Jacob Monroe Cullum v. State of Iowa
This text of Jacob Monroe Cullum v. State of Iowa (Jacob Monroe Cullum v. State of Iowa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1907 Filed October 30, 2024
JACOB MONROE CULLUM, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Adria Kester,
Judge.
An applicant appeals the denial of his postconviction-relief action claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ. 2
TABOR, Chief Judge.
After pleading guilty to two drug offenses and a related weapons charge,
Jacob Cullum appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief (PCR).
Cullum claims his counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress evidence
found during a warrantless search of his car. Because the search was justified
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, counsel had no duty
to file a meritless motion. Thus, we affirm the PCR ruling.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
A sheriff’s deputy on routine patrol noticed a car with front and rear license
plates that did not match. The deputy pulled up next to the car and spoke to the
driver, later identified as Cullum, who admitted that he did not have a valid driver’s
license. After ordering Cullum out of the car and handcuffing him, the deputy ran
his license and determined that he was driving while barred. The deputy then
arrested Cullum and searched him incident to arrest. While searching his person,
the deputy found a methamphetamine pipe, a small plastic bag of a crystalline
substance, and a loaded pistol magazine. Cullum denied having a gun in his car.
The deputy placed Cullum in the back of his patrol car. The deputy then searched
Cullum’s car and found a loaded pistol under the passenger seat; three small
plastic bags of a crystalline substance, two small plastic bags of a green leafy
substance, and drug paraphernalia inside a leather case on the floor in front of the
passenger seat; a rolled marijuana joint in the center console; and two marijuana
plants in the trunk.
The State charged Cullum with six counts: (1) possession with intent to
manufacture marijuana, (2) failure to affix a drug tax stamp, (3) driving while 3
barred, (4) possession of marijuana—second offense, (5) possession of
methamphetamine—first offense, and (6) carrying a dangerous weapon while
possessing a controlled substance. Defense counsel did not move to suppress
the evidence found in the vehicle search. Cullum filed a written plea of guilty to
counts four through six; the State dismissed the first three counts under a plea
agreement. The district court sentenced Cullum to 365 days in jail for each of the
three charges to be served consecutively, suspended the terms of incarceration,
and placed him on probation. He did not file a direct appeal of his sentence.
Instead, in 2023 Cullum applied for PCR, alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. Cullum argued that his counsel was remiss in not moving to suppress
the contraband found in his car.1 Trial counsel testified that he did not believe that
a motion to suppress would have succeeded, so he concentrated on securing a
plea deal. The district court denied relief, rejecting Cullum’s claims of ineffective
assistance. Cullum now appeals the PCR ruling.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
We ordinarily review PCR rulings for correction of legal error; but when the
applicant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, we review de novo. Goode v.
State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 2018).
III. Analysis
We analyze ineffective-assistance claims under a two-prong test. Dempsey
v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015). Cullum must show his counsel failed
1 Cullum also argued that the weapons charge was unconstitutional. The district court rejected that claim, and Cullum does not renew it on appeal. 4
to perform an essential duty, and that the failure resulted in prejudice. See id. If
he fails to prove either prong, we need not address the other. See id.
Because Cullum pleaded guilty, we view his claim of ineffective assistance
under the lens of State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Iowa 2009) (requiring
case-by-case analysis to decide whether counsel breached a duty before the guilty
plea, and whether that breach rendered the plea unintelligent or involuntary). See
Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Iowa 2011).
Cullum alleges that his counsel’s performance was subpar because he
recommended that Cullum accept the plea offer after advising him that the search
of his car was “textbook perfect.” Cullum insists that advice was inaccurate. He
claims that because counsel failed to move to suppress, his guilty pleas were
neither voluntary nor intelligent. A successful motion to suppress, according to
Cullum, would have forced the State to dismiss four of the six charges.
The State deflates Cullum’s argument. In its view, trial counsel had no duty
to move to suppress because the search of Cullum’s vehicle was justified under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.2 That exception allows
police to search if probable cause and exigent circumstances exist when police
stop the automobile. State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2017).3 “The
2 The State also argues that the search was justified under the warrant exception
for probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances. The State asserts that the mobility of the vehicle was the exigent circumstance. Because the search fell under the automobile exception, we do not address that similar alternative. 3 In Storm, the majority elected to retain the automobile exception. It compared
the “easy-to-apply automobile exception” to the less predictable alternative—“a case-by-case exigency determination resulting in prolonged roadside seizures awaiting a warrant, with attendant dangers and no net gain for civil liberties.” Id. at 142. The court acknowledged that it “may revisit this issue at a future time when 5
inherent mobility of motor vehicles satisfies the exigent-circumstances
requirement.” Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 145.
Cullum contends the deputy lacked probable cause to search. But he
underplays the significance of the deputy finding methamphetamine and a loaded
pistol magazine on his person. The evidence in Cullum’s possession gave the
deputy probable cause to believe that he was carrying more contraband in his car.
See State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Iowa 1996) (test is whether reasonable
person armed with all the facts of the stop would believe the car contained
contraband). Because methamphetamine is a controlled substance, the
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