Jackson v. United States

• Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 24-CO-0363
• Status: Published

Opinion

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 24-CO-0363

JOSEPH E. JACKSON, APPELLANT,

V.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2001-FEL-006799)

(Hon. Kendra Davis Briggs, Trial Judge)

(Submitted May 20, 2025 Decided November 13, 2025)

Jason K. Clark was on the brief for appellant.

Matthew M. Graves, United States Attorney at the time, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Nicholas P. Coleman, Simran Dhillon, and Kevin Birney, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.

Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, HOWARD, Associate Judge, and GLICKMAN, Senior Judge.

GLICKMAN, Senior Judge: Appellant Joseph Jackson was convicted in

Superior Court in 2003 of first-degree murder and other felonies, and he was

sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-five years’ incarceration. Jackson was

twenty years of age when he committed the offenses in 2001. Two decades later, he

moved for a reduction of his sentence under the Incarceration Reduction 2

Amendment Act (IRAA), D.C. Code § 24-403.03, which—as amended in 2021—

allows the Superior Court to reduce lengthy prison sentences imposed for offenses

committed when the defendant was under twenty-five years of age. The court is

empowered to grant such relief if the defendant has served at least fifteen years in

prison and the court affirmatively finds that the defendant “is not a danger to the

safety of any person or the community and that the interests of justice warrant a

sentence modification.” Id. § 24-403.03(a). In making its determination of these

criteria, the court is required to consider eleven factors that are listed in subsection

(c) of the IRAA. The defendant has the burden of proof. 1

In this case, the Superior Court denied Jackson’s IRAA motion after

addressing each of the statutory factors, and he has appealed its ruling. He contends

the court erred in its consideration of two of the factors listed in subsection (c):

whether his personal circumstances showed his “aging out of crime” (factor ten),

and the extent to which “another person” was involved in his offense (factor nine).

However, we conclude that the court properly considered those factors, and we

affirm its decision.

1 Bishop v. United States, 310 A.3d 629, 636 (D.C. 2024). 3

I.

In 2001, according to the evidence at his trial in 2003, Jackson and his co-

defendant Troy Ashley were selling crack cocaine on 25th Street in southeast

Washington, D.C. After a rival drug dealer named Larry Smith told Jackson he

could no longer sell drugs in that territory, Jackson told Ashley to “handle that.” To

that end, Ashley enlisted and armed an accomplice, Jason Parker, and the two men

confronted Smith and two of his associates on July 30, 2001. Ashley shot and killed

Smith, and he and Parker robbed and shot the two men who accompanied Smith.

Ashley and Parker then reported back to Jackson. Jackson asked Ashley, “Did you

take care of that?” Ashley replied, “Did what you asked me to do,” and demonstrated

how he had “caught Smith with his head coming up.” Upon hearing this, Jackson

excitedly jumped up and down, unloaded Ashley’s and Parker’s guns for them, and

rewarded Parker for his help with two bags of crack cocaine.

At the conclusion of Jackson’s trial, the jury found him guilty of first-degree

premeditated murder, armed robbery, and various lesser offenses. This court

affirmed his convictions on appeal and remanded the case for merger of some of the

offenses and limited resentencing. On remand, Jackson was sentenced to an

aggregate term of thirty-five years in prison. 4

In 2023, Jackson moved in Superior Court for a reduced sentence under the

IRAA. He argued in his motion that he had satisfied the criteria set forth in the

statute; in particular, he claimed that he had overcome his abusive and traumatic

childhood, had matured and had “substantially” complied with Bureau of Prisons

rules, and was no longer dangerous. Jackson’s sister submitted a letter in his support,

in which she described his difficult childhood and expressed her perception that he

had matured and “grown into a more responsible individual.” The letter’s assertions

that Jackson had reformed were conclusory and unsubstantiated, however. For

example, Jackson’s sister stated:

From a distance, I have been able to witness the changes in my brother. He has grown into a more responsible individual . . . . The fact of the matter is that my brother has been able to repent for his actions, he has been able to grow into the man that he should have grown into so many years ago. I have been able to see his growth since reconnecting with him so long ago. His demeanor has changed significantly, he has totally transformed his attitude . . . . [H]e has now been able to see the errors of his ways and has been able to exhibit the characteristics of a responsible, accountable individual.

