ACCEPTED 07-15-00118 SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS 9/28/2015 10:50:55 PM Vivian Long, Clerk
No. 07-15-00118-CR FILED IN 7th COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS In the Court of Appeals 9/28/2015 10:50:55 PM VIVIAN LONG for the Seventh District of Texas CLERK Amarillo _________________ JACOB JORDANN BRIGHT, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. _________________
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1, Tarrant County, Texas, The Honorable Elizabeth Beach Presiding ____________________________
APPELLANT’S INITIAL BRIEF ____________________________
WILLIAM R. BIGGS WILLIAM R. BIGGS, PLLC 115 W. 2nd St., Suite 202 Fort Worth, TX 76102 817.332.3822 (t) 817.332.2763 (f) wbiggs@williambiggslaw.com TX Bar No. 24052832 ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The number and style of the case in the court below is as follows:
State of Texas v. Jacob Jordann Bright, Cause No. 1306330D, Criminal
District Court No. 1, Tarrant County, TX.
Criminal District Judge Hon. Elizabeth Beach
Defendant-Appellant Jacob Jordann Bright
Prosecution-Appellee The State of Texas
Defense Counsel William R. Biggs (appeal) 115 W. 2nd St., Suite 202 Fort Worth, TX 76102
William H. Ray (trial) 512 Main St., Suite 308 Fort Worth, TX 76102
Stephen E. Gordon (trial) 2101 Moneda St. Fort Worth, TX 76117
Prosecution-Appellee Sharen Wilson Tarrant County District Attorney 401 W. Belknap, 4th Floor Fort Worth, TX 76196
Assistant District Attorneys:
Steve Gebhardt (trial) Michele Hartman (trial)
i TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ISSUE PRESENTED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
I. The evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding of guilt on capital murder.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
II. The trial court provided erroneous instructions to the jury which constitute reversible error... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
III. The trial court erred by declining to exclude from evidence text messages from “Shawn,” in violation of TEX. R. EVID. 403. . . . . 36
PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS CASES
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W. 2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 32, 33
Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W. 3d 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). . . . . . . . . . 22
Dougherty v State, 188 S.W. 3d 670, 2006 WL 475802 at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 33
Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W. 2d 267, 272 (Tex. Crm. App. 1999). . . . 25, 28
Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).. . . . . . . . . 23
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App.2007). . . . . . . . . . . 23
King v. State, 953 S.W. 2d 2266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). . . . . . . . 37
McGee v. State, 774 S.W. 2d 229, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).. . . . . . . 24
Medina v. State, 7 S.W. 3d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). . . . . . . . . 32
Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 488-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). . . . . . . 22
Nava v. State, 415 S.W. 3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 32, 33, 34
iii PAGE
Paulson v. State, 28 S.W. 3d 570, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). . . . . . . 35
Riles v. State, 595 S.W. 2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). . . . . . 24, 25
Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W. 3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). . . . . . . . 37
Soloman v State, 49 S.W. 3d 345, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). . . . 37, 40
Taylor v. State, 332 S.W. 3d 483, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).. . . . 27, 28
Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W. 3d 654, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 29, 30
Torres v. State, 81 S.W. 3d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). . . . . . . . . 36
COURTS OF APPEALS CASES
Chaney v. State, 314 S.W. 3d 561, 568-573 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Dougherty v. State, 2007 Tex App. LEXIS 4449 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist., June 7, 2007) (unpublished). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Matthews v. State, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6861 (Tex. App.—FortWorth, July 2, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35, 36
Montgomery v. State, 198 S.W. 3d 67, 79 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2006, pet. ref’d.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Vosberg v. State, 80 S.W. 3d 320, 324 (Tex.App.—FortWorth, 2002, pet. ref’d.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 35, 36
iv STATUTES AND RULES
TEX. R. APP. PR. 44.2(B).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
TEX. PEN. CODE § 19.02(b)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
TEX. PEN. CODE § 19.02(b)(2).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
TEX. PEN. CODE § 19.02(b)(3).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Tex. Pen. Code § 19.03(a)(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4, 23
TEX. R. EVID. 403. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 37, 42
v STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case presents an appeal of a criminal judgment of conviction
and sentence arising from Criminal District Court No. 1 in Tarrant
County, Texas.
Appellant Jacob Jordann Bright was indicted with one count of
capital murder, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). (CR 9.) The
State waived the death penalty. (CR 173.)
The case proceeded to jury trial and the jury returned a verdict of
guilty. (CR 296); (6 RR 133-36.) The Court sentenced Appellant to life
without parole. (6 RR 135-36); (CR 301-06.) Appellant timely filed a
notice of appeal the same day. (CR 307.)
This appeal follows.
Page 1 of 44 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is requested.
Page 2 of 44 ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Is the evidence legally sufficient to support a conviction?
II. Did the trial court commit reversible jury charge error when defining capital murder and murder in the jury instructions?
III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to exclude text messages from “Shawn” under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence?
Page 3 of 44 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
INDICTMENT
The State of Texas indicted Appellant for capital murder, as
proscribed under Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). (CR 9.) That is, the
State alleged that Appellant committed intentional murder in the course
of a robbery or attempted robbery. (CR 9.) The indictment specifically
alleged that Appellant, on or about November 19, 2012, did:
then and there cause the death of an individual, Islander Tavira, by shooting him with a firearm, and said defendant was then and there in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery. (CR 9.)
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY AND SHOOTING
On November 19, 2012, Islander Tavira was shot and killed in the
courtyard area of the South Gate apartment complex in Fort Worth, TX.
