Jacob Miday v. Harlans Auto Care, Ltd, et al.

District Court, N.D. Ohio·Decided September 16, 2026·No. 4:25-cv-01833·Unknown

Opinion

PEARSON, J. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION JACOB MIDAY, ) ) CASE NO. 4:25CV1833 Plaintiff, ) ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON v. ) ) HARLANS AUTO CARE, LTD, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION ) AND ORDER Defendants. ) [Resolving ECF Nos. 26 and 28] Pending is Defendants Harlans Auto Care, Ltd (“Harlans”) and Jack M. Harlan III’s (“Mr. Harlan”) Renewed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. ECF No. 26. Defendants move the Court to dismiss the First Amended Collective Action Complaint (ECF No. 12) because Plaintiff Jacob Miday was paid as a commissioned employee and is exempt from overtime. For the reasons set forth in Section III below, Defendants’ motion is denied as moot. Also pending is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint Instanter (ECF No. 28), filed one day after Defendants’ renewed dispositive motion. Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his affirmative pleading to: (1) conform the pleadings to the facts revealed by Defendants’ recent production of payroll data and time logs; (2) assert necessary factual allegations regarding uncompensated “diagnostic time” and the “piece-rate” nature of (4:25CV1833) Defendants’ pay plan; and (3) allege the specific mathematical failure of the requirements for the Section 7(i) retail or service commission exemption to the overtime provisions of the FLSA during the relevant period. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(i). Plaintiff attached the proposed Second

Amended Collective Action Complaint (ECF No. 28-1) to the motion. For the reasons set forth in Section II below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted. I. Background On September 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Collective Action Complaint for Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (“OMFWSA”) (ECF No. 1). On November 2, 2025, he filed a First Amended Collective Action Complaint for Violations of the FLSA and OMFWSA (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff alleges he is a former non-exempt hourly employee of Defendants. He brings a

putative collective action for willful violation of the overtime provisions of the FLSA (Count I) and a state-law claim for violation of the OMFWSA and Article II, Section 34a of the Ohio Constitution (Count II). Mr. Harlan is the owner and/or principal of Harlans, whom supervised and/or controlled Plaintiff’s employment. In March 2024, Plaintiff was hired as an Auto Repair Technician. Defendants allegedly did not pay Plaintiff or the putative Collective Class Members overtime for any hours worked over 40 in a single workweek. According to Plaintiff, he and the putative Collective Class Members were required to attend morning meetings lasting

approximately 30 minutes, for which they were not paid, resulting in additional unpaid overtime. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants did not keep accurate records of pre-shift meetings and other time worked. Plaintiff does not, however, state when his employment was terminated.

2 (4:25CV1833) Plaintiff requests back pay, unpaid overtime, liquidated damages under the FLSA, exemplary damages under the OMFWSA, statutory damages under Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.15, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs. Defendants filed their Answer to the First Amended Collective Action Complaint (ECF No. 21) on November 17, 2025, but did not file a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 23) until January 5, 2026. Defendants subsequently filed a Notice of Withdrawal of 12(c) Motion (ECF No. 24) “pending further consultations between the parties and additional document discovery.” On January 15, 2026, ECF No. 23 was marked withdrawn. See Order (ECE No. 25). II. ECF No. 28 The Court requires the party seeking leave of court to amend to “certify that prior notice of the proposed amendment was given and the adverse party withheld consent.” Case Management Plan (“CMP”) (ECF No. 17) at PageID #: 91, § 11. In compliance therewith, Plaintiffs counsel conferred with Defense counsel by telephone on January 20, 2026 to determine whether Defendants would oppose the proposed amendment. See ECF No. 28 at PagelD #: 147. Notably, this occurred the day before Defendants filed their Renewed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 26). Thus, Defendants were fully aware of the proposed amendment before they chose to file ECF No. 26. After Plaintiff's counsel renewed his inquiry by email on January 21, 2026, Defense counsel indicated that he “could not consent” to the filing of the proposed Second Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 28 at PagelID #: 147. A.

(4:25CV1833) Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A), district courts are required to issue a scheduling order that limits the time to join other parties and to amend the pleadings. The cutoff to amend pleadings and add parties was December 31, 2025. See ECF No. 17 at PageID #: 91,4111. This cutoff date was set in compliance with Local Rule 16.3(b)(2)(H). Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint /nstanter (ECF No. 28), however, was not filed until January 22, 2026. Plaintiff does not dispute that ECF No. 28 was filed after the Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 cutoff to amend the pleadings had passed. According to Rule 16(b)(4), when the Court has entered a scheduling order that limits the time to join other parties and to amend the pleadings, “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” In Jnge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit stated that good cause is primarily measured by the movant’s “diligence in attempting to meet the case management order’s requirements.” /d. at 625 (quoting Bradford vy. DANA Corp., 249 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2001)). Prejudice to the party opposing the modification is not an express component of Rule 16, however, the Sixth Circuit has stated that a district court must consider prejudice to the non-moving party when it decides whether to amend a scheduling order. Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th Cir. 2003); Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 662-63 (6th Cir. 1994). If the Court determines that the movant satisfies the requirements of Rule 16(b), then the Court must determine whether the moving party has satisfied the requirements of Rule 15. /d. At this stage of the proceedings, Rule 15 asks whether leave should be freely given because justice so requires.

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Jacob Miday v. Harlans Auto Care, Ltd, et al., (N.D. Ohio 2026).

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