But Jackson’s sister proffered no facts to justify these impressions—she did not, for

example, describe anything Jackson had said or done in prison that demonstrated his

maturation or transformation, nor did she address his behavior or any rehabilitative

accomplishments while he was incarcerated. The letter stated that Jackson “has a

plan to relocate to another jurisdiction immediately upon his release into the 5

community,” and that he “dreams of becoming a business owner, a family man.”

And his sister stated that she would “ensure” that Jackson is “connected with

additional supports in the community,” and with “therapeutic services, employment

services and . . . resources and services that will allow him the opportunity to give

back to his community.” The letter offered no specifics, however, nor did it

otherwise set out a re-entry plan for Jackson (though Jackson’s sister did assure the

court that he could reside with her if he were released from prison).

The government opposed Jackson’s release, mainly on account of his lengthy

and unabated history of both violent and nonviolent (but serious) disciplinary

infractions during his incarceration, and also because of the lack of any meaningful

re-entry planning. By the time of the hearing on his IRAA motion, Jackson had

incurred a total of forty-five disciplinary violations during his imprisonment, many

of them of heightened severity. His prison offenses included an attempted killing of

another inmate, whom Jackson had stabbed with a homemade knife; several other

injurious assaults at various times against both other inmates and prison staff;

possession of a dangerous weapon on multiple occasions; and possession of illegal

drugs. And as the government emphasized, Jackson did not stop perpetrating such

violations as he got older; he committed serious assaults when he was between

thirty-five and thirty-eight years of age, and was found in possession of narcotics

(opium alkaloids, amphetamines, and heroin) in his prison cell at the age of forty. 6

The government argued that this was “not the conduct of a rehabilitated individual,”

and that Jackson’s “continued and recent violent conduct demonstrate[d] that he

remain[ed] a danger to the community.”

After a hearing, the court denied Jackson’s motion in a written order. 2 The

court found that Jackson met the “threshold requirements for IRAA relief,” as he

had been sentenced for an offense committed before his twenty-fifth birthday and

had served at least fifteen years in prison. The court therefore proceeded to address

and make findings with respect to each of the eleven factors it was required to

consider by the IRAA. The court found that four of those factors weighed in favor

of a sentence reduction, specifically Jackson’s youth at the time of the offense

(factors one and ten), and the “significant trauma and abuse” he had endured as a

child (factors two and eight). 3 However, for reasons we discuss below, the court

found that factor ten weighed only marginally in Jackson’s favor. 4

2 It was not an evidentiary hearing, although it conformed to the requirements of D.C. Code § 24-403.03(b)(2). Jackson and his sister spoke at the hearing, but not as witnesses subject to cross-examination, and the court did not take other testimony.

3 D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c)(1), (2), (8) and (10). 4 In full, the court concluded as follows regarding factor ten:

The Court agrees with defendant that this factor favors a reduction in defendant’s sentence, although not to a significant degree. He was twenty-years old at the time of 7

In the court’s view, five statutory factors weighed more heavily against

reducing Jackson’s sentence at this time. The most consequential of these, in the

court’s assessment, were factors three, five, and nine. Factor three directs the court

to consider “[w]hether the defendant has substantially complied with the rules of the

institution to which the defendant has been confined.” 5 And factor five directs the

court to assess “[w]hether the defendant has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation,

and a fitness to reenter society sufficient to justify a sentence reduction.” 6 As to

factor three, the court found that Jackson’s record of numerous and seriously violent

disciplinary infractions over a twenty-year period in federal custody demonstrated

that he had not substantially complied with the rules of the institutions in which he

was confined. 7 And as for factor five, the court stated that “[b]ased on [Jackson’s]

the murder and the Court therefore considers the “mitigating qualities of youth” that are the bases for the decisions in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and the bases for the D.C. Council’s enactment of the IRAA. 5 Id. § 24-403.03(c)(3). 6 Id. § 24-403.03(c)(5). 7 In discussing factor three, the court also found that Jackson’s participation in prison programming had been lackluster and less than successful. Although Jackson had participated in over two thousand hours of educational programming between November 2004 and May 2023, the court found he had yet to obtain his GED and had “not completed many programs . . . to improve the likelihood that he will be able to successfully transition back into the community when he is released from prison.” 8

continued history of infractions,” it “does not believe that [Jackson] has matured

significantly since he facilitated this murder in 2001.” 8

The court also found that factor nine, which required it to consider Jackson’s

“role in the offense” and the involvement of others, 9 weighed against him, for it was

undisputed that Jackson had a “substantial” role in causing Smith’s death by ordering

Ashley to “take care” of Smith. 10

The remaining two factors—factors seven and eleven—were neutral because

they weighed neither for nor against reduction of the sentence.

