Jackson v. Zimmer

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 21, 2024
• Docket: 1:23-cv-01223
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAMUEL DEREK JACKSON, Case No. 1:23-cv-01223-JLT-HBK 12 Plaintiff, AMENDED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS CASE1 13 v. (Doc. No. 12) 14 DARRELL WORTHY and CYNTHIA WORTHY, FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Pending review before the Court is Plaintiff’s pro se First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 19 12). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss 20 this action because the First Amended Complaint fails to state a cognizable federal claim and any 21 further amendments would be futile. 22 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 23 Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may dismiss a case “at any 24 time” if the Court determines, inter alia, the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state claim 25 on which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 26

27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2023). These Findings and Recommendations amend and supersede the undersigned’s Findings 28 and Recommendations issued on October 30, 2023 (Doc. No. 8). 1 such relief. 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) -(iii); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F. 3d 1122, 1129 2 (9th Cir. 2000) (section 1915(e) applies to all litigants proceeding in form pauperis). A 3 complaint, however, should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 4 prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle him to relief. Johnson v. 5 Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 996 (1997). A complaint must 6 include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. 7 R. Civ. P. 8(a). Dismissal for failure to state a claim in this context is governed by the same 8 standard as dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Barren v. Harrington, 152 9 F. 3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). As such, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to 10 state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 11 “A complaint is plausible on its face when it contains sufficient facts to support a reasonable 12 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. At this stage, the court 13 accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Tr., 425 U.S. 738, 14 740 (1976). The Court does not accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 15 unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 16 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Nor are legal conclusions considered facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 17 Due to Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court must liberally construe the Complaint in the 18 light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt 19 v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). If a pleading could be cured by the allegation 20 of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 21 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. 22 Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the Court to 23 advise a litigant on how to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role 24 as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d 25 at 1131 n.13. 26 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE COMPLAINT 27 Plaintiff initiated this action pro se in the Sacramento Division of this Court by filing a 28 “Complaint for a Civil Case” form. (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). On August 16, 2023, the 1 Sacramento Court transferred the action to this Division because the alleged violations took place 2 in Kern County. (Doc. No. 3; see also Doc. No. 1). The Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed in 3 this action in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 4). On September 21, 2023, the Court issued an order 4 finding the Complaint failed to state any cognizable constitutional claim. (Doc. No. 6). After 5 Plaintiff failed to timely respond to the September 21, 2023 Order or file an amended complaint, 6 the undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations to dismiss this case due to Plaintiff’s 7 failure to prosecute this action and/or comply with a court order. (Doc. No. 8). Plaintiff timely 8 filed objections to the Findings and Recommendations, explaining that he failed to file a change 9 of address with the Court as he homeless for a time. (Doc. No. 9). The Court construed the 10 objections as a request for an extension of time to file an amended complaint and granted it. 11 (Doc. No. 11). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 12, “FAC”). 12 Plaintiff’s FAC, like his initial Complaint, challenges his March 13, 2002 conviction 13 entered by Kern County Superior Court for “LOL w/force on a minor,” for which he was 14 sentenced to 14.5 years in prison, plus five years parole and mental health counseling. (Doc. No. 15 12 at 5). The FAC names as Defendants Darrell Worthy and Cynthia Worthy, the grandparents of 16 Chandra Moore, Plaintiff’s victim. (Id. at 1, 5). Given Plaintiff’s addresses of record and the 17 information provided in his application to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is no longer 18 incarcerated on the conviction he challenges. 19 Plaintiff challenges his conviction primarily based on “newly discovered evidence” and 20 attaches a hand-written, notarized statement from Chandra Moore that states, “the charges 21 brought against Samuel D. Jackson involving me as a victim are false.” (Id. at 9). The FAC also 22 asserts claims under the Fifth Amendment due process clause, the Fourteenth Amendment 23 “preponderance of the evidence rule,” and California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.7. (Id. at 3). 24 As relief, Plaintiff requests “a collateral review” of his conviction, a new trial, or a finding that he 25 is “actually innocent” of the charges of which he was convicted, and monetary damages of 26 $140.00 for each day he “spent behind bars.” (Id. at 8). 27 //// 28 //// 1 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 2 A. Color of State Law 3 Section 1983 allows a private citizen to sue for the deprivation of a right secured by 4 federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017). “To 5 establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the 6 Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a 7 person acting under color of state law.” Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 8 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003)); Soo Park v. 9 Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 2017). “The ‘under color of law’ requirement under 10 § 1983 is the same as the Fourteenth Amendment's ‘state action’ requirement.” Chudacoff at 1149 11 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982)). 12 Here, on its face the FAC does not name any state actor as a Defendant. To the extent 13 discernible, the two named Defendants are private citizens rather than government actors, and 14 there are no facts alleged by which the Court could reasonably infer that either Defendant is a 15 state actor. (See Doc. No. 5). Thus, Plaintiff cannot pursue a claim against Defendants in the 16 present section 1983 action. 17 B. Plaintiff’s Claim Seeks Relief Not Available in a Section 1983 Action 18 As the Court previously noted, because each of Plaintiff’s claims stem from his 19 underlying state court criminal conviction and trial, his claims are barred under Heck v. 20 Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), unless Plaintiff’s criminal conviction has been reversed, 21 expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Id.; see also Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 896 22 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck v. Humphrey that a conviction or 23 sentence cannot be challenged under § 1983 until after the conviction or sentence is invalidated). 24 Specifically, if a judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a § 1983 action “would necessarily imply the 25 invalidity of his conviction or sentence[,]” the claim must be dismissed. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 26 In contrast, civil suits that “threaten[ ] no consequence for [an inmate’s] conviction or the 27 duration of [their] sentence” do not require plaintiffs to first exhaust habeas opportunities before 28 filing their civil claims. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004). The FAC does not 1 allege any facts indicating that Plaintiff’s criminal conviction has been reversed, expunged, or 2 otherwise invalidated. (See Doc. No. 12). 3 “In evaluating whether claims are barred by Heck, an important touchstone is whether a 4 § 1983 plaintiff could prevail only by negating ‘an element of the offense of which he has been 5 convicted.’” Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2002). Consequently, a 6 plaintiff's claims would be barred if they depend on a theory that calls into question whether the 7 plaintiff committed the offense for which he was convicted. In the Ninth Circuit, “application of 8 Heck turns solely on whether a successful § 1983 action would necessarily render invalid a 9 conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction that affected the length of the prisoner’s 10 confinement.’” Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 840 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ramirez v. 11 Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003)). A criminal conviction does not operate to bar a 12 § 1983 action only in rare circumstances. A plaintiff may seek damages for an alleged Miranda 13 violation but only if the plaintiff’s conviction did not rely on the evidence obtained from that 14 allegedly unlawful interview. Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2014). Claims 15 challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, claims that evidence was not properly suppressed, 16 claims of actual innocence, as Plaintiff asserts here, and claims of trial court error all impinge on 17 the validity of a conviction and would fall within the ambit of Heck. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 18 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are Heck barred. 19 The Court previously advised Plaintiff that the proper recourse for someone who wishes to 20 challenge a conviction as violative of federal constitutional protections or based on actual 21 innocence is to file a habeas corpus petition after such claimed federal constitutional errors have 22 been fully exhausted through the state court habeas process. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 23 486 (1973). Although Plaintiff is no longer confined, it is unclear whether there are there are 24 collateral consequences to his conviction, i.e., whether his release is subject to conditions such 25 that a habeas petition would not be moot. Because Plaintiff asserts a claim of actual innocence 26 without having previously sought and exhausted claims through a habeas corpus petition, his 27 claims are barred by Heck. 28 //// 1 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 Plaintiff here had an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his initial complaint. In its 3 | prior screening order, the Court instructed Plaintiff in detail on the applicable law and pleading 4 | requirements. (See Doc No. 6). Despite affording Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the 5 | deficiencies in his original Complaint, the FAC again fails to adequately state any plausible 6 | § 1983 claim and largely repeats the same deficient claims alleged in the initial Complaint, which 7 | cannot be maintained in a section 1983 action. (See Doc Nos. 1, 12). The undersigned thus finds 8 | that any further leave to amend would be futile and recommends the district court dismiss the 9 | FAC without further leave to amend. McKinney v. Baca, 250 F. App’x 781 (9th Cir. 2007) citing 10 | Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting discretion to deny leave to amend 11 is particularly broad where court has afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his 12 | complaint); see also Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (A district court can 13 | deny leave “where the amendment would be futile . . . or where the amended complaint would be 14 | subject to dismissal”). 15 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: 16 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to 17 || state a claim and the action be dismissed. 18 | Dated: _ February 21, 2024 Mile. Wh fareh Zaskth 20 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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