MEMORANDUM OPINION
*1 Fenton L. Jacobs was found guilty, after a jury trial, of two counts of second-degree murder, two counts of third-degree assault, and one count of first-degree harassment.1 The two second-degree murder verdicts merged into a single conviction for second-degree murder.2 Jacobs's convictions arose out of four incidents that occurred on a single night: (1) Jacobs's fatal stabbing of one man; (2) Jacobs's threat to stab another man; (3) Jacobs's attempted stabbing of a third man; and (4) Jacobs's spitting on law enforcement when they arrested him.
Jacobs now appeals his second-degree murder conviction, raising two claims. First, Jacobs argues that the jury reached irreconcilable verdicts for the homicide counts based on how the jury initially completed the verdict forms for these counts. Jacobs further argues that the trial court erred because the court reconvened the jury minutes after it was discharged to address the potentially ambiguous homicide verdict forms. Second, Jacobs argues that the jury's initial packet of instructions contained an instruction that improperly commented on the evidence.
For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reject Jacobs's claims and affirm the judgment of the superior court.
Facts and proceedings
During the late evening of May 1, 2019, Jacobs used or threatened to use a knife in a series of escalating altercations in downtown Juneau. Jacobs first threatened to stab Ernest Grant after Grant told Jacobs to leave a third man alone. Jacobs's threat against Grant formed the basis for one of Jacobs's convictions for third-degree assault.
Shortly after this incident, Jacobs threatened to stab Phillip Melendrez after Melendrez called 911 to report Jacobs's threatening behavior towards two other men. Jacobs also attempted to stab Melendrez while he was on the phone with 911. Jacobs's threats and attempted stabbing of Melendrez formed the basis for his other conviction for third-degree assault.
A short time after this attempted stabbing, Jacobs became involved in an altercation with Scott Campbell. This altercation started as a verbal argument between multiple people, including Campbell's wife and Jacobs's brother. This altercation escalated, and Jacobs began physically fighting Campbell, ultimately stabbing him multiple times. Campbell died as a result of the stab wounds.
For these actions, Jacobs was charged with one count of first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree murder, two counts of third-degree assault, and one count of first-degree harassment.3 At trial, Jacobs argued that he stabbed Campbell in self-defense. As to the murder counts, the jury was instructed on self-defense, heat of passion, and the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
*2 The jury acquitted Jacobs of first-degree murder but found him guilty on both second-degree murder theories, both third-degree assault charges, and the single first-degree harassment charge. The jury did not initially return a verdict on the manslaughter charge. The jury was then discharged.
Minutes later, the court noticed that the absence of a verdict on the manslaughter charge created an unusual and unexpected ambiguity, as discussed in more detail below. The court alerted the parties to this ambiguity and — over Jacobs's objection — reconvened the jury to review the verdicts. The jury ultimately affirmed its initial verdicts and returned an additional verdict of guilty on the manslaughter charge.
Jacobs now appeals his second-degree murder conviction.
Why we affirm Jacobs's second-degree murder conviction
Jacobs argues that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent and that it was inappropriate to reconvene the jury after it had been discharged.
Jacobs's inconsistency argument rests upon a complicated interaction between the general jury instructions, the instructions on the first-degree murder verdict form, and the manner in which the jury initially completed the first-degree murder verdict form. This form — when read in conjunction with the other jury instructions — directed the jury to first reach a verdict on first-degree murder, then (only if its first-degree murder verdict was not guilty) reach verdicts on the second-degree murder counts, and then (only if its first- and second-degree murder verdicts were not guilty) reach a verdict on manslaughter. Following these instructions, the jury first reached a verdict on first-degree murder (finding Jacobs not guilty) and then reached verdicts on the second-degree murder counts (finding him guilty of both theories of second-degree murder). Accordingly, the jury did not return a verdict on the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
This set of verdicts would normally create no potential for inconsistency. But the first-degree murder verdict form had a unique and overly complicated structure that created the potential for inconsistency.
The verdict form included a set of instructions for how to complete the form depending on whether the jury accepted Jacobs's self-defense claim. The form provided a clear way for the jury to signal its acceptance of Jacobs's self-defense claim: the instructions provided that if the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jacobs did not act in self-defense, the jury was to simply check the box next to “not guilty” on first-degree murder and not complete the rest of the form.
But the form did not provide an explicit mechanism for the jury to signal its rejection of Jacobs's self-defense claim.4 If the jury found that the State had proved all the elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt (including disproving self-defense), the jury was directed to mark “guilty” on the form and then fill out another section of the form, Section A, addressing “heat of passion.”5 (This section is not at issue here.)
*3 If, however, the jury found Jacobs not guilty of first-degree murder because it concluded that the State had failed to prove all the elements of the offense, the jury was directed to Section B of the verdict form. In Section B, the jury was asked to determine whether the jury found Jacobs guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. The jury was told to complete this section only if it found both that the State had failed to prove all the elements of first-degree murder and the State had proved that Jacobs did not act in self-defense.
