Affirmed as iiodi11ed; Opinion Filed October 31, 2012.
In ‘[he (court of tppcat Jftttij itrict of cxa at atta No. 05-12-00041-CR No. 05-12-00042-CR No. 05-12-00043-CR
VASt-lEAN MARQUIN JACKSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellec
On Appeal from the 363rd District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. Fi0-56595-W, F10-56596-W, F10-56597-W
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O’Neill, FitzGerald, and Lang-Miers Opinion By Lang-Miers
Yashean Marquin Jackson appeals from the adjudication of his guilt for one aggravated
sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years offense and two indecency with a child
offenses. In two issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating
his guilt and revoking his community supervision. We modify the trial court’s judgments and
affirm as modified. The background of the cases and the evidence admitted at trial are well
known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to he applied in the
case is well settled.
B.xcKcIwuND
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to one aggravated sexual assault o a child
younger than fourteen years offense and two indecency with a child offenses. See TEX. PENAL
CODE 2 1.11 (a), 22.021 (a)( I )(B) (West 2011). Appellant also pleaded true to one
enhancement paragraph contained in each indictment. Pursuant to a plea agreement in each case,
the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt. Placed appellant on community supervision for ten
years, and assessed a $2,500 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant
violated condition (h) by testing positive for marijuana: condition (j) by failing to pay
community supervision fees: condition (k) by failing to pay Crime Stoppers; condition (1) by not
completing community service hours: condition (m) by failing to obey all program instructions
and/or treatment br Substance Abuse or Psychological Health: condition (n) by failing to pay
urinalysis fee; and condition (p) by failing to attend the Safe Neighborhood class. In a hearing
on the motions, appellant pleaded true to the allegations. Appellant’s signed judicial confessions
and stipulations of evidence were admitted. The trial court found the allegations true,
adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment in each case.
APPLICABLE LAW
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Ricke/s r. Slate, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.
Crirn. App. 2006). An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that would
create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763—64.
2 A hnding of a single violation ol community supervision is sufflcicnt to support revocation. See
Sanchez v,State. 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.j 1980). Thus, to prevail on
appeal, appellant must successililly challenge all of the findings that support the revocation
order. See .Jone. i’. State. 571 S.W.2d 191. 193—94 (Tex. Crim App. [Panel Op.] 1978).
DiscussioN
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating his guilt and
revoking his community supervision because he raised the defense of inability to pay, and the
State failed to prove he had the ability to pay or that his failure to pay was intentional. Appellant
also argues that because he was not required to complete the community service hours until the
end of the probationary period, he did not violate condition (1). The State responds that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by adjudicating appellant’s guilt and revoking his community
supervision in each case.
Appellant pleaded true to all of the allegations in the motions to adjudicate. including that
he tested positive for marijuana. Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s finding on this
violation. A plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support revocation of community
supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crirn. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant’s community
supervision and adjudicating his guilt. See Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871. We resolve appellant’s
two issues against him.
MODIFY JuDGMENTs
The record shows the trial court did not orally pronounce a fine when it adjudicated
appellant guilty and imposed the sentences. The judgment in cause no. 05-12-00041-CR,
however, includes a $2,500 fine. When a conflict exists between the oral pronouncement and the
3 written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. See CoJJiy v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326. 328
(Ta. Crim. App. 1998). We modify the judgment to delete the $2,500 fine. See TDC. R. App. P.
43.2(b); Bigley v. Stale, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberrv ‘t’. Slate, 813 S.W.2d 526. 529-30 (rex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. rerd).
In cause no. 05-12-00042-CR, appellant was convicted of indecency with a child younger
than fourteen years, a second-degree felony offense. The judgment, however, states the offense
is a first-degree felony. Thus, the judgment is incorrect We modify the judgment to show the
offense for which appellant was convicted is a second-degree felony. See Id.
