Jackson v. Williams
This text of Jackson v. Williams (Jackson v. Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 4 Robert Jackson, Case No. 2:21-cv-01773-CDS-MDC
5 Plaintiff Order Dismissing and Closing Case
6 v.
7 Brian Williams, et al.,
8 Defendants
9 10 On January 14, 2025, I granted defendants Taerik Berry, Jennifer Nash, and Brian 11 Williams motion to dismiss plaintiff Robert Jackson’s First Amendment and Eighth 12 Amendment claims related to June 2019 searches of his cell. Order, ECF No. 43. The claims 13 against Berry, Nash, and Williams were dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 14 Id. at 10. Jackson was given until February 12, 2025, to file a first amended complaint curing the 15 deficiencies identified in my order. Id. Jackson was warned that failure to timely file his first 16 amended complaint would result in this case being dismissed without further notice. Id. That 17 deadline expired, and Jackson did not file an amended complaint, move for an extension, or 18 otherwise respond. 19 I. Discussion 20 “If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district 21 court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into a dismissal of the entire action.” Lira v. 22 Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Yourish v. Ca. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 991–92 23 (9th Cir. 1999)). Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “if the plaintiff 24 fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to 25 dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Yet the court may act on its own 26 accord in exercising this authority. Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 1 (9th Cir. 2005) (approving sua sponte dismissals under Rule 41(b)); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 2 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962) (interpreting the rule to permit courts to dismiss actions sua sponte 3 for a plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s orders). 4 The Ninth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the following factors in determining 5 whether to dismiss an action for failure to comply with the court’s order: “(1) the public’s 6 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the 7 risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 8 merits, and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 992 (affirming 9 dismissal for failure to timely file an amended complaint, applying the five factors). 10 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and 11 the court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal. The Ninth Circuit has 12 held that “[t]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” 13 Id. In cases like the one at hand, where a case is delayed by a party’s failure to comply with 14 deadlines, the case cannot move forward toward resolution on the merits. In re 15 Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). For that reason, 16 “[i]t is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to routine 17 noncompliance of litigants.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, Jackson 18 has delayed further adjudication of the claims by failing to timely amend his complaint. There is 19 currently no operative complaint on file, and it is Jackson’s responsibility to move this action 20 forward; but it cannot proceed without his compliance, and it cannot simply remain idle on the 21 court’s docket, unprosecuted. 22 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal. While 23 the mere pendency of a lawsuit cannot constitute sufficient prejudice to require dismissal, “a 24 presumption of prejudice arises from a plaintiff’s unexplained failure to prosecute.” Laurino v. 25 Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 26 393, 400–01 (9th Cir. 1998)). A plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a non-frivolous reason || for failing to meet a court deadline. Id. at 753. Jackson has not provided an explanation, non- frivolous or otherwise, for his failure to file an amended complaint. 3 The fourth factor, the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, always weighs against dismissal. Jackson was given an opportunity to amend his complaint to properly 5|| demonstrated the causation element required for a First Amendment retaliation claim and to add facts supporting an Eighth Amendment claim, but he failed to do so. Without an operative 7|| complaint, the claims cannot be decided on the merits; therefore, I find that the fourth factor is 8|| greatly outweighed by the factors in favor of dismissal. 9 The fifth factor, the availability of less drastic sanctions, also weighs in favor of dismissal. Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but 11 must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th 12]| Cir. 1986). A court’s warning to a party that their failure to obey the court’s order will result in 13|| dismissal satisfies the “consideration of alternatives” requirement. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1411258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Jackson was provided adequate warning that dismissal would result 15|| from noncompliance with the court’s order. See ECF No. 43 at 10. Jackson’s decision not to amend, made in the face of warnings of the consequences, leaves the court with two alternatives: dismiss the action or leave it pending indefinitely without an operative complaint. There is thus 18]| no lesser alternative, so the fifth factor favors dismissal. 19} TT. Conclusion 20 Finding that four of the five factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal, I hereby dismiss 21) this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b). The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment accordingly and to close this case. / ) 23 Dated: September 23, 2025 LZ (
24 ibyhg——= 5 Cristina Silva Unit | States District Judge 26
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Jackson v. Williams, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-williams-nvd-2025.