Tavira, his girlfriend, Maria Rodriguez, and two of her children had
returned to the South Gate apartments sometime during the evening. It
was dark. (3 RR 67.) As they were parking, Rodriguez saw two
individuals inside a breezeway which connected the parking lot to the
interior courtyard of the complex. (3 RR 70-71.) Their front door was
Page 4 of 44 located inside the courtyard; the breezeway provided passage between the
parking lot and the front door. (3 RR 70; 80.)
Tavira pulled into a parking spot a few spaces to the left of the
breezeway. See (State Ex. 5-7); (3 RR 71-72.) Exiting the car, Tavira
walked in front of the vehicles towards the breezeway, between the
vehicles and a wall of the apartment complex; Rodriguez and her children
walked behind the vehicles towards the breezeway. (State Ex. 5-7); (3 RR
72-73.)
As Tavira approached the corner of the wall and the breezeway, he
was near the back of a red truck. (State Ex. 11); (3 RR 75.) Near the edge
of the breezeway, Rodriguez saw a short black man, dressed in all black
and wearing a cold-weather mask. (3 RR 74-76.) She did not recognize
him. (3 RR 77.) He held a gun in his right hand, and it was pointed at
Tavira. (3 RR 78.) The man told Tavira in broken Spanish that he wanted
money. (3 RR 77-78.) Tavira replied in Spanish that he didn’t have any
money. (3 RR 78.) The man again advised he wanted money and Tavira
again told him he did not have any money. (3 RR 78.) The man had been
holding his pants with his left hand. During the encounter, Rodriguez
Page 5 of 44 remembered that the man let go of his pants and might have touched the
red truck immediately nearby. (3 RR 90-91.)
At this point one of the minors, J.R., ran through the breezeway
towards the courtyard. (3 RR 79.) The masked man then turned and ran,
either after or at least in the same direction as J.R. (3 RR 79-88.)
Rodriguez told Tavira that J.R. had run, and that the masked man was
running after him. (3 RR 81.) Both Tavira and Rodriguez then ran
through the breezeway after the masked man. (3 RR 81.)
The man ran into the grass courtyard. (3 RR 83.) He turned around
and was either running or walking quickly backwards; while doing so he
shot his gun. (3 RR 84-85.) Tavira was hit three times and grazed once.
(5 RR 79-84.) Tavira was hit near the collarbone, below the left armpit,
and in the left elbow. (5 RR 79-84.) The shot near the collarbone proved
to be lethal because the bullet ruptured an artery. (5 RR 80-82.) The shot
to the armpit traveled through the abdominal area. (5 RR 82-82.) A
fourth shot grazed his right shoulder. (5 RR 79-80.) The man continued
running in the opposite direction and left. (3 RR 86.)
Page 6 of 44 According to Rodriguez, Islander stood for two minutes before he
collapsed. (3 RR 87.) He was pronounced dead at the hospital. (5 RR 98.)
Mechelle Patterson testified that she saw the shooting from inside
her apartment. She claimed that Appellant and Floyd McCoy were in her
apartment prior to the shooting. (4 RR 83.) According to Patterson,
Appellant told McCoy that he had lost some money and wanted to get it
back. (4 RR 84-85.) McCoy suggested that Appellant rob someone and
Appellant was receptive to that idea. (4 RR 85.) Appellant had a revolver.
(4 RR 86.) The two eventually left the apartment. (4 RR 87.)
Patterson claimed she saw Floyd and Appellant “peeking around the
corner of the breezeway from across [her] apartment.” (4 RR 88.) But she
never saw Appellant wearing any kind of face covering. (4 RR 87.)
Eventually McCoy returned to the apartment. (4 RR 90-91.) At some
point she saw Appellant running through the breezeway. (4 RR 92-93.)
She then saw a “little Mexican man” running through the breezeway and
“it looked like he was chasing after Jacob.” (4 RR 92-93.) Patterson
testified Appellant “turned around and fired off three shots.” (4 RR 92-93.)
Page 7 of 44 The man collapsed after the third shot. (4 RR 108.) She fell to the ground,
began to cry, and did not see where Jacob went. (4 RR 94; 108-09.)
Beatriz Alvera, Appellant’s live-in girlfriend at the time, testified
that Appellant told her about the shooting. (4 RR 128.) According to
Alvera, Appellant told her that he had asked a guy to “give him whatever
he had.” (4 RR 128.) Appellant advised her that he “noticed they knew
each other,” and “he took off running.” (4 RR 128.) The “guy came after
him and they started tussling.” (4 RR 128.) He was “scared and didn’t
know what to do,” so he “pulled the trigger.” (4 RR 128.)
IDENTITY
Without text messages
The State elicited the following evidence in effort to establish that
Appellant was the shooter.
Surveillance footage from a nearby school showed someone park a
car matching Olvera’s at the South Gate apartment complex several hours
prior to the shooting. (5 RR 109-110; State Ex. 60.) Appellant’s girlfriend
arrived to pick up the car after the shooting. (5 RR 110-111; State Ex. 60.)
Surveillance video also showed an individual running through the school
Page 8 of 44 parking lot near the time of the shooting. (5 RR 107-108; State Ex. 60.)
Cell phone records suggested that Appellant had been in the general
vicinity of the shooting when the shooting took place. (4 RR 220-257.)
