Jackson v. Unnamed Present and Former Members of the District Attorney's Office for Clark County, Nevada Family Support Division

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 27, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00941
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * *

5 MYLES STANLEY JACKSON Case No. 2:24-cv-00941-RFB-MDC

6 Plaintiff, ORDER

7 v.

8 UNNAMED PRESENT AND FORMER MEMBERS OF THE DISTRICT 9 ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA FAMILY SUPPORT 10 DIVISION

11 Defendants.

12 Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 7), filed by Defendant, Unnamed Present 13 and Former Members of the District Attorney’s Office for Clark County, Nevada Family Support 14 Division. For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. 15 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 16 On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff Myles Stanley Jackson (“Plaintiff”) commenced this case by 17 filing the Complaint. ECF No. 1. On June 12, 2024, Defendant, Unnamed Present and Former 18 Members of the District Attorney’s Office for Clark County, Nevada Family Support Division 19 (“Defendant”) filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 7. The motion was fully briefed by June 27, 20 2024. ECF Nos. 13, 14, 15. 21 On June 13, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery. ECF No. 10. On July 9, 22 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions. ECF No. 18. On July 18, 2024, Defendants filed a 23 motion to strike. ECF No. 19. On August 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 24 21. On October 8, 2024, Magistrate Judge Couviller granted Defendants’ motion to stay discovery, 25 ECF No. 10, and denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, ECF No. 18. ECF No. 25. On February 26 5, 2025, this Court held a motion hearing. ECF No. 27. Plaintiff did not attend. The Court’s Order 27 follows. 28 II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 1 On December 30, 1989, a child was born to LaSanya Rucker at Huntington Memorial 2 Hospital in Pasadena, Los Angeles County, CA. The child’s birth certificate states that Mr. Charles 3 Eugene Mackey is the father of the child. In January 2002, a paternity suit against Plaintiff was 4 filed by LaSanya Rucker. On March 12, 2002, Plaintiff was arrested on charges unrelated to this 5 action. Plaintiff was convicted and remained in jail serving his sentence until May 10, 2007. On 6 March 20, 2002, Plaintiff received service at his Las Vegas address. Plaintiff was not personally 7 served as he was incarcerated at the time service was completed. Plaintiff never took a DNA test 8 to determine paternity. In January 2024, Plaintiff learned that his paternity was determined by 9 default. Plaintiff paid involuntary, compulsory child support for the child to the State of Nevada, 10 by payroll deduction, from 2002 – 2020. 11 Plaintiff alleges a host of harms based upon not receiving proper notice of the paternity 12 action against him. 13 III. LEGAL STANDARD 14 An initial pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 15 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The court may dismiss a complaint for “failure 16 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion 17 to dismiss, “[a]ll well-pleaded allegations of material fact in the complaint are accepted as true and 18 are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Faulkner v. APT Sec. Services, 19 Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 20 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” 21 but it must do more than assert “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements 22 of a cause of action. . . .” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. 23 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, a claim will not be dismissed if it contains 24 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” 25 meaning that the court can reasonably infer “that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 26 alleged.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit, in elaborating on 27 the pleading standard described in Twombly and Iqbal, has held that for a complaint to survive 28 dismissal, the plaintiff must allege non-conclusory facts that, together with reasonable inferences 1 from those facts, are “plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. 2 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 3 IV. DISCUSSION 4 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains six causes of action including Thirteenth and 5 Fourteenth Amendment claims under the United States Constitution as well as claims under the 6 Nevada State Constitution. Additionally, Plaintiff brings a negligence and gross negligence claim 7 under Nevada law. 8 Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Defendant’s motion makes two 9 primary arguments. First, Defendants contend that district attorney defendants enjoy absolute 10 prosecutorial immunity from damages alleged to have arisen from their quasi-judicial activity. 11 Second, Defendants assert that, pursuant to the statute of limitations periods outlined in NRS 12 11.190, Plaintiff’s claims are no longer legally actionable. 13 Plaintiff counters that Defendants are not entitled to immunity because the policies and 14 customs in place within the District Attorney’s Office violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 15 Plaintiff also argues that the claims raised in the Amended Complaint are not barred by the statute 16 of limitations because Plaintiff was unaware of the alleged constitutional violations until 2023. 