Jacobson-Gentry v. County of Santa Clara

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: 5:23-cv-04096
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 JULIE JACOBSON-GENTRY, Case No. 23-cv-04096-NC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 12 v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 13 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 14 Defendant. JUDGMENT; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR 15 JUDICIAL NOTICE 16 Re: ECF 99, 106, 110

17 18 In this civil case, Plaintiff Julie Jacobsen-Gentry alleges that she could not wear a 19 mask because of a medical condition, and that her former employer, Defendant County of 20 Santa Clara, failed to accommodate her and engage in the interactive process when the 21 County required a return to in-person work amid the Covid-19 pandemic. 22 Before the Court is (1) the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues, 23 and (2) Gentry’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that she had a FEHA-qualifying 24 medical condition. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the County’s Motion for 25 Summary Judgment and DENIES Gentry’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The 26 Court also DENIES the County’s Request for Judicial Notice. 27 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 Gentry was an employee at Santa Clara County in the County Assessor’s Office. 4 TAC ¶ 5. 5 On June 26, 2020, Gentry sought accommodations from the County’s Covid-19 6 masking policy for times when she was required to come into the office. ECF 108 7 (Brandwajn Decl.), Ex. E; Brandwajn Decl., Ex. A (Gentry Tr.) 92:12–93:1. Gentry’s 8 request included a note from her primary care doctor which stated that Gentry “has a 9 medical condition that makes it hard for her to wear a mask at work.” Brandwajn Decl., 10 Ex. F; Brandwajn Decl., Ex. G (Akhtar Tr.) 65:8–66:21. On July 22, 2020, the County 11 held an interactive meeting with Gentry. Brandwajn Decl., Ex. J; Gentry Tr. 115:23– 12 116:19. The County then accommodated Gentry by allowing her to work from home the 13 majority of the time. Brandwajn Decl., Ex. J. It further stated that when she was required 14 to come into the office, the County would space out the limited employees in the office, 15 and Gentry could “hold up a folder/face shield” when walking through public areas. 16 Brandwajn Decl., Ex. J. 17 On November 9, 2020, Gentry’s supervisor wrote to Gentry that “[d]ue to a revised 18 face mask policy,” the County was requesting “a note from your physician regarding your 19 ability to wearing a mask.” Brandwajn Decl., Ex. L at 2. Gentry then submitted a redacted 20 note from Dr. Gary Ross that stated that “[i]t is medically necessary in her case that she not 21 wear a mask due [to] . . . issues listed above.” Brandwajn Decl., Ex. P. After a follow-up 22 interactive meeting on January 29, 2021, the County again accommodated Gentry by 23 allowing her to work from home the majority of the time. Brandwajn Decl., Ex. S. It 24 further stated that it would space out the limited employees in the office, allow Gentry to 25 take personal leave when she was required to work in the office, and arrange for another 26 appraiser to present her hearings for when the mask requirement was in place. Id. 27 In line with the County’s requirement, on June 25, 2021, Gentry submitted a third 1 redacted June 25, 2021, “update letter” from Dr. Ross that stated, “It continues to be 2 medically necessary in her case that she not wear a mask.” Brandwajn Decl., Ex. W; 3 Gentry Tr. 142:8–18. The County asked Dr. Ross for more information and he responded. 4 Brandwajn Decl., Ex. Y, Ex. Z. On August 6, 2021, the County held another interactive 5 meeting with Gentry. Brandwajn Decl., Ex. AA at 5; Gentry Tr. 194:6–22; Brandwajn 6 Decl., Ex. BB (Zertuche Tr.) 50:13–51:25. The County then determined it could no longer 7 accommodate Gentry by allowing her to work remotely. Ex. AA at 5–6. It instead advised 8 that she could exhaust her leave banks and/or apply for State Disability Insurance. Id. 9 Gentry then took paid leave until October 2021 and unpaid leave thereafter. Gentry 10 Tr. 244:5–11. During this time, Gentry requested, and the County explored, reasonable 11 accommodations on religious grounds. Brandwajn Decl., Ex. CC, Ex. DD; see e.g., Gentry 12 Tr. 270:21–272:23. 13 Throughout and after this entire process, Gentry made plans to leave California, 14 including readying her house for sale and selling it, being in contract for a house in 15 Nevada, arranging for her daughter to go to school in Nevada, and applying for an in- 16 person job in Nevada. Gentry Tr. 23:21–24:1, 31:15–17, 37:3–7, 42:11–44:19, 46:8–47:6, 17 72:8–73:4, 455:5–456:5; Brandwajn Decl., Ex. HH. 18 On September 15, 2022, Gentry accepted a job position in Nevada. Gentry Tr. 19 283:3–284:24. One month later, on October 15, 2022, she resigned from the County 20 claiming her resignation was forced. Brandwajn Decl., Ex. LL at 4, Ex. MM; Gentry Tr. 21 403:15–17. On February 22, 2023, after the County rescinded its Covid-19 masking 22 requirements, the County unconditionally offered to reinstate Plaintiff. Gentry Tr. 302:24– 23 303:19; Brandwajn Decl., Ex. NN. 24 B. Procedural Background 25 Gentry filed her original complaint on August 11, 2023, a first amended complaint 26 on October 17, 2023, and a second amended complaint on January 24, 2024. ECF 1; ECF 27 13; ECF 32. Gentry then filed a third amended complaint (TAC) on May 2, 2024. ECF 43 1 Act (FEHA) for a failure to accommodate disability and a failure to engage in interactive 2 process. Id. 3 Gentry moved for partial summary judgment requesting that the Court find that she 4 had a medical condition that triggered FEHA protections. ECF 99. The County opposed. 5 ECF 122. Gentry replied. ECF 125. 6 The County moved for summary judgment on every issue. ECF 106. To support its 7 motion, the County requested judicial notice of 19 exhibits. ECF 110. Gentry opposed at 8 ECF 113, along with a notice of errata for its opposition at ECF 124. The County replied. 9 ECF 127. 10 The Court held a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on 11 August 6, 2025. ECF 132 (Hr’g). 12 Both parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. ECF 11; ECF 12. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Summary judgment may be granted only when, drawing all inferences and 15 resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any 16 material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014); Celotex 17 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under governing 18 substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 19 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is 20 such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Bald 21 assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist are insufficient. Galen v. Cnty. of L.A., 22 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). 23 The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, 24 discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 25 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving 26 party must go beyond the pleadings, and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth 27 specific facts showing that a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 1 Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)). All justifiable inferences, however, 2 must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan, 572 U.S. 651 3 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 A. The Court Grants the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment 6 The County moves for summary judgment “on each and every issue or part of 7 Plaintiff’s two causes of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act 8 (FEHA).” ECF 106 at 1. The County argues that “Plaintiff cannot raise a triable issue of 9 fact regarding whether she had a FEHA-qualifying ‘medical condition’ or ‘disability’ and 10 thus cannot make out an essential element of her prima facie case.” ECF 106 at 1. This is 11 because, the County argues, Gentry (1) has not shown any evidence of a FEHA-qualifying 12 medical condition, and (2) limited the basis of her claims to an underlying “medical 13 condition.” ECF 106 at 10. The Court, as explained below, agrees and therefore finds that 14 there is no genuine issue of material fact for both of Gentry’s FEHA claims. 15 1. Gentry has not shown a genuine issue of material fact that she 16 had a FEHA-qualifying medical condition 17 As a preliminary matter, to bring a claim for a failure to accommodate disability 18 and a claim for failure to engage in interactive process, a plaintiff must show that he or she 19 has a qualifying medical condition or disability under FEHA. King v. C&K Mkt., Inc., No. 20 16-cv-00559-TLN-CMK, 2018 WL 934551, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018). A failure to 21 accommodate claim under FEHA requires that “the plaintiff has a disability under the 22 FEHA.” Ayala v. Frito Lay, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 3d 891, 907 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (citations 23 omitted); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m). The County does not dispute that a “medical 24 condition” can also trigger a failure to accommodate, and some California Courts have 25 accepted a plaintiff’s “medical condition” for a failure to accommodate claim. See, e.g., 26 Swanson v. Morongo Unified School Dist., 232 Cal. App. 4th 954, 969 (2014) (accepting a 27 plaintiff’s medical condition for a failure to accommodate claim). A failure to engage in 1 has a “known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” Cal. Gov’t Code 2 § 12940(n). 3 Here, because Gentry frames her medical issues that triggered the alleged need for 4 reasonable accommodations as “medical conditions,” the Court analyzes whether there is a 5 genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had a medical condition as defined by 6 FEHA. TAC 11; see also ECF 99 (asking the Court to find that “the County had notice of 7 Ms. Gentry’s medical condition . . . and recognized that it had a duty to accommodate that 8 medical condition”). A FEHA-qualifying “medical condition” is limited to (1) “[a]ny 9 health impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer or a record or history 10 of cancer” or (2) certain genetic or inherited characteristics. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(i). 11 The County met its initial burden under Rule 56 by pointing out that Gentry failed 12 to allege in her TAC that her alleged medical condition is related to a diagnosis of cancer 13 or inherited characteristics such that it would trigger FEHA’s protections. ECF 106 at 11. 