Jacob Niederquell v. Dosanjh Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a 7-Eleven, and David Peterson

Opinion

1 Jul 01, 2026 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 JACOB NIEDERQUELL, No. 2:25-CV-00169-RLP Plaintiff, 9 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION 10 DOSANJH ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 7-ELEVEN, and DAVID PETERSON, 11 Defendants. 12

13 Before the Court are Defendant Dosanjh Enterprises, Inc. and David 14 Peterson’s Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 77); to Strike (ECF No. 98, 15 100, 101); and to Expedite (ECF No. 103). Also before the Court is third-party 16 Spokane County Sheriff’s Motion to Quash (ECF No. 113). Oral argument was 17 held on the summary judgment motion on June 30, 2026. Plaintiff Jacob 18 Niederquell appeared pro se. James Bernanrd King appeared on behalf Defendants. 19 The remaining motions were considered without oral argument. 20 The primary issue before the Court is whether Defendants violated Title III 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by enforcing a footwear policy at its 2 7-Eleven store, despite Mr. Niederquell’s protestation that he has an impairment 3 preventing him from wearing shoes. The Court concludes Defendants have not

4 violated the ADA. Defendants’ footwear policy is a legitimate health and safety 5 measure that may be imposed despite Mr. Niederquell’s alleged disability. 6 Furthermore, Defendants have offered Mr. Niederquell remote purchasing options

7 that adequately accommodate Mr. Niederquell’s circumstances and afford him full 8 and equal access to Defendants’ goods. 9 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Niederquell’s ADA 10 claim. Mr. Niederquell’s state law claims are remanded to Spokane County

11 Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Defendants’ remaining motions 12 are denied as moot. The Spokane County Sheriff’s Motion to Quash is granted. 13 BACKGROUND

14 Defendant Dosanjh owns and operates a 7-Eleven store located in 15 Spokane Valley, Washington. ECF No. 79, ¶2. Defendant David Peterson is 16 the Manager of the store. Id. at ¶3. Defendants’ store sells food and beverage 17 products packaged in glass, which are stocked on shelves in customer

18 accessible areas. Id. at ¶7. The store also operates a self-service area, selling 19 hot food and beverages. Id. at ¶8. The hot food items are prepared in a 500- 20 degree oven and then put on heated trays in the self-service area at a 1 temperature set between 165 and 175 degrees. Id. at ¶9. Spillage and 2 breakage occurs regularly, often multiple times in an eight-hour shift. Id. at 3 ¶13. Over recent years, the store has had an increasing problem with

4 discarded street drugs and drug paraphernalia being left in public areas of 5 the store. Id. at ¶¶18-19. Store employees have also reported the presence of 6 human feces, blood, urine and vomit on the floors. Id. at ¶20.

7 Given the hazards posed by offering products on a self-serve basis, 8 Defendants’ store maintains a policy requiring all customers to wear shoes 9 while inside the store since at least April of 2017. Id. at ¶¶14-15. The policy 10 is posted at the front door of the store and is readily visible to anyone

11 entering the store. Id. The policy was in effect March of 2025 and remains in 12 effect today. Id. 13 On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff Jacob Niederquell entered Defendants’

14 7-Eleven store, barefoot. ECF No. 17, ¶3.1. An employee noticed Mr. 15 Niederquell’s condition and informed him the store had a policy requiring 16 customers to wear shoes. Mr. Niederquell responded, "I don't wear shoes 17 because of my sensory issues." ECF No. 17, at ¶¶3.3-3.4 Mr. Niederquell

18 was directed to resolve the issue with the store manager, to whom he 19 requested an exception to the store dress code as a reasonable 20 accommodation for his sensory impairment, which he alleges is a symptom 1 of Autism Spectrum Disorder. Id. at ¶¶3.3-3.6. The manager refused to 2 provide the requested accommodation. Id. 3 Mr. Niederquell thereafter filed this action in Spokane County

4 Superior Court on April 21, 2025, asserting claims under the Americans with 5 Disabilities Act and state law. ECF No. 1-1. Defendants subsequently 6 removed the case to this Court. ECF No. 1 at 3.

7 The parties engaged in early motions practice which prompted the 8 Court to issue an order bifurcating discovery. See ECF No. 74. In order to 9 protect Mr. Niederquell from potentially unnecessary discovery regarding 10 his mental health, the Court ruled initial discovery would be limited to the

11 issues of (1) whether Defendants were on notice that Mr. Niederquell was 12 disabled; and (2) assuming Mr. Niederquell is disabled, whether his 13 requested accommodation (i.e. to be allowed to shop inside the store without

14 shoes) was reasonable. 15 The initial phase of discovery is now complete and Defendants have 16 moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 77. Defendants have also filed a 17 variety of motions, seeking to strike Mr. Niederquell’s responsive materials.

