Jackson v. Whitson's Food Corp.

130 A.D.3d 461, 13 N.Y.S.3d 71
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 7, 2015
Docket303448/10 15640A 15640
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 130 A.D.3d 461 (Jackson v. Whitson's Food Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Whitson's Food Corp., 130 A.D.3d 461, 13 N.Y.S.3d 71 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

Orders, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Julia I. Rodriguez, J.), entered May 16, 2014, which, to the extent appealed from, granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and denied plaintiffs cross motion to strike defendant Camba, Inc.’s answer for spoliation of evidence, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny defendants’ motions, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff alleges that she sustained personal injuries after she slipped and fell on liquid that was on the hallway floor of a homeless women’s shelter operated by defendant Camba. Defendants Whitson’s Food Corp. and Whitson’s Food Service Corp. (collectively Whitson’s Food) delivered prepared meals to *462 the shelter on the day of the accident. Plaintiff alleges that she routinely observed liquid at the accident location after Whitson’s Food completed its food deliveries and that she complained about the liquid to Camba’s maintenance staff.

Camba failed to make a prima facie showing that it lacked constructive notice of the liquid on the floor. Although Camba’s employee testified that she completed her inspection of the building about an hour before the accident, and that it was her usual custom and practice to pass by the area where plaintiff claims she fell, she could not recall whether she inspected the accident location itself that afternoon when she made her rounds (see Jahn v SH Entertainment, LLC, 117 AD3d 473, 473 [1st Dept 2014]). Her affidavit stating that she did not observe a slippery substance or liquid on the hallway floor during her daily rounds did not satisfy Camba’s burden of showing it had no actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition alleged and that it did not exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit Camba employees to discover and remedy it (see Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836 [1986]). Camba also failed to present evidence regarding the shelter’s cleaning schedule, and Camba’s employee lacked personal knowledge regarding the shelter’s maintenance (see Rodriguez v Board of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 107 AD3d 651, 651-652 [1st Dept 2013]).

Even if Camba had met its initial burden, the record shows that there exists a question of fact as to whether it had notice of a recurring condition. Plaintiffs testimony that she frequently would see liquid leaking from Whitson’s Food’s delivery crates at the accident location, and that she complained to Camba’s maintenance staff about the liquid, is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to a recurring condition (see Uhlich v Canada Dry Bottling Co. of N.Y., 305 AD2d 107, 107 [1st Dept 2003]).

Whitson’s Food, which had a contract with Camba to provide cooked meals for the shelter, failed to make a prima facie showing that it did not launch a force or instrument of harm by dropping liquid on the floor when it delivered food to the shelter on the day of the accident (see Jenkins v Related Cos., L.P., 114 AD3d 435, 436 [1st Dept 2014]). The deposition testimony from an employee of Whitson’s Food was insufficient to show that Whitson’s Food did not cause or create the liquid condition, since he lacked personal knowledge as to whether the floor was clean after Whitson’s Food delivered the food (Jackson v Manhattan Mall Eat LLC, 111 AD3d 519, 520 [1st Dept 2013]).

The court providently exercised its discretion in determining *463 that plaintiff was not entitled to sanctions. Plaintiff failed to establish that her case has been fatally compromised as a result of Camba’s alleged spoliation of surveillance video footage of the hours before her accident. Plaintiff has sufficient evidence to prove her case, including her own testimony, surveillance footage showing the accident itself, and documents defendants provided during discovery (see Shapiro v Boulevard Hous. Corp., 70 AD3d 474, 476 [1st Dept 2010]). Plaintiffs February 9, 2010 letter requesting that Camba preserve the surveillance footage of the accident did not indicate that plaintiff wanted Camba to retain the surveillance footage for the hours preceding the accident (see Duluc v AC & L Food Corp., 119 AD3d 450, 452 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 908 [2014]). Therefore, Camba should not be penalized for failing to retain such footage (id.). Concur — Tom, J.P., Andrias, Feinman, Gische and Kapnick, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Vasquez v. Fordham Univ.
2024 NY Slip Op 01124 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2024)
Butler v. New York City Tr. Auth.
2021 NY Slip Op 01939 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2021)
Vazquez v. Jerome Gas Corp.
2019 NY Slip Op 4867 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2019)
Sarris v. Fairway Group Plainview, LLC
2019 NY Slip Op 922 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2019)
Lam v. 2 W. Nightlife, Inc.
2018 NY Slip Op 1672 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2018)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
130 A.D.3d 461, 13 N.Y.S.3d 71, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-whitsons-food-corp-nyappdiv-2015.