Jacobs v. Arlington Owners Inc.

Opinion

Jacobs v Arlington Owners Inc.

2026 NY Slip Op 05173

September 2, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Justin Wax Jacobs, appellant,

v

Arlington Owners Incorporated, respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on September 2, 2026

2022-10017, (Index No. 711112/21)

Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.

Cheryl E. Chambers

William G. Ford

James P. McCormack, JJ.

Justin Wax Jacobs, Jamaica, NY, appellant pro se.

Boyd Richards Parker & Colonnelli, P.L., New York, NY (Frederick C. Sung and Jennifer A. Levine of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph Risi, J.), dated October 17, 2022. The order denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging breach of contract and granted the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The complaint alleged that at a public auction, the plaintiff placed a bid for shares of stock in the defendant's cooperative residential apartment building located in Queens and the proprietary lease to an apartment in the building (hereinafter the subject apartment). The complaint further alleged, inter alia, that the parties agreed to certain terms of sale (hereinafter the TOS), the defendant offered the plaintiff the opportunity to close on the sale, the plaintiff requested access to the subject apartment for an appraisal in order to obtain financing to close on the sale, the defendant denied that request, and the defendant thereafter rejected the plaintiff's bid and refunded his deposit.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging breach of contract. The defendant opposed the plaintiff's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In an order dated October 17, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendant's cross-motion. The plaintiff appeals.

"The essential elements of a cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract are (1) the existence of a contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance pursuant to that contract, (3) the defendant's breach of the contract, and (4) damages resulting from that breach" (Wedgewood Care Ctr., Inc. v Kravitz, 198 AD3d 124, 131; see Chestnut Bay Equestrian, Inc. v Irrevocable Trust of Jean Pizzirusso, 244 AD3d 1056, 1057). "A breach of contract cause of action fails as a matter of law in the absence of any showing that a specific provision of the contract was breached" (Westchester County Corr. Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Westchester, 99 AD3d 998, 999). Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant breached any provision of the TOS [*2](see Village of Spring Val. v Post Off. Sq., LLC, 211 AD3d 885, 889; Westchester County Corr. Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Westchester, 99 AD3d at 999). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment without regard to the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).

By contrast, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing causes of action (see Laskaratos v Bay Ridge Hoyt Lender, LLC, 185 AD3d 908, 909). The defendant's evidence demonstrated, among other things, that it did not breach the terms of the TOS, which did not obligate it to assist the plaintiff with obtaining financing or to allow him access to the subject apartment for an appraisal. Further, the duty of good faith and fair dealing "cannot be used to imply obligations inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship, and encompasses only those promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding were included" (Singh v City of New York, 40 NY3d 138, 146 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Dalton v Educational Testing Serv., 87 NY2d 384, 389). Here, the plain terms of the TOS put the plaintiff on notice, inter alia, that he had no right to an appraisal of the subject apartment. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Singh v City of New York, 40 NY3d at 147; Laskaratos v Bay Ridge Hoyt Lender, LLC, 185 AD3d at 909). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHAMBERS, FORD and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court