18 ECF Nos. 98, 100, 101, 103. In addition, the Spokane County Sheriff’s 19 Office has filed a motion to quash a third party subpoena issued by Mr. 20 Niederquell. ECF No. 113. 1 ANALYSIS 2 Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in any 3 place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. The statute provides, in

4 relevant part: 5 (a) General rule No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 6 disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 7 place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 8

(b) Construction 9

… 10

(2) Specific prohibitions 11

(A) Discrimination. For purposes of subsection (a), 12 discrimination includes— (i) the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that 13 screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities 14 from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, 15 unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 16 advantages, or accommodations being offered; (ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, 17 practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, 18 privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that 19 making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, 20 advantages, or accommodations; … 1 (3) Specific construction. Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or 2 benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where such 3 individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. The term “direct threat” means a significant risk to the health or 4 safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of 5 auxiliary aids or services.

6 As is true for other causes of action, a complaint for relief under the ADA 7 may be resolved via summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no 8 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 9 matter of law.” FRCP 56(a). When considering a motion for summary judgment, 10 the court may neither weigh the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, “the 11 evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to 12 be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 13 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). Nevertheless, where no reasonable juror could find in favor of 14 the non-moving party, no genuine dispute of fact exists, and the moving party is 15 entitled to summary judgment. See id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 16 As relevant here, a discrimination claim under Title III of the ADA requires 17 proof of three elements: (1) the plaintiff is disabled; (2) the defendant is a place of 18 accommodation; and (3) the defendant engaged in discrimination either by (a) 19 imposing eligibility criteria that “screen out or tend to screen out an individual with 20 a disability” (42 U.SC. § 12812(b)(2)(a)(i)) or (b) by failing to make reasonable 1 modifications to policies, practices, or procedures when “necessary to afford … 2 goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to 3 individuals with disabilities” (42 U.S.C. § 12812(b)(2)(a)(ii)).1 See Lopez v.

4 Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 974 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2020). 5 The current dispute centers on the third element. The Court assumes, 6 pursuant to the order bifurcating discovery, that Mr. Niederquell is disabled such

7 that he is unable to wear shoes. And, as the parties agree, Defendants operate a 8 place of public accommodation. So, the question on summary judgment is whether 9 there are questions of fact as to whether Defendants engaged in discrimination by 10 improperly imposing eligibility criteria for entry into the 7-Eleven store or by

11 improperly refusing Mr. Niederquell’s request for a modification of its policy 12 requiring in-store patrons to wear shoes. 13 In analyzing the parties’ dispute, it is important to note that an entity does

14 not violate the ADA merely by imposing eligibility criteria on customers or by 15 refusing a customer’s request for accommodation. Title III’s requirements are 16 subject to exceptions. As recognized by the Department of Justice’s implementing 17

1 The duty to provide an accommodation is triggered when a covered entity 18 is on notice of a disability. See Bax v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc., 52 19 F.4th 848, 869 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, there are at least issues of fact as to whether 20 Mr. Niederquell notified Defendants of his disability. 1 regulations and federal case law, a place of public accommodation may adopt 2 eligibility criteria based on legitimate safety concerns. See 28 CFR 36.301(b) (“A 3 public accommodation may impose legitimate safety requirements that are

4 necessary for safe operation”); Campbell v. Universal City Dev. Partners, Ltd., 72 5 F.4th 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[N]ecessary” eligibility criteria includes 6 “criteria imposed to ensure safety”).2 In addition, a covered entity may deny a

7 request to modify its policies and procedures based on legitimate safety concerns.3 8 Baughman v. Walt Disney World, 685 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Facilities 9 are not required to make any and all possible accommodations that would provide 10

2 The textual support for this exception lies in the statute’s recognition that a 11 place of public accommodation may impose eligibility criteria “necessary for the 12 provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 13 accommodations being offered.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). 14 3 The textual support for this exception lies in the statute’s recognition that a 15 place of public accommodation need only provide “reasonable” modifications to 16 policies “when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, 17 facilities, privileges, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless [the 18 place of public accommodation] can demonstrate that making such modifications 19 would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, 20 advantages, or accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii). 1 full and equal access to disabled persons; they need only make accommodations 2 that are reasonable. In deciding what’s reasonable, facilities may consider the costs 3 of such accommodations, disruption of their business and safety.”) (emphasis

4 added). 5 Citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3), Mr. Niederquell argues the only safety 6 concerns that may be considered under Title III are ones posed to others. Mr.

7 Niederquell claims that because his inability to wear shoes inside Defendants’ store 8 does not pose a health or safety risk to others, Defendants cannot enforce their 9 footwear policy simply because Mr. Niederquell poses a risk to himself. 10 The Court disagrees with Mr. Niederquell’s constrained reading of §

11 12182(b)(3). Mr. Niederquell correctly notes the language in Title III specifies that 12 nothing in the statute requires a covered entity to make adjustments to their 13 accommodations that would pose “a direct threat to the health or safety of others.”