14 Vague allegations of, for example, having a “documented history of having heart 15 palpitations and a racing heart” without mention of cancer or inherited characteristics is 16 not enough to plausibly allege that Gentry suffers from a qualifying medical condition. 17 See, e.g., ECF 109 (Brandwajn Decl.), Ex. LL at 4–5; see Ellis v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 18 No. 23-cv-02437-CJC-KESX, 2024 WL 5411195, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2024) (finding 19 that alleging that a third party stating that the plaintiff had mood swings and routine 20 appointments at the hospital for mental health reasons was not enough to plausibly allege 21 that the plaintiff suffered from a qualifying mental disability). Further, the County points 22 out testimony from Gentry’s medical provider, Dr. Ross, that showed that he believed 23 Gentry’s symptoms were “not necessarily” hereditary (i.e., genetic). Brandwajn Decl., Ex. 24 M (Ross Tr.) 74:6–76:12. Gentry did not point to any evidence disputing this in her 25 Opposition brief or other summary judgment briefings. See ECF 113. 26 Gentry attempts to overcome her lack of evidence of a “medical condition” by 27 arguing that the County “should be estopped from questioning her [medical] condition” 1 during the interactive process.” ECF 113 at 16–17; see also ECF 99 at 9. The Court finds 2 that regardless of whether the County is estopped, Gentry cannot, as a matter of law, 3 conclusorily allege that she had a medical condition under FEHA without citing any 4 authority which stands for the proposition that her “heart palpitations and racing heart” 5 constitutes a medical condition. See Meintser v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2024 WL 4289579 6 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 25, 2024) (finding that the plaintiff could not state a FEHA claim because 7 he did not allege how his religious beliefs constituted a mental or physical disability). 8 Even if the Court assessed the County’s alleged lack of questioning of her accommodation 9 request and opening of the interactive process, it is “entirely insufficient” for Gentry to not 10 point to any evidence of a medical condition as defined by FEHA. Roman v. BRE Props., 11 Inc., 237 Cal. App. 4th 1040, 1053 (2015). Although Gentry attempts to differentiate this 12 case from Roman, the Court finds that its Roman’s reasoning is applicable because it was 13 also assessing whether the plaintiff’s disability qualified under FEHA at the summary 14 judgment stage. Id. 15 Gentry then attempts to argue that she sufficiently showed a material issue of 16 genuine fact that the duty to accommodate and the duty to engage in interactive process 17 was triggered because they both have a “notice standard,” and she pointed to evidence that 18 she notified the County of her medical condition. ECF 113 at 15 (emphasis in original); 19 ECF 99 at 8. However, this argument fails as a matter of law for both her failure to 20 accommodate and her failure to engage in interactive process claim. 21 A failure to accommodate claim under FEHA does not have such a “notice” 22 standard for medical conditions. It can only be triggered if Gentry has a medical 23 condition, is disabled, or is perceived to be disabled—not if the County perceived Gentry 24 to have a medical condition. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926.1 (stating that only the 25 definitions of “physical disability and mental disability” is construed to include “an actual 26 or perceived physical or mental impairment that is disabling, potentially disabling, or 27 perceived as disabling or potentially disabling,” emphasis added). Thus, Gentry notifying 1 the County of a vague, non-FEHA-qualifying “medical condition” would not trigger the 2 County’s duty to accommodate under FEHA. 3 While a failure to engage in interactive process claim under FEHA has a “notice” 4 standard in that the duty to engage in the interactive process is triggered when an employee 5 requests an accommodation, several courts have made it clear that this duty occurs only 6 when “the employee is disabled.” Alejandro v. ST Micro Elecs., Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 898, 7 912 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Humphrey v. Memorial Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 8 (9th Cir. 2001)). Indeed, Gentry did not cite any authority where an employer was bound 9 to engage in an interactive process with an employee who claimed disability but was 10 neither disabled nor regarded by the employer as disabled. Hodges v. Cedars-Sinai Med. 11 Ctr., 91 Cal. App. 5th 894, 913 (2023). Therefore, here, it is irrelevant as to whether 12 Gentry requested an accommodation for a medical condition because Gentry has not 13 identified a triable material fact as to whether she had a medical condition as defined by 14 FEHA. See Allos v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 112 Cal. App. 5th 822 (2025); supra 15 Section III.A.1. 16 As such, Gentry has not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she 17 had a FEHA-qualifying medical condition that would trigger either a failure to 18 accommodate claim or a failure to engage in the interactive process claim. 