Brian Mason testified that he saw Appellant at the South Gate
apartments earlier in the day. (4 CRR 32-33.) Mason’s brother lives in
South Gate; Mason’s son was also present. (4 RR 32-33.) According to
Mason, Appellant took an interest in a black Halloween mask in Mason’s
son’s possession. (4 RR 32-34.) Appellant expressed interest in acquiring
the mask. (4 RR 34.) When Mason left the apartment, he “threw it out
the window, on the street.” (4 RR 34.)
Later that day, Mason saw Appellant running towards his house
(technically, his mother’s house) on East Seminary. (4 RR 36.) The house
is a 15-20 minute run from South Gate Apartments. (4 RR 42.) Appellant
looked excited and was asking for help. (4 RR 34-39; 51.) Appellant was
asked to leave and he eventually left. Rashad Holloway testified that he
picked up Appellant at Mason’s house. (4 RR 56; 65-66.) He took
Appellant home and then took Alvera to pick up her car, dropping her off
at a Citgo station near the apartment. (4 RR-56-60.)
Page 9 of 44 Alvera testified that Appellant arrived back at the apartment with
a man purporting to be his cousin. Alvera accompanied the cousin to the
apartment complex to pick up her car, though they first strolled through
the complex “to see what was going on.” (4 RR 127-128.) Alvera testified
that she returned and told Alvera about the shooting. (4 RR 128)
The only purported eyewitness who identified Appellant as the
shooter was Patterson. She claimed McCoy had also been present, but
McCoy never testified. Patterson initially claimed in a 38 minute
interview with law enforcement that she did not see what happened. (4
RR 79-81.) She only identified Appellant as the shooter after she caught
a felony drug case a year and a half later. (4 RR 96; 99.) Patterson met
with prosecutors, changed her story, and her case was ultimately
dismissed. (4 RR 94-97.) Patterson claimed she had initially been
untruthful when police suspected “Dante” had been the shooter. (4 RR 80-
81.)
No fingerprints or DNA could link Appellant to the robbery; no
fingerprints or DNA of Appellant’s could be found on the red truck located
immediately near the robbery. (4 RR 201-202); (5 RR 16-26.) While
Page 10 of 44 Appellant’s fingerprints were found on Alvera’s car, the two lived together
and were in a relationship. (4 RR 114; 212.)
Text messages
Over defense objection, the State admitted screen shots of text
messages contained on Appellant’s phone. See ( 5 RR 126- 140; 6 RR 6-18.)
This included a series of text messages exchanged between Appellant and
“Shawn,” who the State established was an older brother of Appellant. (4
RR 55; 133; 5 RR 65-66.)
They included the following:
Shawn: An get a different phone get redd of your phone. Get a prepaid phone. To much text an talking on that phone.
Appellant: Bet
Shawn: You can get away with this just play your cards right. I got to make sure nobody talkin. you no officer west bitch ass no you. (State Ex. 78)
Appellant: I know but he aint seen me in 7 months he don’t even know I still be coming to the hood. 1200 Blocc hot boy. *** Shawn: Did eneyone see you.
Appellant: No.
Page 11 of 44 Shawn: Are you sure?
Appellant: Yea.
See (State Ex. 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85.)
Defendant objected to the admission of “Shawn’s” texts on a number
of grounds, including Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See ( 5 RR
126- 140; 6 RR 6-18.)
The State also introduced a text message to a friend, “Manual,” that
appeared to place Appellant at the South Gate apartments approximately
an hour before the shooting:
Mon, Nov. 19, 8:23 p.m.
Appellant: Say bro im in south gates im tryna fuck wit u bro holla at me. (State ex. 94.)
DEFENSE CASE
Appellant testified in his defense. He acknowledged that he had
driven to the South Gate apartment complex in his girlfriend’s car that
night. (4 RR 60-61.) He testified that he had come to the South Gate
apartments in order to sell a firearm and marijuana to McCoy; the
transaction took place in Patterson’s apartment. (6 RR 62-66.) Appellant
Page 12 of 44 testified that he soon thereafter went to see a friend at a nearby
apartment complex for two or three hours. (6 RR 66.)
Appellant testified that he then went outside the nearby apartment
complex and sat in a car with Miesha Davis, another girlfriend. (6 RR 67.)
They sat together smoking marijuana for 30-45 minutes when McCoy
approached the car. (6 RR 69.) McCoy confronted Appellant about the
firearm Appellant had sold him. McCoy complained the firearm did not
work, and he wanted a refund. (6 RR 72-73.) The two got in fight. (6 RR
72.) After the fight, Appellant ran to Mason’s house. (6 RR 72.)
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In the Court’s charge, the Court defined capital murder in the
following manner:
[a] person commits the offense of capital murder if the person intentionally commits the offense of murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery.
(CR 289) (emphasis added). In defining murder, the Court instructed the
jury that:
[a] person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally causes the death of an individual or intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
Page 13 of 44 (CR 289) (emphasis added).
The jury was invited to consider murder as a lesser-included offense.
(CR 291-292.) Neither the murder definition nor the application
paragraph included felony-murder conduct in its definition. The
application paragraph provided:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 19th day of November, 2012, in Tarrant County, Texas, Jacob Jordann Bright, did then and there intentionally cause the death of an individual, Islander Tavira, by shooting him with a firearm, or intended to cause serious bodily injury to Islander Tavira and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, by shooting him with a firearm, you will find the defendant guilty of the offense of murder.
(CR 292.)
Regarding the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, the trial court
instructed the jury that “[i]t is not required that the prosecution prove
guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecutions’ proof
exclude all reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s guilt.” (CR 291.)
CLOSING ARGUMENT, JURY DELIBERATIONS, AND VERDICT
During closing argument, the State specifically emphasized
Appellant’s text conversation with Shawn. See (6 RR 130-131.) And
Page 14 of 44 during deliberations, the jury requested to see the exhibits which
photographed these series of text messages on Appellant’s phone. See
(CR 297.)
The jury ultimately found Appellant guilty of capital murder. (CR
296); (6 RR 133-36.) The trial court sentenced Appellant to life without
parole. (6 RR 135-36); (CR 301-06.)
Page 15 of 44 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue I:
The evidence was legally insufficient for two reasons. First, the
evidence does not establish that the murder was committed “in the course”
of a robbery or attempted robbery. The evidence shows that any
attempted robbery had been abandoned by the time of the shooting. The
State could only plausibly argue that the shooting was committed in
immediate flight from the attempted robbery. However, this putative
basis also fails, because the evidence shows that the shooter did not fire
his weapon while fleeing from any attempted robbery. Rather, the
evidence shows that the shooter fired his gun to stave off an attack from
Tavira, who had (justifiably) gone after the shooter to protect a minor that
the shooter had been or appeared to be chasing.
Second, the evidence fails to show that the shooter specifically
intended to kill Tavira. The evidence shows a quick sequence of events
where the shooter appeared to have gotten scared and fired his gun to
avoid an attack from Tavira. The shooter did not hit Tavira in the head,
heart or any other organ that might demonstrate a specific intent to kill.
Page 16 of 44 Rather Tavira died because a bullet to his clavicle ruptured an artery.
Additionally, the evidence shows that the shooter fled while Tavira was
still standing. A rational juror would find that a shooter would not have
simply left while Tavira was still standing if he specifically intended to kill
him.
Issue II:
The trial court provided erroneous instructions to the jury that
caused egregious harm. The trial court made two related errors in
defining capital murder and murder. First, the trial court defined capital
murder in terms of “intentionally commit[ting] the offense of murder”
instead of narrowing the conduct to “intentionally causing the death of
another.” Murder was in turn defined in the charge as encompassing both
1) intentionally causing the death of another, and 2) with intent to cause
serious bodily injury, committing an act clearly dangerous to human life
that caused the death of another. Reading these definitions together, the
jury would have been mislead into believing that serious-bodily-injury
murder could support a capital murder conviction.
Page 17 of 44 The trial court also erred in defining murder. It failed to include
felony murder in its definition of murder. That is, the definition failed to
include a third type of murder: during the course of a felony or attempted
felony commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that results in the
death of an individual. The application paragraph to the lesser-included
offense of murder also failed to include felony murder as an option,
thereby limiting the potential bases for a jury to find the lesser-included
offenses of murder.
These errors caused egregious harm. The application paragraph to
capital murder correctly narrowed the murder element to intentionally
causing the death of Tavira, but this does not end the inquiry.
Additionally, the application paragraph for felony murder failed to include
felony murder in its definition. The error was particularly harmful in
light of the state of the evidence. Once the jury identified Appellant as the
shooter, his specific intent would have been the central issue of the trial.
The chaotic events leading up to the shooting, the fact that Appellant did
not shoot Tavira in the head or vital organ, and the fact that Appellant left
while Tavira was standing would cast grave doubt as to whether Appellant
Page 18 of 44 had a specific intent to kill. Furthermore, the arguments of counsel, or
lack thereof failed to cure the harm. While the arguments of counsel did
not make the error worse, their silence on this issue failed to cure the
harm arising from the erroneous definitions.
Appellant also claims that the trial court erred when it instructed
the jury that the prosecution need not prove guilt beyond all doubt.
However, he acknowledges this particular issue is foreclosed under the
Second Court of Appeals decision in Vosberg v. State, 80 S.W. 3d 320, 324
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2002, pet. ref’d.). He nevertheless raises the issue
to preserve for further review.
Issue III.
The trial court erred when it declined to exclude from evidence text
messages found on Appellant’s phone from “Shawn,” a man who appeared
to be Appellant’s older brother. In Shawn’s messages, he 1) instructs
Appellant to get a different phone; 2) tells Appellant he can “get away with
this” 3) informs Appellant he intends to make sure that “nobody talkin;”
and 4) he inquires as to whether anyone saw him. The evidence should
have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.
Page 19 of 44 The evidence is of limited probative value because the messages fail
to specify what exactly the two are talking about. Second, to the extent
that the two are talking about the shooting, the evidence fails to show
what if any personal knowledge Shawn actually may have about the
shooting. Third, it cannot be determined whether Shawn actually sent the
incriminating text messages, as it is unknown who may have access to his
phone.
For similar reasons, the evidence is unduly prejudicial. The evidence
invites the jury to believe that on an irrational basis that Appellant
committed the shooting. It is unknown exactly what event Shawn may be
describing, and assuming it is the murder, the basis for Shawn’s
information is unknown. Additionally, the text messages allow the jury
to rely on unknown implied hearsay, the reliability of wich cannot be
tested by cross examination.
The error caused harm. The central issue of the trial was identity,
and only one eyewitness, Mechelle Patterson, could positively identify
Appellant as the shooter. But this witness was not credible: she initially
denied any knowledge of the shooting and only changed her story after
Page 20 of 44 catching a felony case. Furthermore, her story differs in key aspects with
the account of the victim’s spouse, a more credible witness. Additionally,
no physical evidence could tie Appellant to the particular scene of the
shooting.
The text messages provided an important (though irrational) link
between Appellant and the shooting. The State attorney specifically
emphasized the text messages in his closing remarks to the jury.
Additionally, the jury specifically requested the text messages in a note to
the trial court. For these reasons, the Court has no fair assurance that the
error did not influence the jury. Thus, the conviction must be reversed.
Page 21 of 44 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. The evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding of guilt on capital murder.
A. Standard of Review
While Appellant did move for a directed verdict following the State’s
case, (6 RR 25), challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence “need not be
preserved for appellate review at the trial level, and it is not forfeited by
the failure to do so.” Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 488-89 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004). When such a claim is raised on direct appeal, “the appellate
court always has a duty to address that issue, regardless of whether it was
raised in the trial court.” Id. at 488.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must
apply the familiar Constitutional standard: viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, it must determine if any rational trier
of fact could have found each of the essential elements of the offense to
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W. 3d 820
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This “rigorous due-process standard . . . .
protect[s] a defendant from conviction without sufficient proof of every
Page 22 of 44 element of the offense to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.”
Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Cochran, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Under this “rigorous” standard, this Court must review all of the
evidence and “reasonable inferences therefrom” and determine if the
standard is met. See, e.g., Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim.
App.2007) (emphasis added).
B. Argument
The evidence was legally insufficient in two respects. First, the
evidence was legally insufficient in showing that Appellant caused death
“in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of
robbery.” (CR 9.) Secondly, the evidence was legally insufficient in
showing that Appellant specifically intended to cause the death of the
Tavira.
In order to establish that the death was caused “in the course of
committing” robbery or attempted robbery under § 19.03(a)(2), the State
must prove the murder took place “in an attempt to commit, during the
commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the
Page 23 of 44 offense . . . of robbery.” Riles v. State, 595 S.W. 2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980); see McGee v. State, 774 S.W. 2d 229, 234 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989). The evidence showed no such nexus between any robbery or
attempted robbery.
The evidence demonstrated that the shooting had taken place after
an attempted robbery. Rodriguez testified that a masked individual held
Tavira at gunpoint and twice asked for money in Spanish. (3 RR 77-78.)
But once her minor child ran past them through the breezeway, the
masked individual took off behind the child and appeared to be chasing
the child. (3 RR 79-88.) Rodriguez and Tavira then ran after the masked
individual. (3 RR 81.) The masked individual eventually turned around
and opened fire. (3 RR 84-85.) Patterson similarly testified that it looked
like the “little Mexican man . . . was chasing after Jacob.” (4 RR 92-93.)
It was at that point that Jacob “turned around and fired off three shots.”
(4 RR 92-93.)
The evidence shows that the shooter had abandoned the commission
of any robbery and thus the shooting did not take place “in the course” of
any robbery or attempted robbery. The evidence shows that the shooter
Page 24 of 44 fired the gun at Tavira in order to stave off any attack from him; he and
Rodriguez were running after him, apparently out of justifiable concern for
their child. No evidence in the record suggests that the shooter still has
any interest in effectuating a robbery.
The only remotely plausible basis for finding the shooting took place
“in the course” of an attempted robbery would be that the shooting took
place “in immediate flight after the [robbery] attempt.” Riles, 595 S.W. 2d
858, 862 (Tex. Crim. 1980). But the evidence fails to support this theory
as well. The evidence did not suggest that Tavira was chasing Appellant
after a failed attempt to rob him. On the contrary, it was clear that
Tavira was chasing after the masked individual because of a perceived
threat to J.R. The masked individual then shot Tavira because it
appeared that Tavira would (justifiably) attack him. The shooter did not
appear to fire at Tavira in order to effectuate his escape from the
attempted robbery itself.
Secondly, no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant specifically intended to kill Tavira. See Fuentes v.
State, 991 S.W. 2d 267, 272 (Tex. Crm. App. 1999) (“The distinguishing
Page 25 of 44 element between felony murder and capital murder is the intent to kill.”)
At best the evidence showed that Appellant “committed an act clearly
dangerous to human life” in firing shots at Appellant, whose death was
caused by a shot to the collarbone which happened to rupture an artery.
(5 RR 81.)
Tavira sustained no injuries to the head or vital organs such as the
heart. The decedent was hit in the elbow, the left armpit, left collarbone,
and grazed on the right shoulder. It just so happened that the shot to the
collarbone ruptured an artery. The evidence shows this to have been a
quick decision made soon after turning around and while in retreat from
a charging Tavira. The evidence shows a quick, clearly dangerous act
committed to stave off an attack, not an act specifically calculated to end
Tavira’s life.
The evidence below stands in stark contrast to a scenario where a
robber shoots a convenience store clerk in the head at close range while
the clerk is kneeling at gunpoint. Those facts evince an intent to kill; or
at the very least a rational juror could find such intent beyond a
reasonable doubt given the circumstances. But here there no such facts.
Page 26 of 44 Rodriguez testified that Tavira remained standing for several minutes
prior to falling to the ground. (3 RR 87.) Had the shooter specifically
intended to kill Tavira, it would stand to reason that he would have fired
another shot at close range.
A rational trier of fact must not only find that the evidence gives rise
to an plausible inference of such intent; the rational juror must find the
evidence yields such an inference beyond a reasonable doubt. No rational
juror could conclude on these facts beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant specifically intended to kill Tavira. For these reasons, the
conviction must be reversed.