17 Thus, Plaintiff contends that his claims are subject to the “Discovery Rule.” 18 The Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 19 A. Prosecutorial Immunity 20 The Nevada Supreme Court has adopted prosecutorial immunity as expressed by the U.S. 21 Supreme Court in County of Washoe ex rel. Office of Dist. Attorney, Nonsupport Div. v. Second 22 Judicial Dist. Court, 652 P.2d 1175 (Nev. 1982). The rationale for the adoption of prosecutorial 23 immunity, as expressed by the Supreme Court, is that “harassment by unfounded litigation would 24 cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he 25 would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his 26 public trust.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976). The Nevada State Legislature has 27 codified common law immunity in NRS § 41.032, which provides in pertinent part: “[n]o action 28 may be brought under NRS § 41.031 or against an officer or employee of the state or any of its 1 agencies or political subdivisions which is . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure 2 to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the state or nay of its agencies 3 or political subdivisions or of any officer or employee of any of these, whether or not the discretion 4 involved is abused.” Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.032(2). 5 In this case, Defendants were engaging in protected prosecutorial activity when they 6 established paternity by default. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 7 for their conduct so long as it is “intimately associated” with the judicial phase of their work. Burns 8 v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (extending prosecutorial immunity to administrative 9 proceedings); Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1984). In the Amended 10 Complaint, Plaintiff’s causes of action arise from Defendants’ prosecution of the 2002 paternity 11 action which resulted in the establishment of paternity by default. Plaintiff alleges throughout the 12 Amended Complaint that Defendants acted under color of the law and does not assert that 13 Defendants acted outside the scope of their prosecutorial duties. 14 The Court finds that Defendants are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. First, there is no 15 dispute that Defendants were acting within their prosecutorial duties when prosecuting the 2002 16 paternity action. Second, it is clear that District Attorney Defendants are immune from § 1983 17 liability when the conduct at issue is required in their role. Demery 735 F.2d; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 18 41.032. 19 B. Statute of Limitations 20 The State of Nevada codified its statute of limitations in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.910. The statute 21 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n act to recover damages for injuries a person caused by the 22 wrongful act or neglect of another, may only be commenced within two years. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 23 11.190(4)(e). Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that tort claims against any 24 political subdivision of the State must be filed within two years of the time of the cause of action. 25 Sparks v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc., 255 P.3d 238, 243 n.4 (Nev. 2011). 26 For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for 27 personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Fink v. Shedler, 28 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999)). Federal law governs when civil rights claims accrue. Knox v. 1 Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff 2 | knows or has reason to know of the injury which 1s the basis of the action.” Id. 3 The claims alleged in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint arise from a paternity action that was 4| initiated and commenced in 2002, over two decades ago. Applying Nevada’s statute of limitations to Plaintiff's claims, the statutory deadline would have been in 2004. Plaintiff asserts that he 6| learned paternity was determined by default in 2024. Alternatively, in count three of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Thirteenth Amendment rights by forcing him 8 | to work to pay child support under threat of imprisonment for 18 years. Additionally, in Plaintiff s Prayer for Relief, he requests the Court order Defendants to pay Plaintiff an award in the amount 10 | of child support paid dating back to the initial child support order in 2002. 11 Federal law provides that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of 12 | theinjury. Knox, 260 F.3d at 1013. Here, Plaintiff asks the Court to draw contradictory conclusions 13 | against unnamed defendants. Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to 18 years of forced labor to pay child support, while simultaneously asserting that although he never participated in a DNA 15 | test, he did not know paternity was established by default. Assuming the veracity of □□□□□□□□□□□ 16 | assertions, over the course of 18 years, Plaintiff had reason to know that absent a DNA paternity 17 | test, paternity was determined by default. 18 The Court finds that the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs claims has run. Thus, Plaintiff’s 19 | claims are dismissed based upon both prosecutorial immunity and the statute of limitations. 20 V. CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF 22 | No.7), is GRANTED. 23 DATED: March 27, 2025 25 AS " 26 7 RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28

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