Jacob Castro v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 17, 2025
• Docket: 07-25-00239-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00239-CR

JACOB CASTRO, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 69th District Court Hartley County, Texas Trial Court No. 1255H, Honorable Kimberly Allen, Presiding

September 17, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Jacob Castro, appeals from the trial court’s judgment revoking his

community supervision for the offense of possession of a controlled substance 1 and

sentencing him to two years of confinement. We dismiss the appeal for want of

jurisdiction.

1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.116(d). The timely filing of a written notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to

hearing an appeal. Castillo v. State, 369 S.W.3d 196, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). If a

notice of appeal is not timely filed, an appellate court has no option but to dismiss the

appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id. Here, the judgment reflects that Appellant was

sentenced on May 27, 2025. Because Appellant did not file a motion for new trial, his

notice of appeal was due within thirty days thereafter, by June 26, 2025. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 26.2(a)(1) (requiring a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after sentence

is imposed or suspended in open court, or after the day the trial court enters an

appealable order). Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 24, 2025.

We, thus, directed Appellant to show how the Court has jurisdiction over the

untimely appeal. In response, Appellant claims that his sentencing was not complete on

May 27, 2025, because the trial court included restitution in the written judgment that was

not pronounced at sentencing. Relying on Bailey v. State, 160 S.W.3d 11 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004), Appellant argues that his appellate timetable therefore “did not start until the

judgment was entered of record . . . on July 11, 2025.” Based on the limited record

presently before the Court, it is unknown whether the trial court ordered Appellant to pay

restitution at sentencing.

Nevertheless, Appellant’s reliance on Bailey is misplaced as the “unique set of

facts of the case” are absent here. See O’Conner v. State, 266 S.W.3d 575, 577–88

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008) (distinguishing Bailey). Following the defendant’s conviction

in Bailey, the trial court probated his sentence and held a separate, subsequent hearing

to determine a restitution amount. Bailey, 160 S.W.3d at 12. The Court of Criminal

2 Appeals held that sentencing was not complete until restitution was pronounced at the

subsequent hearing, and that the appellate deadline ran from that date. Id at 14, 16.

This Court has held that Bailey does not apply when the trial court alters the

sentence in the written judgment and not at a later hearing. O’Conner, 266 S.W.3d at

577–78. In O’Conner, the trial court added several conditions of probation into a written

judgment that were not pronounced at sentencing. Id at 577. Citing Bailey, the defendant

argued that his appellate deadline therefore ran from the signing of the judgment rather

than the date of sentencing. Id. We rejected O’Conner’s arguments and distinguished

his case from Bailey as there was no separate hearing or subsequent “pronouncement”

modifying O’Conner’s sentence. Id. at 577. Instead, we concluded that, in the ordinary

appellate context, the deadline to file a notice of appeal runs from the date sentence is

pronounced in open court, not from the later inclusion of additional conditions in the

written judgment. Id. at 577–88.

We apply the same reasoning here. Nothing before the Court shows that the trial

court held a subsequent hearing and orally ordered restitution after sentencing Appellant

on May 27, 2025. Indeed, the judgment was signed that day. Accordingly, the appellate

timetable began on May 27, 2025, even assuming, arguendo, restitution was later added

to the written judgment without an oral pronouncement. See O’Conner, 266 S.W.3d at

577–88. Moreover, even if the inclusion of restitution in the written judgment could be

deemed the completion of sentencing under Bailey, Appellant would gain no additional

time because the judgment was signed on May 27, 2025.

3 For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed untimely

and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.2

Per Curiam

Do not publish.

2 Appellant may be entitled to relief by filing an application for writ of habeas corpus returnable to

the Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of an out-of-time appeal. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07.