II. The trial court provided erroneous instructions to the jury which constitute reversible error.
A . Standard of Review
Under Rule 36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the “trial
judge is ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the jury charge and
accompanying instructions.” Taylor v. State, 332 S.W. 3d 483, 488 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). This duty exists “even when defense counsel fails to
object to inclusion or exclusions in the charge.” Id. at 486. Claims of jury
Page 27 of 44 charge error are thus reviewable notwithstanding the absence of a timely
objection at trial.
If no objection is made, this Court will reverse the jury charge error
if the error resulted in “egregious harm.” Id. at 489 (citing Almanza v.
State, 686 S.W. 2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Egregious harm
means the error was such that it “deprived [Appellant] of a fair and
impartial trial.” Taylor, 332 S.W. 3d 489; see Almanza, 686 S.W. 2d at
489. “The record must disclose ‘actual rather than theoretical harm,’ and
the error must have affected the very basis of the case, deprived the
defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affected a defensive theory.” Nava
v. State, 415 S.W. 3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Taylor, 332
S.W. at 489). In conducting its inquiry, the Court must look to the jury
charge, the state of the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and any other
relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Id.
1) The court erroneously instructed the jury as to the definitions of capital murder and murder.
The trial court made multiple errors in the jury charge. First, it
defined capital murder in a way that would lead a jury to believe it did not
Page 28 of 44 necessarily have to find that Appellant specifically intended to kill Tavira.
Second, the trial court failed to include felony murder in both its definition
of murder, and in the application paragraph of the lesser-included offense,
thereby limiting the range of options for the jury regarding the lesser
included offense.
First, the trial court provided an erroneous definition of capital
murder to the jury. It defined capital murder as the intentional
commission of murder instead narrowing the definition to the type of
murder that could give rise to a capital offense. The trial court’s
instruction provided:
[a] person commits the offense of capital murder if the person intentionally commits the offense of murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery.
(CR 289) (emphasis added). The trial court in turn defined murder as:
[a] person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally causes the death of an individual or intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
(CR 289) (emphasis added).
This was error. Capital murder requires the specific intent to kill.
See Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W. 3d 654, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“The
Page 29 of 44 element distinguishing capital murder from felony murder is the intent to
kill.”). The trial court defined capital murder too broadly. Instead of
limiting its definition to intentionally causing the death of an individual,
it defined capital murder generally as the intentional commission of
murder. The problem here is that some types of murder fail to establish
a capital offense; capital murder requires a specific intent to kill.
Threadgill, 146 S.W. 3d at 655. The trial defined murder as (1)
intentionally causing the death of another (authorized basis for capital
murder), and (2) with intent to cause serious bodily injury, the commission
of an act clearly dangerous to human life (unauthorized basis for capital
murder). By defining capital murder as the intentional commission of
murder, the jury was authorized to find Appellant guilty of capital murder
even if it failed to find that he specifically intended to cause the death of
Tavira. Said another way, the instructions suggested that serious-bodily-
injury murder could support a capital murder conviction. It cannot.
Secondly, the trial court failed to include felony murder within the
applicable definition of murder. In defining murder, the trial court
provided the jury with the definitions of murder provided in Sections
Page 30 of 44 19.02(b)(1) & (2) of the Texas Penal Code. See (CR 289.) That is, the
causing defined murder as either: intentionally causing the death of
another [(b)(1) definition], or where an individual intends to cause serious
bodily injury, he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of another [(b)(2) definition]. See (CR 289.) But the trial
court failed to provide for the third possibility, felony murder under §
19.02(b)(3):
commits or attempts to commit [robbery]. . .and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
TEX. PEN. CODE § 19.02(b)(3).
By failing to define murder with respect to this third definition, the
jury was given only a limited basis to find Appellant guilty of the lesser-
included offense of murder. This error was not cured by the application
paragraph. The application paragraph was also missing language
pertaining to felony murder:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 19th day of November, 2012, in Tarrant County, Texas, Jacob Jordann Bright, did then and there intentionally cause the death of an individual, Islander Tavira,
Page 31 of 44 by shooting him with a firearm, or intended to cause serious bodily injury to Islander Tavira and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, by shooting him with a firearm, you will find the defendant guilty of the offense of murder. (CR 292.)
Failure to include felony-murder in the definition and application
paragraphs limited the jury’s ability to consider the full range of
possibilities for the lesser-included offense of murder.
2) The errors caused egregious harm.
The first factor the Court must consider is the jury charge. See
Nava, 415 S.W. 3d at 298. This factor arguably cuts in favor of both sides.
The application paragraph for capital murder did correctly limit the
murder definition to “intentionally causing the death of . . . Tavira.” (CR
291.) But the application paragraph for the lesser offense of murder still
failed to include the felony-murder definition.1 See (CR 292.)
