Jacob Kalman v. Anthony J. Principi

18 Vet. App. 522, 2004 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 813, 2004 WL 2940822
CourtUnited States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
DecidedDecember 21, 2004
Docket03-0947
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 18 Vet. App. 522 (Jacob Kalman v. Anthony J. Principi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jacob Kalman v. Anthony J. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 522, 2004 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 813, 2004 WL 2940822 (Cal. 2004).

Opinion

KASOLD, Judge:

Veteran Jacob Kalman appeals through counsel a September 13, 2002, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) that dismissed his appeal on the basis that he had withdrawn his Substantive Appeal to the Board. Mr. Kalman requests reversal, arguing that the Board erred in its determination that the Substantive Appeal *523 had been withdrawn because that determination did not comply with the regulatory requirements. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 6-8. The Secretary argues that the Board’s decision was supported by a plausible basis in the record and urges the Court to affirm. Secretary’s Br. at 5-8. For the reasons set forth below, the Board’s decision will be reversed and the matter remanded.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Kalman served on active duty in the U.S. Air Force from October 1956 to March 1960. Record (R.) at 8. Four months after service, he claimed service connection for residuals of anterior-chest-wall trauma, which was granted with a noncompensable rating. R. at 40-43, 62-63. In early 1999, Mr. Kalman sought a compensable rating for his service-connected anterior-chest-wall trauma and sought service connection for, inter alia, hiatal hernia, psoriasis, bipolar disorder, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. R. at 65-66, 73-74, 78-80. A VA regional office (RO) denied the claims (R. at ISO-35), and Mr. Kalman filed a Notice of Disagreement (R. at 141, 152). Mr. Kal-man was subsequently awarded service connection for a bipolar disorder. R. at 2, 274.

In June 2000, during a hearing before the RO, Mr. Kalman verbally perfected his appeal to the Board by submitting his testimony during the hearing in lieu of a written Substantive Appeal. R. at 206-07. In January 2002, the RO sent to Mr. Kal-man a letter informing him that his appeal was perfected as to his claims for, inter alia, service connection for psoriasis and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder and for his claim for an increased rating for residuals of his service-connected anterior-chest-wall trauma. R. at 285. The RO also stated: “The only issue that remains relative to your appeal inquiry, which you must clarify, is whether you want a Board of Veteran’s [sic] Appeals’ [sic] ... Travel Board Hearing or a [Board] Video Conference....” R. at 285. On January 22, 2002, Mr. Kalman responded by letter, stating: “[Y]ou refer to ‘the only issue that remains to your appeal inquiry, which you must clarify.’ [sic] Since you did not specifically name that issue [,] I reluctantly have to assume that it is the chest[-]wall trauma_That is the only issue remaining ....” R. at 288 (former emphasis added; latter emphasis in original). At some point, Mr. Kalman did request a video-conference hearing.

At the Board video-conference hearing, a Board member indicated that the issue before the Board was “increased rating for bipolar disorder,” to which Mr. Kalman’s representative replied: “No, there was some chest trauma in service [for] which he was given a[0%] rating.... They found out that it was misdiagnosed. The correct diagnosis was a hiatal hernia....” R. at 298. Mr. Kalman then testified about both the hernia and the chest-wall trauma. R. at 301-05. At the end of the testimony, when asked whether there was anything else Mr. Kalman wished to cover, his representative stated: “No, I don’t think there is any other issue. Although we thought there was in the beginning.” R. at 305.

In its September 2002 decision, the Board referred the hiatal-hernia claim to the RO because no rating decision had been issued on that claim. R. at 2. The Board dismissed the claims of service connection for psoriasis and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder and the claim for a compensable evaluation for residuals of anterior-chest-wall trauma “without prejudice,” finding that Mr. Kalman had withdrawn those claims. R. at 4. In doing so, the Board found that Mr. Kalman “essen *524 tially asserted” that service connection for hiatal hernia was warranted and that was “the only issue remaining.” Id. The Board also noted that, at the hearing before the Board, Mr. Kalman addressed only the issue of service connection for the hiatal hernia and, when asked whether there were any other issues, Mr. Kalman’s representative stated: “No, I don’t think there is any other issue.” Id.

II. ANALYSIS

When reviewing the question of a claimant’s withdrawal of an appeal to the Board, the Court must take into consideration “the nonadversarial setting of the [VA] claims adjudication process,” Isenbart v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 537, 541 (1995), during which VA is required to construe liberally all submissions by a claimant, see EF v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 (1991); see also Verdon v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 529, 533 (1996) (holding that when it is ambiguous whether a claim is withdrawn in a written letter, “it is not sufficient for the Board to conclude there was an abandonment without providing an adequate statement of reasons or bases to support that conclusion”); 38 C.F.R. § 20.202 (2004) (arguments within the Substantive Appeal to Board will be construed “in a liberal manner for purposes of determining whether they raise issues on appeal”). The Board’s determination on whether Mr. Kalman’s January 2002 response to the RO constituted a withdrawal of his appeal is a finding of fact that the Court reviews under the “clearly erroneous” standard of review set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4) (Court shall “hold unlawful and set aside” clearly erroneous factual findings). Cf. Hanson v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 29, 32 (1996) (applying “clearly erroneous” standard of review involving withdrawal of a claim at the RO). “ A finding is “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 52 (1990) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). If the Board’s “ ‘account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it? ” Gilbert, supra (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)).

At the time of the Board hearing in this case, the regulations provided that an appeal could be withdrawn only in a writing, submitted prior to the Board’s promulgated decision and, if an appeal was filed by the claimant, an authorized representative could submit a withdrawal on his behalf only if he had the “express written consent” of the claimant. 38 C.F.R. § 20.204(b), (c) (2002). In finding that Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
18 Vet. App. 522, 2004 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 813, 2004 WL 2940822, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jacob-kalman-v-anthony-j-principi-cavc-2004.