We also note that appellant’s convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and
indecency with a child subject him to the sex offender registration requirements. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 62.001(5XA) (West Supp. 2011). The trial court’s judgment in each
case, however, recites the sex offender registration requirements do not apply. Thus, the judgments are incorrect. We modify the judgments to show the sex offender registration
requirements apply and the age of the victims is ten years.
CONCLUSION
in cause no. 05-12-00041-CR, we modify the judgment to delete the $2,500 fine, to show
the sex offender registration requirements apply, and the age of the victim is ten years.
in cause no. 05-12-00042-CR, we modify the judgment to show the degree for the
offense is “second-degree felony,” that the sex offender registration requirements apply, and the
age of the victim is ten years.
in cause no. 05-12-00043-CR, we modify the judgment to show the sex offender
registration requirements apply, and the age of the victim is ten years.
4 As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
/7q /
ETH LANG-MIERS 1 ELIZB ,/ JUE /
Do Not Publish TEX, R. App, P.47 120041EU05
5 Qrourt ot ZtpptaI jfiftjj 1Bitritt of ZEexa at afta JUDGMENT
YASHEAN MARQUIN JACKSON, Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Appellant Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. F I 0-56595-W). No. 05-12-00041-CR V.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Affirmed as iiodi11ed; Opinion Filed October 31, 2012.
In ‘[he (court of tppcat Jftttij itrict of cxa at atta No. 05-12-00041-CR No. 05-12-00042-CR No. 05-12-00043-CR
VASt-lEAN MARQUIN JACKSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellec
On Appeal from the 363rd District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. Fi0-56595-W, F10-56596-W, F10-56597-W
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O’Neill, FitzGerald, and Lang-Miers Opinion By Lang-Miers
Yashean Marquin Jackson appeals from the adjudication of his guilt for one aggravated
sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years offense and two indecency with a child
offenses. In two issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating
his guilt and revoking his community supervision. We modify the trial court’s judgments and
affirm as modified. The background of the cases and the evidence admitted at trial are well
known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to he applied in the
case is well settled.
B.xcKcIwuND
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to one aggravated sexual assault o a child
younger than fourteen years offense and two indecency with a child offenses. See TEX. PENAL
CODE 2 1.11 (a), 22.021 (a)( I )(B) (West 2011). Appellant also pleaded true to one
enhancement paragraph contained in each indictment. Pursuant to a plea agreement in each case,
the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt. Placed appellant on community supervision for ten
years, and assessed a $2,500 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant
violated condition (h) by testing positive for marijuana: condition (j) by failing to pay
community supervision fees: condition (k) by failing to pay Crime Stoppers; condition (1) by not
completing community service hours: condition (m) by failing to obey all program instructions
and/or treatment br Substance Abuse or Psychological Health: condition (n) by failing to pay
urinalysis fee; and condition (p) by failing to attend the Safe Neighborhood class. In a hearing
on the motions, appellant pleaded true to the allegations. Appellant’s signed judicial confessions
and stipulations of evidence were admitted. The trial court found the allegations true,
adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment in each case.
APPLICABLE LAW
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Ricke/s r. Slate, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.
Crirn. App. 2006). An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that would
create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763—64.
2 A hnding of a single violation ol community supervision is sufflcicnt to support revocation. See
Sanchez v,State. 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.j 1980). Thus, to prevail on
appeal, appellant must successililly challenge all of the findings that support the revocation
order. See .Jone. i’. State. 571 S.W.2d 191. 193—94 (Tex. Crim App. [Panel Op.] 1978).
DiscussioN
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating his guilt and
revoking his community supervision because he raised the defense of inability to pay, and the
State failed to prove he had the ability to pay or that his failure to pay was intentional. Appellant
also argues that because he was not required to complete the community service hours until the
end of the probationary period, he did not violate condition (1). The State responds that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by adjudicating appellant’s guilt and revoking his community
supervision in each case.
Appellant pleaded true to all of the allegations in the motions to adjudicate. including that
he tested positive for marijuana. Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s finding on this
violation. A plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support revocation of community
supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crirn. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). We
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant’s community
supervision and adjudicating his guilt. See Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871. We resolve appellant’s
two issues against him.