1 To the extent the Court finds Appellant fails to prevail on the first factor, he submits he should still prevail after consideration of all the factors. In an unpublished case, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed an appellate court that did not conduct analysis using all of the Almanza factors after concluding that the application paragraph had been correct. See Dougherty v State, 188 S.W. 3d 670, 2006 WL 475802 at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The appellate court in Dougherty had relied on Medina v. State, 7 S.W. 3d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) for the proposition that errors in the abstract instructions can never be “egregious” where the application paragraph is correctly written. See Dougherty v. State, 2007 Tex App. LEXIS 4449 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist., June 7, 2007) (unpublished). In reversing, the Court of Criminal Appeals indicated that no such bright line rule exists. Even where the application
Page 32 of 44 The second factor the Court must consider is the state of the
evidence. Nava v. State, 415 S.W. 3d at 298 The state of the evidence
militates in favor of reversal. It is true that identity was the primary
focus of the parties at trial. But once the jury identified Appellant as the
shooter, Appellant’s specific intent during the shooting would have been
the central issue for the jury to decide. There was limited evidence
regarding the circumstances of the shooting itself----essentially two
eyewitnesses (to the extent that both should be believed). And these
witnesses describe a sudden, chaotic event in which Appellant was
suddenly being chased by Tavira, with Rodriguez not far behind. He
turned around and fired three or four shots. The physical evidence shows
that Tavira sustained no gunshot wounds to the head, nor to any vital
organs that might have been attractive targets for a gunman specifically
intending to kill. Instead, Tavira died from a bullet near the collar bone
that unfortunately ruptured an artery. (5 RR 82.) Additionally, Rodriguez
testified that Tavira remained standing for two minutes after the
paragraph is correct, an appellate court must consider all of the Almanza factors when assessing harm. See Chaney v. State, 314 S.W. 3d 561, 568-573 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010) (citing Doughtery and finding egregious harm even where application paragraph had been correct).
Page 33 of 44 shooting. (3 RR 87.) A juror would have a difficult time finding a specific
intent to kill where the shooter left the victim while he was standing.
Furthermore, it was dark, and thus it would have been difficult for him to
ascertain whether he had done enough damage to Tavira to kill him.
Third, the court must consider the arguments of counsel. Nava, 415
S.W. 3d at 298. Appellant acknowledges that neither government nor
defense counsel discussed this error. But Appellant submits that this very
silence provides a reason why this factor should cut in his favor. Neither
side drew the jury’s attention to the faulty jury instructions. Thus, while
neither side exacerbated the error with their comments, neither side
mitigated the error either by steering the jury in the right direction. And
this was not an issue which the jury may have avoided confronting. Once
identity was established, the jury was inevitably going to have to decide
upon Appellant’s specific intent at the time of the shooting.
Page 34 of 44 3) Foreclosed issue: the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that the State need not “prove guilt beyond all possible doubt.”2
The trial court erred reversibly erred in providing a partial definition
of beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the trial court instructed the
jury “[i]t is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all
possible doubt; it is required that the prosecutions’ proof exclude all
reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s guilt.” (CR 291.)
Appellant submits this was error. In Paulson v. State, 28 S.W. 3d
570, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that
“the better practice is to give no definition of reasonable doubt at all.” By
instructing a jury that beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean all
possible doubt, the trial court is providing at least a partial definition of
beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant acknowledges that this issue is
foreclosed by the Second Court of Appeals’ decision in Vosberg v. State, 80
S.W. 3d 320, 324 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2002, pet. ref’d), and in the
Second Court of Appeals more recent decision in Matthews v. State, 2015
Tex. App. LEXIS 6861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, July 2, 2015) (declining to
2 Foreclosed by Vosberg v. State, 80 S.W. 3d 320, 324 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2002, pet. ref’d.)
Page 35 of 44 overrule Vosberg). Nevertheless, he preserves the issue for further review.
Counsel will note that the Second Court of Appeals in Matthews observed
that “we do not now hold that giving such an instruction is a wise thing for
trial courts to do,” and hardly appeared enthusiastic about its Vosberg
decision. Id. at *2.
III. The trial court erred by declining to exclude from evidence text messages from “Shawn,” in violation of TEX. R. EVID. 403.
A trial court’s decision as to whether admit or exclude evidence is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Torres v. State, 81 S.W.
3d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see Montgomery v. State, 198 S.W. 3d
67, 79 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2006, pet. ref’d.) The trial court’s decision
will be reversed if it was “outside the zone of reasonable disagreement”
among jurists. Montgomery, 198 S.W. 3d at 77.
In conducting its prejudice v. probative analysis when reviewing
Rule 403 violations, the Court considers (1) how probative is the evidence;
(2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational, but
nevertheless indelible way; (3) the time the proponent needs to develop the
evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence. Montgomery, 198
Page 36 of 44 S.W. 3d at 77 (citing Soloman v State, 49 S.W. 3d 345, 366 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001)).
Non-constitutional errors are reversible if the error affected
Appellant’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. PR. 44.2(B). An error
affects a substantial right when it has a substantial and injurious effect
or influence on the verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W. 2d 2266, 271 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997). An error does not affect a substantial right if the Court
has “fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but
slight effect.” Solomon v. State, 49 S.W. 3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001). The Court considers “everything in the record[,] . . . includ[ing]
testimony, physical evidence, jury instructions, the State’s theories and
any defense theories, and voir dire, if applicable.” Schmutz v. State, 440
S.W. 3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that a court “may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of,” among other things, “unfair prejudice,” “confusing the issues,”
and misleading the jury. TEX. R. EVID. 403. The trial court erred under
Page 37 of 44 Rule 403 when it admitted into evidence the following texts from Shawn,
during his conversation between Shawn and Appellant:
Shawn: An get a different phone get redd of your phone. Get a prepaid phone. To much text an talking on that phone.
Shawn: You can get away with this just play your cards right. I got to make sure nobody talkin. you no officer west bitch ass no you.
Appellant: I know but he aint seen me in 7 months he don’t even know I still be coming to the hood. 1200 Blocc hot boy. *** Shawn: Did eneyone see you.
Shawn: Are you sure?
See (State Ex. 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85); (6 RR 18.)