Thus, the only way for the jury to signal its rejection of Jacobs's self-defense claim was by either (1) returning a verdict of “guilty” on first-degree murder or (2) returning a verdict on the lesser included offense of manslaughter that was located in Section B of the first-degree murder verdict form.6
The problem arose because the general jury instructions otherwise precluded the jury from returning a verdict on the lesser included offense of manslaughter unless it first unanimously acquitted Jacobs of first-degree murder and each second-degree murder count. As a result, if the jury acquitted Jacobs of first-degree murder but returned guilty verdicts on either of the second-degree murder charges, the jury was barred from returning any finding on manslaughter. Yet, Section B of the first-degree murder verdict form asked the jury to determine (after acquitting Jacobs only of first-degree murder) whether the jury found Jacobs guilty of manslaughter.
Consistent with the general instruction not to reach the lesser included offense unless it first acquitted on the greater homicide offenses, the jury did not initially complete Section B. This suggested that the jury found that the State had not disproved Jacobs's self-defense claim. But such a finding would be inconsistent with the jury's guilty verdicts on second-degree murder, since Jacobs's self-defense claim was a complete defense to all the homicide charges.
The trial court recognized this ambiguity and addressed it with the parties minutes after the jury was discharged. Over Jacobs's objection, the court recalled the jurors, questioned each juror individually to ensure they had not discussed the case or received outside information about the case since they had been released, reswore the jurors, informed them that the court noticed a potential issue with the verdict forms, and asked them to review the verdict forms to make sure the jurors had “fully and completely filled out what [they] intended to fill out.”
The jury then reviewed the forms. Citing the jury instruction directing the jurors not to return a verdict on a lesser included offense unless they returned a verdict of “not guilty” on the greater offense, the jurors sent a note asking if they were supposed to return a verdict on the lesser included manslaughter charge on the first-degree murder form. The court instructed the jury that it did not need to return a verdict on manslaughter but informed the jury that if it acquitted Jacobs of first-degree murder because he had acted in self-defense, it was required to acquit him on the two counts of second-degree murder as well.
*4 Shortly after this, the jury returned the verdict forms unchanged, except that the first-degree murder verdict form now included an additional finding of “guilty” on the charge of manslaughter. The trial court then polled the jury to ensure that the jurors did not redeliberate on any issues and that the most recent verdict was consistent with the earlier verdicts. No juror indicated that they had reopened deliberations or that their current verdicts were inconsistent with their initial verdicts.
On appeal, Jacobs renews his arguments that the trial court's procedure for resolving the potential ambiguity was improper and that the jury's initial verdicts were inconsistent.
When faced with ambiguous or potentially mistaken verdicts, a trial court may conduct a limited inquiry to resolve the ambiguity and ensure there are no errors in the verdict form.7 Here, Jacobs argues that the trial court acted improperly because it posed an open-ended question about the potentially ambiguous verdicts to the jury, which he argues impermissibly suggested there was error with the verdicts. But the trial court's open-ended prompt took pains to remain neutral and make clear to the jury that there was not necessarily any issue with how it filled out the verdict forms. We therefore reject this claim.
Jacobs further argues that the trial court's questioning of jurors after they returned their amended verdicts violated Alaska Evidence Rule 606. But Evidence Rule 606 does not prohibit a court's inquiry to ensure that the written verdict accurately conveys the jury's decision.8 Indeed, given the initial ambiguity in the jury's verdicts, it was appropriate for the trial court to question the jurors to ensure that both the amended verdict accurately represented their decision and that their decision had not changed as a result of their review of the verdict forms. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by reconvening the jury minutes after it was discharged and asking the jurors limited questions to resolve the ambiguity in the verdict forms after ensuring that they had not received any outside information about the case.9
The verdicts were also not inconsistent. Verdicts are only inconsistent when they are “irreconcilably in conflict, meaning necessarily or strictly inconsistent.”10 Therefore, this Court will not find verdicts to be inconsistent when “the record reveals a basis upon which the jury's verdicts can rationally be explained.”11
As the trial court identified, there was a potential for inconsistency because of the ambiguity in the verdict form for first-degree murder. But this ambiguity does not mean that the verdicts themselves were “necessarily or strictly inconsistent.”12 The jury's verdicts can be rationally explained by the jury finding that Jacobs intended to injure — but not kill — Campbell when stabbing him. This is consistent with the jury's initial verdict forms, its question to the court after reconvening as to whether it was supposed to return a verdict as to manslaughter on the first-degree murder verdict form, and its final verdict forms. We therefore conclude that the verdicts are not inconsistent, and the trial court properly denied Jacobs's request for a new trial on this ground.
*5 Jacobs raises one additional claim. As part of its instructions to the jury prior to deliberations, the superior court gave an instruction limiting the purposes for which Jacobs's alleged threats toward Grant and Melendrez could be used in relation to the homicide counts. Jacobs did not object to this instruction. Now, on appeal, Jacobs argues that this instruction constituted plain error because it improperly commented on the evidence by “singl[ing] out evidence from the assault[ ] counts from other evidence presented in the trial and instruct[ing] the jury to consider that evidence for specific purposes.” Jacobs acknowledges that he did not raise this issue in the superior court, so we review it for plain error.13 Having reviewed the record, however, we see no obvious error affecting Jacobs's substantial rights.14 We accordingly reject this claim.
Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is therefore AFFIRMED.