Jacob v. Illinois Cent. R.

63 So. 306, 133 La. 735, 1913 La. LEXIS 2097
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedOctober 20, 1913
DocketNo. 19,645
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 63 So. 306 (Jacob v. Illinois Cent. R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jacob v. Illinois Cent. R., 63 So. 306, 133 La. 735, 1913 La. LEXIS 2097 (La. 1913).

Opinion

SOMMERVILLE, J.

Mrs. Annie Jacob, widow of Frederick Jacob, individually and as tutrix of their minor children, sues the defendants in solido in the sum of $50,000 for damages resulting to them from the loss and death of their late husband and father. There was judgment dismissing plaintiff’s demand, and she has appealed.

The deceased, Frederick Jacob, a day laborer, was in the employ of a firm of stevedores, Ross & Heyn, doing business in the city of New Orleans, at the time of his accidental death. They were engaged in unloading very long pieces of timber which extended over two flat cars belonging to the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas & Pacific Railway Company. This company is not before the court. An exception filed by it to the jurisdiction of the court was sustained, and no appeal has been taken from that judgment.

The pieces of timber, some 16 in number, were loaded on the cars by the Kentwood & Eastern Railroad Company. And that company has not been made a party to the suit, and hence it is not before the court.

The cars were brought from Kentwood, La., to New Orleans by the Illinois Central Railroad Company; but the suit is not pressed against that company. There is no evidence for or against it; and no argument has been made concerning its liability. Plaintiff abandons her claim against it on her brief filed in this court.

When the cars arrived in New Orleans they were transferred by the' Illinois Central Railroad Company to the Public Belt Railroad, belonging to and operated by the city of New Orleans. The cars were standing upon the tracks of the Public Belt at the time of the accident resulting in the death of Mr. Jacob; and the stevedores, Ross & Heyn, were engaged in transferring the timbers from the ears to a vessel lying near the Public Belt tracks. The city of New Orleans and Ross & Heyn are the only defendants now before the court.

[1] The timbers were square-edged; they were piled one on top of the other four deep and four wide; their weight was about 72,400 pounds; and they were of such great length that two flat cars were used to carry them. One of these flat cars was made of iron and the other of wood; it was a sill of the latter (the wooden car) which broke and caused the accident. A piece of the sill, some three or four feet in length, suddenly broke out of the sill; ( and this broken piece carried with it two of the stanchions which were in the iron pockets attached to that(portion of the sill. The accident was clearly due to the faulty condition of the wooden car, the sill of which broke, and the breaking of which sill precipitated some of the timber to the ground on the opposite side of the car from which the pieces of timber were being unloaded. The deceased was thrown from [739]*739his position on the car and crushed to death beneath a piece of falling timber. No fault whatever is sought to be charged against him.

This load of timber was held in place by wooden stanchions. The stanchions had been wired together at the top. These wires had been cut by the workmen, and the stanchions on the sides of the cars nearer the river had been removed. Some two or three pieces of timber had been unloaded, when three or four pieces fell from the opposite side of the car, bearing down the stanchions that held the load in place, and breaking or tearing out the piece of three or four feet in length of the sill of the car before mentioned. The breaking of the sill was the cause of the accident which resulted in the death of Mr. Jacob.

The break in the sill makes it quite evident that the sill was defective at that point. And this is further shown -by the testimony found in the record.

It is argued on behalf of plaintiff that it was the duty of the city of New Orleans, through its Belt Railroad Commission, to have inspected the cars in question and to have discovered the faulty condition of the sill of one of them, and that it was at fault in not having made such proper inspection and in not haying rejected the car when delivered to the Belt Road by the Illinois Central Railroad Company. And she also ■ argues, as to Ross & Heyn, that they were at fault in not making a proper inspection of the car and in discovering the faulty sill, and also in not having provided a safe place for their servant, her husband, to work in.

It is the duty of the owners of cars to examine them carefully with the view of seeing that they are safe in all their parts. It is also the duty of a railroad company which receives cars from another company to inspect the same with the, view of ascertaining their condition. And it is equally true that employers must provide their servants with safe places to work in, and with proper appliances to work with.

[5] The record is silent as to when and how the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas & Pacific Railroad Company, the owner of the car in question, inspected the defective ear or the result of that inspection. The record is also silent as to the inspection made by the Kentwood & Eastern Railroad Company, which loaded the pieces of timber on the cars. The record shows that the Public Belt authorities inspected the cars and the load and found them to be in good order and condition. But that Ross & Heyn, stevedores, made only a casual inspection of the cars before proceeding -with the unloading.

The inspector for the Public Belt had been engaged in inspecting cars for six or seven years at the time of the accident, and he had been a repairer of cars before that time. He is now employed by the Illinois Central Railroad Company as a car inspector. And, as the judge of the trial court, who saw and heard this witness, accepted his testimony, we shall accept it also as that of a competent and reliable witness. The Public' Belt will not be held to be at fault in employing this witness as an inspector of cars. He testified that he had examined this car when it was received from the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and that it was in good condition, and that the load thereon was in good shape and in good order. He testified that he went underneath the car for the purpose of inspecting it, and that his examination was complete. He was not asked about the particular defect which afterwards developed in this car. But it would appear from the evidence, both oral and by photograph, that -the defect in the sill was not apparent; and it is not shown how the same might have been discovered by the inspector. One of the witnesses for plaintiff, a day laborer, testified that the broken sill looked as if it were affected

[741]*741by dry sap; and a second witness, a photographer, testified that it was affected by dry rot, and again that:

“The outside piece of timber seemed to be sappy (in other words, decayed); the inside part (the heart) appeared to be good. Q. The heart of it appeared to be good and hard? A. Yes, sir. Q. But the outside appeared to be sappy? A. Yes, sir. Q. What was the depth of that sap on the outside? A. To the best of my knowledge about two inches in depth. Q. About what length? A. Well, I judge about three or four feet. Q. By an indication of sap do you mean damp? A. No, sir; I mean by that that the wood was decaying.”

[4] This evidence as to the condition of the sill is not satisfactory; it appears to be inconsistent. One would hardly expect dry rot and sap to exist at the same time in the space of three or four feet in a piece of timber.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
63 So. 306, 133 La. 735, 1913 La. LEXIS 2097, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jacob-v-illinois-cent-r-la-1913.