19 2. Gentry cannot reframe her medical condition to be a perceived 20 disability 21 Gentry then presents a new legal theory in her Opposition to the County’s Motion 22 for Summary Judgment (and her Reply to the County’s Opposition to Gentry’s Motion for 23 Partial Summary Judgment) that the County should be held liable because it had notice that 24 her medical condition “affected a major life function” such that it would be a perceived 25 disability under FEHA. ECF 113 at 19; ECF 125 at 4; see Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926.1. 26 Thus, Gentry argues, the question is whether the County treated Gentry as having a 27 disabling medical condition when it opened the interactive process. ECF 113 at 8; Hr’g. 1 However, the Court bars this argument because Gentry improperly asserted a new 2 legal theory for the first time at the summary judgment stage. See Corona v. Time Warner 3 Cable, Inc., No. 13-cv-5521-PSG-VBKX, 2014 WL 11456535, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 4 2014) (collecting cases in the Ninth Circuit finding that parties cannot assert unpled 5 theories for the first time at the summary judgment stage). “In determining whether a 6 claim raised at summary judgment is ‘new’ (meaning not adequately pled), it looks to Rule 7 8’s ‘liberal notice pleading’ standard,” and thus, to rely on a theory at summary judgment, 8 plaintiffs are “required either (1) to plead the additional [] theory in their complaints, or (2) 9 to make known during discovery their intention to pursue recovery on the [] theory omitted 10 from their complaints.” Strandquist v. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., No. 23- 11 cv-05071-TMC, 2024 WL 4645146, at *16 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2024); Corona, 2014 12 WL 11456535, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2014) (quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 13 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000)). 14 Here, this legal theory did not appear in Gentry’s TAC pleadings and instead 15 appeared for the first time in Gentry’s Opposition to the County’s Motion for Summary 16 Judgment. TAC; ECF 113. It is not enough to argue that Gentry had alleged facts in her 17 TAC to support her new theory—the notice pleading standard requires a “factual 18 explanation” that alleges how the failure to accommodate occurred. Corona, 2014 WL 19 11456535, at *4. Further, Gentry did not make it known during discovery that it was her 20 intention to pursue recovery on this theory. As identified by the County, “Plaintiff has 21 limited the basis of her claims to an underlying ‘medical condition’” through her 22 “discovery responses.” ECF 106 at 10. Gentry did not dispute this. 23 As such, the Court finds that Gentry limited the basis of her claims to an underlying 24 “medical condition” because she alleged only a “medical condition” in her TAC and 25 discovery responses. 26 In conclusion, because (1) there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Gentry 27 had a medical condition and (2) Gentry is barred from going beyond a medical condition 1 failure to accommodate and failure to interactive process claims in her TAC.1 As such, the 2 Court GRANTS the entirety of the County’s motion for summary judgment. 3 B. The Court Denies Gentry’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 4 Gentry “seeks partial summary judgment that the County that she had a medical 5 condition (heart palpitations) that prevented her from complying with the County’s mask 6 mandate” that in turn “triggered the County’s duty to accommodate her under FEHA.” 7 ECF 99 at ii, 11. The Court, as explained in Section III.A. of this Order, previously found 8 that Gentry does not have a qualifying medical condition under FEHA and could not 9 expand her argument past her original medical condition framing. Gentry’s briefing for 10 her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment does not point to any new evidence or legal 11 analysis that would support that Gentry had a FEHA-qualifying medical condition or that 12 she could reframe her “medical condition” argument. ECF 99; ECF 125. Thus, the Court 13 finds that Gentry is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and DENIES her Motion for 14 Partial Summary Judgment. 15 C. The Court Denies the County’s Request for Judicial Notice and 16 Declines to Rule on the County’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence 17 The County requested judicial notice of 19 exhibits to support its Motion for 18 Summary Judgment. ECF 110. The Court DENIES the County’s request for judicial 19 notice because they are not relevant to the Court’s decision. 20 The County also objected to several pieces of Gentry’s evidence that supported her 21 motion. ECF 122 at 16–24. The Court declines to rule on the County’s objections because 22 the objected-to evidence was not material to the disposition of the motion. 23 24 25 26 1 Because the Court finds that a reasonable jury could not find that Gentry could make a 27 prima facie case for either claim, it declines to address the County’s other arguments, 1 || IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 3 || DENIES Gentry’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court also DENIES the 4 || County’s request for judicial notice. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: September 2, 2025 hbo ——> _ NATHANAEL M. COUSINS 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12

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