Jacob Nocita v. Housing Authority of Grays Harbor County

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 JACOB NOCITA, Case No. 3:24-cv-05771-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 9 MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DEFENSE v. COUNSEL 10 HOUSING AUTHORITY OF GRAYS 11 HARBOR COUNTY, 12 Defendants. 13

14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Jacob Nocita’s (“Mr. Nocita”) motion to disqualify 16 Georgia Stearns (“Stearns”) as counsel for defendant Grays Harbor County (“the County”). 17 Dkt. 29. For the following reasons, Mr. Nocita’s motion is DENIED. 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 The Court assumes familiarity with Mr. Nocita’s amended complaint, Dkt. 10, and will 20 recite only facts necessary to resolve the instant motion. Mr. Nocita and his family resided in a 21 unit provided by the Housing Authority of Grays Harbor County (“Housing Authority”). Dkt. 10 22 at 2. In his amended complaint, Mr. Nocita alleges that he and his family were wrongfully 23 24 1 evicted, overcharged on rent, and were not relocated by the Housing Authority despite 2 “numerous requests and incidents of domestic violence and unlawful entry.” Id. 3 Mr. Nocita filed his amended complaint with the County as the defendant, believing “the

4 Housing Authority is a department or agency of the County.” Dkt. 10 at 2. After the County was 5 served the amended complaint, Stearns filed a notice of appearance on behalf of the County. 6 Dkt. 25. Most important for this motion, before the period alleged in the amended complaint, the 7 Department of Children, Youth, and Families (“DCYF”) pursued a dependency action 8 concerning Mr. Nocita’s children. Dkt. 29 at 6. Stearns represented DCYF in that action. Id. 9 A little more than two weeks later, Mr. Nocita filed the instant motion, seeking to 10 disqualify Stearns as counsel for the County. Dkt. 29. 11 III. DISCUSSION “Motions to disqualify counsel are generally decided under state law and are ultimately 12 subject to the trial court’s discretion.” Bolding v. Banner Bank, No. C17-601, 2021 WL 1171988, 13 at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2021) (first citing In re County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 14 (9th Cir. 2000), then citing Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980)). “Disqualification 15 of counsel is a drastic remedy that exacts a harsh penalty from the parties as well as punishing 16 counsel; therefore, it should be imposed only when absolutely necessary.” Matter of Firestorm 17 1991, 129 Wn.2d 130, 140, 916 P.2d 411, 416 (1996). “Washington courts are reluctant to 18 disqualify an attorney absent compelling circumstances.” Thompson v. Seattle Pub. Sch., No. 19 2:25-CV-00468-TL, 2025 WL 2654650, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 2025) (citation omitted). 20 Those “compelling circumstances” include when counsel has “access to privileged information 21 of an opposing party,” or a “conflict of interest that undermines the fairness of the process.” Id. 22 (citations omitted). It can also include violations of the Washington Rules of Professional 23 Conduct (“RPCs”). Id. 24 1 To support his motion to disqualify, Mr. Nocita argues that Stearns’ continued 2 representation of the County violates RPC 1.9(c) and RPC 1.11(a) because Stearns represented 3 DCYF in a dependency matter concerning Mr. Nocita’s children. Dkt. 29 at 2–3. The Court will

4 consider each RPC in turn. 5 A. RPC 1.9(c) 6 A lawyer’s “[d]uties to former clients” is regulated by RPC 1.9. Under RPC 1.9(c) “[a] 7 lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has 8 formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:” 9 (1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when 10 the information has become generally known; or (2) reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would 11 permit or require with respect to a client. 12 RPC 1.9(c)(1)–(2). “[T]he burden falls on the former client who seeks to disqualify an adverse 13 party’s lawyer.” Plein v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 195 Wn.2d 677, 686, 463 P.3d 728, 732 (2020). 14 Mr. Nocita argues that Stearns’ “prior involvement as counsel for [DCYF] in [his] 15 dependency case is not tangential—it was central to the very same events and constitutional 16 violations now at issue in this lawsuit.” Dkt. 29 at 2. The County argues that RPC 1.9(c) does not 17 disqualify Stearns because Mr. Nocita does not have standing and “is not and does not claim to 18 be [] Stearns’ current or former client.” Dkt. 33 at 1–3. The Court agrees. Again, RPC 1.9(c) 19 concerns a “lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter” and what duty they owe 20 the former client. Plein, 195 Wn.2d at 697 (“RPC 1.9(c) forbids only use of confidential 21 information against a former client.”). Mr. Nocita does not allege that he was a former client of 22 Stearns. Accordingly, Stearns’ continued representation of the County does not violate 23 RPC 1.9(c). 24 1 B. RPC 1.11(a) 2 The obligations of “former or current government” lawyers are outlined in RPC 1.11. 3 Under RPC 1.11(a):

4 Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the government … shall not otherwise represent 5 a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government 6 agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation. In other words, this rule concerns successive government and private employment, prohibiting a 7 lawyer in private practice from representing a client in connection with the same matter in which 8 they “participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee.” Id. 9 Mr. Nocita makes the same argument under this rule as he did under RPC 1.9, and the 10 County gives the same response. See supra. RPC 1.11(a) is inapplicable to the facts before the 11 Court. There is no issue of conflict-of-interest stemming from successive government and private 12 employment. Stearns represented the government in the prior dependency case and she continues 13 to represent the government. Although work by the same attorney for different government 14 agencies on related matters has the potential to implicate other Rules of Professional Conduct, 15 they are not implicated by the facts or arguments presented in this motion. Stearns’ continued 16 representation of the County in a matter adverse to Mr. Nocita does not violate RPC 1.11(a). 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 “Disqualification of counsel is a drastic remedy” that “should be imposed only when 19 absolutely necessary.” Firestorm, 129 Wn.2d at 140. Mr. Nocita has not established that 20 disqualification is necessary here. His motion to disqualify Stearns as the County’s attorney is 21 therefore DENIED. 22 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and 23 to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address. 24 l Dated this 12th day of November, 2025. ba 3 Tiffany M. Cartwright United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24