lilly & Co., 2026 WL 1584704, at *5 (quoting 2 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976)). 3 To illustrate, this Court recently declined to enter a proposed consent decree that 4 was “overbroad relative to [the plaintiff’s] claims.” Id. at *6. The plaintiff’s original
5 complaint alleged “Defendants improperly used its Mounjaro and Zepbound trademarks 6 to promote the sale of compounded tirzepatide to patients” in violation of the Lanham 7 act and Washington’s Consumer Protection Act. Id. at *1. This Court found the 8 proposed decree was “overbroad” as it covered, for example, “‘any activity that is likely 9 to . . . otherwise infringe any rights of [plaintiff’s] Marks or any similar mark.” Id. at *6 10 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). This included defendants “suggesting they are 11 associated or connected in any way with [plaintiff] or its products” or “[e]ngaging in any 12 unfair competition” with plaintiff. Id. (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Stated 13 otherwise, plaintiff’s “complaint provided an inch, the proposed decree takes a mile.” Id. 14 Here, the parties have not sufficiently explained why a broadened consent
15 decree is necessary, as opposed to a stipulated dismissal, to resolve the claims and 16 alleged violations asserted in plaintiff’s complaint. See, id. at *2, *7, *9 (quoting Evans v. 17 City of Chicago, 10 F.3d 474, 477 (7th Cir. 1993)) (“because a consent decree ‘is no 18 ordinary contract,’ requiring ‘continuing supervision by the district court,’ ‘[j]udges need 19 a good reason, one in addition to the parties’ say so, before diverting attention from 20 other business in this fashion.’”). 21 III. CONCLUSION 22 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS the joint motion to amend judgment 23 IN PART. Dkt. 47. As discussed at the hearing on June 26, 2026, the Court rescinds its
24 1 prior dismissal (Dkts. 45-46) to permit the parties to meet and confer, and present a 2 revised and more narrowly drawn proposed Consent Decree. Dkt. 44-1 at 9. 3 The parties shall file a proposed consent decree, or in the alternative a joint 4 status report, on or before July 29, 2026.
5 6 Dated this 29th day of June, 2026. 7 8 A 9 Theresa L. Fricke 10 United States Magistrate Judge
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