14 Id. But, importantly, Title III does not say a covered entity is prohibited from 15 adjusting their accommodations out of concerns for the health or safety of the 16 disabled person. This is a distinction with a difference. See Chevron v. Echazabal, 17 536 U.S. 73, 81-82, 122 S.Ct. 2045 (2002) (In the context of Title I, Congress’s

18 explicit concerns about threats to others does not prohibit an employer from 19 adopting policies necessary to protect the disabled person themselves). Indeed, it 20 strains credulity to think that Congress intended Title III to empower disabled 1 persons to force covered entities to allow them to undertake dangerous activities. 2 Instead, consistent with DOJ regulations and governing case law, Title III allows a 3 covered entity to adopt legitimate safety measures to account for the protection of

4 both the disabled person and others. See Baughman, 685 F.3d at 1136); Campbell, 5 72 F.4th at 1254; 28 CFR 36.301(b). 6 Defendants argue their footwear policy is a legitimate health and

7 safety measure, consistent with the ADA. Defendants point out the goods 8 sold by their store pose hazards to all patrons, including broken glass, spilled 9 liquids, discarded drug paraphernalia and the resulting risks of burns or 10 lacerations or infection. ECF No. 79 at ¶¶3-20. These perils are increased if

11 a customer is not wearing shoes. Given the realities of operating a 7-Eleven 12 store, Defendants argue not only that their footwear policy is necessary, but 13 also that Mr. Niederquell’s requested accommodation—exemption from the

14 policy—is unreasonable. Furthermore, Defendants point out that they offer 15 an alternate accommodation—remote purchase of 7-Eleven goods through 16 the use of computer based applications or simply by calling the store. 17 According to Defendants, this accommodation is sufficient to meet Mr.

18 Niederquell’s needs. 19 The Court agrees with Defendants that undisputed facts support the 20 legitimacy of the footwear policy as well as Defendants’ refusal to accede to Mr. 1 Niederquell’s preferred accommodation. The ADA requires health and safety 2 measures be “based on actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or 3 generalizations about individuals with disabilities.” 28 CFR 36.301(b). Here, that

4 standard is met. It is well understood that barefoot customers face “significant 5 health and safety risk[s]”, even in environments posing fewer hazards than a 7- 6 Eleven store. Neinast v. Board of Trustees of Columbus Metropolitan Library, 346

7 F.3d 585, 594 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding public library’s footwear policy under a 8 First Amendment challenge). There is no indication Defendants adopted their 9 footwear policy based on stereotypes about people with disabilities. Indeed, part of 10 the problem in this case is Mr. Niederquell’s professed disability is unusual and

11 undoubtedly not anticipated by Defendants when they adopted the policy. The 12 Court recognizes stores face the threat of significant tort liability as a result of slip- 13 and-fall incidents. See, e.g., id. at 594. This risk is increased where, as here, a store

14 offers self-service areas. See O’Donnell v. Zupan Enterprises, Inc., 107 Wn. App. 15 854 (2001). It is entirely reasonable for a store to adopt policies, such as a footwear 16 requirement, to protect the safety of customers and reduce the risk of liability. 17 Mr. Niederquell complains the remote purchase modification is inadequate

18 because it bars him from “full and equal enjoyment” of 7-Eleven stores. 42 U.S.C. 19 § 12182(a). This argument fails for two reasons. First, as set forth above, 20 a modification is not reasonable, and therefore not required, if it poses legitimate 1 health and safety concerns. Second, Mr. Niederquell’s modification request is not 2 necessary to afford him access to 7-Eleven. The record makes clear the function of 3 Defendants’ 7-Eleven store is merely to sell goods. It is not an experienced-based

4 public accommodation akin to an amusement park or a movie theater. Compare 5 Baughman, 685 F.3d at 1135 (discussing reasonableness of accommodations to 6 allow full and equal enjoyment a theme park) with Fortyune v. American Multi-

7 Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing reasonableness 8 of accommodations to allow full and equal enjoyment of movie theater). Mr. 9 Niederquell is not deprived of any form of personal entertainment or services 10 because he is barred from walking down the aisles of a 7-Eleven store without

11 shoes. Mr. Niederquell can access 7-Eleven’s goods through use of Defendants’ 12 remote purchasing options without ever entering the store.4 Mr. Niederquell is thus 13 afforded equal enjoyment of 7-Eleven’s goods, regardless of his alleged disability.

14 This comports with the ADA. Nothing more is required. 15 CONCLUSION 16 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 77, is GRANTED 17 as to Mr. Niederquell’s federal claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

18 19

4 Although not addressed by the parties, it appears Mr. Niederquell could 20 also access the store by using a wheelchair. l 2. Defendants’ Motions to strike and for expedited consideration, ECF Nos. 98, 100, 101, 103, are DENIED as moot. 3 3. Spokane County Sheriff's Office’s Motion to Quash, ECF No. 113, is GRANTED. 4. Mr. Niederquell’s supplemental state law claims are REMANDED to Spokane County Superior Court, Case No. 25-2-01920-32, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) for further proceedings. 8 5. The Clerk’s Office is directed to CLOSE this file. IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this Order, provide copies to counsel, counsel for the Spokane County Sheriff's Office, certified copy to the Clerk of the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Spokane County, Case No. 25-2-01920-32, enter judgment as to the federal claims favor of Defendants, and close the file. 1 DATED June 30, 2026 FLL 15 REBECCA L. PENNELL 1 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 1 18 1 2

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR