Jacobs v. Allen

18 Barb. 549, 1854 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 82
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 6, 1854
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 18 Barb. 549 (Jacobs v. Allen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jacobs v. Allen, 18 Barb. 549, 1854 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 82 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1854).

Opinion

Mitchell, P. J.

It is true the assignment in this case declares that the trustees shall not be! answerable for the acts, neglects or defaults of any attorney or agent that they may appoint, nor for any misfortune, loss or damage which may happen without their willful default; but this is followed by an express covenant on their part to accept the trust and to act faithfully and justly in the execution of the same. The two parts of the trust deed are to be taken together, and if the trustees were sued for any fraud committed under the deed, or for any thing indicating a breach of faith towards creditors, the deed itself, on its face, would show their liability, if such wrong in fact were proved. The deed, then, cannot be fraudulent on its face, and there was no pretense that it was fraudulent in fact. It Was argued that [550]*550under the first clause the trustees might carelessly appoint incompetent agents. If their carelessness were so gross as to amount to fraud, they would be liable as for their willful default, and under their covenant to execute the trusts faithfully and justly. If their carelessness did not amount to fraud or to a willful default, or to an unfaithful or unjust execution of their trusts, then only they would be protected by the deed, and that would be because the deed on its face does not admit of any fraud; it cannot then be fraudulent on its face or in its provisions. These, too, are the common provisions in trust deeds, and should not be condemned by a decision avoiding all such instruments, when they have received the sanction of the profession, and been generally acted on. It is no proof that an assignment is fraudulent because it may be perverted by a careless and indifferent and fraudulent trustee. Fraud ought not to be presumed from the provisions of an instrument which admits of a contrary interpretation, any more than it should be presumed from the acts in pais of a party, which admit of an interpretation in favor of honesty; and especially it ought not to be inferred conclusively from an instrument which requires a faithful and just execution of its trusts on the part of the trustee. Mr. Hill, in his Treatise on Trustees, after showing that a trustee may be liable where he neglects to prevent a wrong which he knows his co-trustee is about to accomplish,' or to prevent a repetition of it after he knows it is done, explains a clause analogous to the one in this case, and says : The ordinary claim for the indemnity of trustees, which limits their liability to their own acts, does not apply to breaches of trust of the nature discussed in this section. Indeed such a clause appears to be of little or no practical use ; for if the conduct of the trustee be such as not to amount to a breach of trust, he will not be liable for the acts of his colleagues, though there be no such clause in the trust instrument; and if there be a breach of trust on his part, the clause in question will not apply.” (Hill on Trustees, p. 314, § 1. Macklin v. Fuller, Jacob, 198.) Can any thing more be needed in this case ? If there was any breach of trust [551]*551here, no clause in this deed would protect the trustee, and if there were no breach of trust, he would not be liable even if that clause were omitted.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Roosevelt, J., concurred.

Clerke. J.

This is an action to set aside an assignment as fraudulent and void against creditors. The plaintiff maintains that it is void on its face, in consequence of the following clause: The parties of the second part shall be charged and chargeable only with and for so much money and property as they shall respectively receive, and shall not he answerable or accountable for the acts, receipts, neglects or defaults of any attorney or attorneys, agent or agents, that they may employ, nor for any misfortune, loss or damage which may happen, without their willful default.”

Here, then, by the operation of the instrument itself, they are exempted from all responsibility in the employment of agents. However careless, however indifferent they maybe in the selection of suitable and trustworthy persons to serve them in performing their trust, they are relieved from all care as to the consequences. They may employ a man utterly incompetent, without inquiry about his qualifications or his character, and if he waste or plunder the property, they are not legally involved, if this instrument shall be sustained; and beyond the mere moral obligation there is no inducement whatever for the faithful performance of their duties; except so far as their own debt is concerned, which, as usual in cases of this nature, is preferred. They are also exempted from all responsibility on account of any misfortune, loss or damage, except what may arise from their willful default. A trustee being under an obligation by his acceptance of the trust to husband the property confided to him with the care and diligence of a provident owner, is liable for every loss sustained by reason of his negligence, want of caution, or mistake, as well as for positive misconduct or willful default. The law would not excuse him, even if he managed the [552]*552affairs of his trust in the same manner in which he managed his own, unless that management were diligent and prudent. Ordinary diligence and ordinary prudence are required. But the provision in question exonerates the trustees from any thing approaching to this, and makes them only liable for any loss arising from their willful default; thus nullifying the requisitions of the law. If a debtor and one or two of his creditors to whom he gives a preference can come together, and, in this way, dispense with all responsibility in regard to defalcations or waste, and any losses which might have been prevented by ordinary care and diligence, creditors not preferred can always, with very little contrivance, be hindered, delayed or defrauded.

The clause at the end of the instrument, binding the assignees “ to act faithfully and justly in the execution of the trust,” does not counteract the effect of the preceding clause, which releases them from all accountability for' the want of ordinary care and diligence. The whole language of the assignment should be taken together; and they may well say, if brought to an account, for the consequences of mistakes or omissions, which ordinary prudence and forecast could have averted, that they did not, nevertheless, act unfaithfully or unjustly; because, by the express terms of their trust, they were only chargeable for any misfortune, loss or damage, which may happen by their willful default. Under that part of the clause exempting the assignees from all care in the appointment of agents, it could also be easily contrived that the assignor himself should have the actual management of the trust; for the trustees could, without much difficulty, and without making themselves amenable for willful default, select some confederate of the assignor, who would connive at his interference; and thus these subordinate agents could make any disposition of the property, although entirely at variance with the professed object of the assignment; the trustees, in the meantime, escaping all liability, unless a positive and willful violation of duty could be proved against them,

At the present time, certainly, the law will not relax the rules relating to assignments. Every provision in these instruments, which may enable the debtor, or his assignees, by the operation

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Gilmore v. Tuttle
32 N.J. Eq. 611 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1880)
August v. Seeskind
46 Tenn. 166 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1868)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Barb. 549, 1854 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 82, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jacobs-v-allen-nysupct-1854.