Shawn’s texts within the context of this conversation are plainly
offered to show that Appellant was the shooter. But his actual comments
have very limited probative value. First, there is no indication that
Page 38 of 44 Shawn has any personal knowledge of the events giving rise to the
shooting. Any putative knowledge he may have had in connection with
the shooting may be based on hearsay, rumors, or speculation.
Second, the statements fail to show exactly what Shawn is talking
about. Shawn admonishes (1) Appellant to switch phones, (2) reassures
him that he can get away with “this;” (3) advises that he needs to ensure
no one is discussing the matter; and (4) inquires whether anyone saw him.
But nowhere does Shawn reveal what particular act Appellant committed
that needs to be kept secret.
Third, we have no assurance that it is in fact Shawn sending the
texts and not someone else. The statements could have come from with
anyone who may have had access to Shawn’s phone or his number.
By contrast, the evidence was extraordinarily prejudicial. The jury
was able to rely on hearsay by implied assertions. The evidence invites
the jury to irrationally find that Shawn either had personal knowledge of
the murder, or that Appellant had previously confessed to the murder.
But Shawn’s statements could have been based on circulating rumors, or
Shawn could have been talking about a different event altogether. The
Page 39 of 44 defense could not cross-examine Shawn regarding the subject matter of his
statements, nor what, if any, personal knowledge Shawn might have had
regarding the shooting.
The central issue of the trial was identity. The court can have no
assurance that the admission of such evidence “did not influence the jury.”
Solomon, 49 S.W. 3d at 356. In fact, record evidence shows that the jury
found the text messages important. In its first Jury Note, the jury
specifically requested photos of the text messages between defendant and
Shawn. See (CR 297.)
Furthermore, the prosecutor emphasized the text messages in its
closing argument in efforts to establish that Appellant was the shooter:
And that’s not all you have. These text messages . . .
*** That is a problem. You better get up there and lie about it. You better come up with something. Get a different phone–from Shawn. Get rid of your phone. Get a prepaid phone. Too much text and talking on that phone. You know what they’re talking about. And the Defendant says: You bet. Got it. I’ll do that.
Shawn: This is not good—for the Defendant. You can get away with this. Just play your cards right. I got to make sure nobody talking. You know Officer West bitch ass, know you. I know, but he aint’ seen me in seven months. He don’t even
Page 40 of 44 know I still be coming to the hood. You can get away with it. I didn’t have to ask the Defendant one question about these text messages. They speak for themselves. In a moment of weakness and candor, the Defendant and his brother sent these back and forth to each other. I didn’t have to ask him one question. You knew what these text messages meant.
See (6 RR 130-131.)
The State had only one eyewitness who could specifically identify
Appellant as the shooter. While there were two putative witnesses to the
shooting, only Patterson could identify Appellant. Rodriguez did not
recognize the shooter. Nor did the State have any physical evidence
linking Appellant to the shooting. Aside from Patterson, the government
had at best a circumstantial case in establishing that Appellant was the
shooter. Furthermore, the State’s only eyewitness was not credible.
Upon initially being questioned, Patterson denied having any knowledge
of the shooting. (4 RR 79-81.) She specifically admitted that she lied
when “Dante” had initially been the suspect. (4 RR 80-81.) It was only
after catching a felony case that Patterson decided to change her story and
point the finger at Appellant. (4 RR 96-99.)
Patterson’s story also differs from Rodriguez’s in several critical
aspects, and Rodriguez would not have any reason to be untruthful. First,
Page 41 of 44 Patterson testified that she did not see Appellant wearing any kind of
mask. (4 RR 87.) Second, Patterson testified that Tavira “went to the
ground” after the shooting. (4 RR 108.)
The text messages provided a crucial, though prejudicial link for the
jury. The brother’s comments would lead the jury to find “in some
irrational, but nevertheless indelible way” that Appellant had in fact been
the shooter. The jury might find this notwithstanding the fact that the (1)
the text messages themselves fail to actually to specify the particular
offense being discussed; (2) the messages fail to establish the basis for
Shawn’s personal knowledge; and (3) the messages fail to establish that
it had in fact been Shawn who sent the text messages.
For these reasons, the Court should find that the trial court
reversibly erred in failing to exclude Shawn’s text messages under FED. R.
EVID. 403.
Page 42 of 44 PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant respectfully
prays that this Court will reverse the conviction and sentence.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests the Court grant him such other and
further relief as he may show himself deserving, at law and in equity.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ William R. Biggs William R. Biggs WILLIAM R. BIGGS, PLLC 115 W. 2nd St., Suite 202 Fort Worth, TX 76102 817.332.3822 (t) 817.332.2763 (f) wbiggs@williambiggslaw.com TX Bar No. 24052832
Page 43 of 44 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this Brief was prepared with WordPerfect X7, and that according to that program’s word-count function, the entire document contains words 8,496 words. Thus, the brief complies with Rule 9.4(i)(2)(B) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
/s/ William R. Biggs WILLIAM R. BIGGS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 28, 2015, I filed a copy of the foregoing electronically. The State will receive electronic notice of this filing at coaappellatealerts@tarrantcounty.com. On September 29, 2015, this brief will be sent via USPS mail to Debra Windsor, Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office, 401 W. Belknap, 4th Floor, Fort Worth TX 76196. Finally, a copy of this motion and the accompanying brief will be sent by certified mail to Jacob Jordann Bright, TDCJ No. 01985440, Telford Unit,3899 Hwy 98, New Boston, TX 75570.
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