Jacksonville v. DEPT. OF NAT. RES.
This text of 466 So. 2d 389 (Jacksonville v. DEPT. OF NAT. RES.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
JACKSONVILLE Shipyards, Inc., Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
*390 Herman Ulmer, Jr., W. Sperry Lee, and J. Michael Lindell of Ulmer, Murchison, Ashby, Taylor & Corrigan, Jacksonville, for appellant.
John W. Williams, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Natural Resources, St. Petersburg, for appellee.
BOOTH, Judge.
This cause is before us on appeal from a final order of the Florida Department of Natural Resources (DNR) denying appellant's application to the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund for the issuance of a disclaimer to 17.30 acres of submerged lands in the St. Johns River, Duval County, Florida.
Appellant filed its application for the issuance of a disclaimer to 11.15 acres of the submerged lands under Section 253.129, Florida Statutes.[1] Commodores Point Terminal Corporation filed a similar application for a disclaimer to 6.15 acres of submerged land adjoining upland adjacent to appellant's upland. The two applications requested the issuance of the disclaimers on the grounds that the submerged lands in question had been filled or developed or permanently improved prior to May 29, 1951, date of the repeal of the Butler Act.[2] Subsequent to the filing of the applications, the parcel of upland belonging to Commodores Point Terminal Corporation was conveyed outright to appellant, and DNR has treated the two applications as one.
Prior to May 29, 1951, appellant made certain structural additions to the adjacent submerged lands now in question, including piers, docks, wharves, dry docks, railroad trestles, and dredging. The facts with respect to the improvements actually situated on these submerged lands as of May 29, 1951, are not at issue here.[3]
*391 On February 21, 1984, the Governor and Cabinet met as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund and voted to deny appellant's application. On April 16, 1984, the final order, which constituted final agency action on the application for disclaimer, was entered by the DNR evidencing the Trustees' decision. The application was denied on the ground that appellant had not "filled in" the submerged lands, action which the Board of Trustees and DNR determined was a "condition precedent" to the acquisition of title to submerged lands under the Butler Act.
After argument and upon consideration of the record and briefs, we must reverse the final order denying appellant's petition for the issuance of a disclaimer. "Filling in" is not the condition precedent to acquiring title to submerged lands under the Butler Act. Section I of the Butler Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The grant herein made shall apply to and affect only those submerged lands which have been, or may be hereafter, actually bulkheaded or filled in or permanently improved. [emphasis added]
Use of the disjunctive conjunction shows the Legislature intended other methods of obtaining title to submerged lands besides "filling in." We specifically reject DNR's suggestion that the court construe "or" as "and" within the Act, and find no basis in the history of enactment or in prior decisions supporting the construction urged.
The Butler Act, adopted in 1921 to cure and replace the Riparian Act of 1856, was made effective as of December 27, 1856, the date of the prior Act.[4] Like the earlier Act,[5] the Butler Act had as its major objective the creation or evolution of commerce in connection with the ports of the State. Another purpose was to encourage upland owners to improve their waterfront property as specified in the Act.[6] In Duval Engineering and Contracting Company v. Sales, 77 So.2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1954), the Florida Supreme Court held:
It is clear that Chapter 8537, Acts of 1921, and Chapter 791, Acts of 1856, had no other purpose than to stimulate and encourage the improvement of submerged lands and to improve the foreshore in the interest of commerce and navigation. Such was the consideration for the grant and was in fact the only valid condition [sic] it could be made in view of the common law as well as the organic law of the State.
In Holland v. Ft. Pierce Financing & Construction Co., 157 Fla. 649, 27 So.2d 76, 81 (1946), the Supreme Court held:
The purpose of the Act being to encourage riparian owners to improve their water-front property as therein specified, but making the full title conditional upon the actual completion of the improvement or development mentioned in the Act. [sic] The riparian owner is restricted in the right granted by the Act in that he cannot bulkhead and fill in or otherwise improve the submerged area in front of his uplands beyond the edge of the channel, nor can he so construct the improvements mentioned in the Act as to obstruct the channel so as to interfere with navigation or to interfere with the requirements of commerce.
Despite the plain language of the Butler Act and statements from opinions construing the Act such as those quoted, supra, DNR has taken the position in the instant case, as well as in its rule,[7] that neither bulkheading nor the permanent improvement of the submerged lands are acts sufficient to vest title in the upland owner. The order sought to be reviewed determines, in accord with the contention of DNR, that the submerged lands must be "filled in" before title can vest in the upland owner. The five cases cited in support of that contention are: Duval Engineering *392 and Contracting Company v. Sales, 77 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1954); Holland v. Ft. Pierce Financing and Construction Co., 157 Fla. 649, 27 So.2d 76 (1946); Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, 3 F.2d 841 (S.D.Fla. 1925); Stein v. Brown Properties, 104 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1958); and Williams v. Guthrie, 102 Fla. 1047, 137 So. 682 (1931).
None of the cases cited support the contention that submerged land must be filled in before title can vest in the upland owner pursuant to the Butler Act. In Holland v. Ft. Pierce Financing and Construction Co., supra, and Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, supra, the submerged lands in question were filled, and the holding of those cases is stated in terms of the facts presented. In Duval Engineering, supra, the owner failed to comply with the Act, either by filling or by any permanent improvement, and did not acquire title. The opinion refers to the prior decision in the Holland v. Ft. Pierce Financing case, supra, where the submerged land was bulkheaded and filled in, and makes the statement relied on by appellees here, that the condition of the grant was for the upland owner to bulkhead and fill in the submerged lands. Appellant correctly points out that the statement from the Duval case is the court's paraphrase of the earlier Holland opinion, which in fact involved the filling in of land. In the Duval Engineering case, the court clearly recognized, however, that permanent improvement was a statutory alternative, stating the question presented in the case as follows:
What was the effect of Chapter 26776, Acts of 1951, on the rights of riparian owners acquired under Chapter 8537, Acts of 1921, Butler Bill, ...
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