MODIFY JuDGMENTs
The record shows the trial court did not orally pronounce a fine when it adjudicated
appellant guilty and imposed the sentences. The judgment in cause no. 05-12-00041-CR,
however, includes a $2,500 fine. When a conflict exists between the oral pronouncement and the
3 written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. See CoJJiy v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326. 328
(Ta. Crim. App. 1998). We modify the judgment to delete the $2,500 fine. See TDC. R. App. P.
43.2(b); Bigley v. Stale, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberrv ‘t’. Slate, 813 S.W.2d 526. 529-30 (rex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. rerd).
In cause no. 05-12-00042-CR, appellant was convicted of indecency with a child younger
than fourteen years, a second-degree felony offense. The judgment, however, states the offense
is a first-degree felony. Thus, the judgment is incorrect We modify the judgment to show the
offense for which appellant was convicted is a second-degree felony. See Id.
We also note that appellant’s convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and
indecency with a child subject him to the sex offender registration requirements. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 62.001(5XA) (West Supp. 2011). The trial court’s judgment in each
case, however, recites the sex offender registration requirements do not apply. Thus, the judgments are incorrect. We modify the judgments to show the sex offender registration
requirements apply and the age of the victims is ten years.
CONCLUSION
in cause no. 05-12-00041-CR, we modify the judgment to delete the $2,500 fine, to show
the sex offender registration requirements apply, and the age of the victim is ten years.
in cause no. 05-12-00042-CR, we modify the judgment to show the degree for the
offense is “second-degree felony,” that the sex offender registration requirements apply, and the
age of the victim is ten years.
in cause no. 05-12-00043-CR, we modify the judgment to show the sex offender
registration requirements apply, and the age of the victim is ten years.
4 As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
/7q /
ETH LANG-MIERS 1 ELIZB ,/ JUE /
Do Not Publish TEX, R. App, P.47 120041EU05
5 Qrourt ot ZtpptaI jfiftjj 1Bitritt of ZEexa at afta JUDGMENT
YASHEAN MARQUIN JACKSON, Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Appellant Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. F I 0-56595-W). No. 05-12-00041-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald THE STATE OF TEXAS. Appellee pallicipati ng.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is MODiFIED as follows:
The section entitled “Fine” is modified to show “None.”
The section entitled “Sex Offender Registration Requirements” is modified to shov’ “Sex Offender Registration Requirements apply to the Defendant. The age of the victim at the time of the offense was 10 years.”
As modified, we AFFiRM the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment entered October 31, 2012.
ELIZABETH LANG-MILkS JI. :sTIC[•: Qtoiirt of ppcab jfiftlj itrict of ZEtxa at atta JUDGMENT
YASHEAN MARQUIN JACKSON. Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Appellant Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. F I 0-56596-W). No. 05-i 2-00042-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers. Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald THE STATE OF TEXAS. Appellee partic i patmg.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is MODIFIED as Ibilows:
The section entitled “l)egrcc” is modified to show “2nd Degree Felony.”
The section entitled “Sex Offender Registration Requirements” is modified to show “Sex Offender Registration Requirements apply to the Defendant. The age of the victim at the time of the offense was 10 years.”
ZAIETK LAN -MIERW 9 E JESTICE Qtourt of ppta1 jfittb ttritt of Z!Itxa at DaUa JUDGMENT
YASHEAN MARQUIN JACKSON, Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Appellant Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. F l0-56597.-W). No. 05l2-00043CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, Justices O’Neill and FitzGerald THE STATE OF TEXAS. Appellee part ic i pati rig.
[3ased on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is MODIFIED as follows:
The section entitled “Sex Offender Registration Requirements” is modified to show “Sex Offender Registration Requirements apply to the Defindant. The age of the victim at the time of the offense was 10 years.”
BEHLANlES!/ JUSTIC El