Ultimately, after considering the eleven statutory factors, the court said it

could not make the findings necessary to grant sentencing relief under the IRAA—

that Jackson “is not a danger to the safety of any person or the community and that

8 The court thus rejected Jackson’s sister’s opinion that he had undergone a positive transformation in prison. And the court attached little weight to her commitment to support Jackson, as there was “no clear plan where [Jackson] will work or the length of time that he would live with [his sister] to ensure he fully participates in his re-entry” into the community.

9 D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c)(9). 10 Other statutory factors that counted against Jackson included the opposition to his motion by the United States Attorney and the murder victim’s family, see id. § 24-403.03(c)(4) and (6). 9

the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.” 11 To the contrary, the court

found, Jackson:

[D]oes currently pose a danger to the safety of any person or the community because he has not substantially complied with the rules of the institutions in which he has been incarcerated and has not developed a greater sense of maturity and judgment, even though he has a greater support network than he had at the time of the offense . . . . [Jackson’s] record of incarceration over the past twenty years has been unsatisfactory, and he has not taken substantial steps to rehabilitate himself while incarcerated and prepare for re-entry upon his release. 12

For much the same reasons, the court further concluded that the interests of

justice did not favor granting IRAA relief to Jackson.

II.

We review the denial of an IRAA motion for abuse of discretion. 13 Jackson

claims the Superior Court abused its discretion in two respects: first, he contends

that the court failed to consider his “personal circumstances that support an aging

out of crime,” as required by factor ten; and second, he contends that the court also

11 D.C. Code § 24-403.03(a)(2). 12 Moreover, the court said, Jackson “also has not developed a thoughtful plan for re-entry.”

13 Bishop, 310 A.3d at 641. 10

failed to consider properly whether “another person” was involved in the murder for

which appellant was convicted, as required by factor nine. We address these

contentions in that order.

A. Factor Ten

Factor ten provides that the court, in determining whether to reduce a term of

imprisonment under the IRAA, shall consider:

The diminished culpability of juveniles and persons under age 25, as compared to that of older adults, and the hallmark features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, which counsel against sentencing them to lengthy terms in prison . . . and the defendant’s personal circumstances that support an aging out of crime. 14

The D.C. Council added the final clause (requiring consideration of “the

defendant’s personal circumstances that support an aging out of crime”) when it

amended the IRAA in 2021. 15 “[T]he purpose of this clause is to mandate

consideration of how the movant has changed [if at all] between the time of the

underlying offense and the time of his or her IRAA motion.” 16 In effect, therefore,

14 D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c)(10). 15 See Bishop, 310 A.3d at 643. 16 Id. at 644. 11

factor ten identifies two considerations: (1) the “diminished culpability” of younger

offenders in general based on the “hallmark features of youth,” and (2) whether the

“personal circumstances” of the particular defendant before the court indicate an

“aging out of crime” by the time of the motion. This court has held that the “hallmark

features of youth” consideration is “unconditional and categorical”; “the trial court

may not inquire, on a case-by-case basis, whether or to what extent the ‘hallmarks

of youth’ played a role in the underlying offense[,]” but must take the immature

defendant’s diminished culpability as a given. 17 In contrast, the court “may,

however—consistent with the second clause . . .—consider the extent to which a

movant’s personal circumstances support an aging out of crime.” 18

The court in this case quoted the entire amended factor ten in its order, and

we therefore are confident that the court was aware of the “aging out” clause.

However, Jackson faults the court for failing, when it discussed factor ten, to address

explicitly “whether[] and to what extent” he had aged out of crime by the time of his

IRAA motion.

In our view, this objection is not well taken, because the court did address the

very issue in its order just before it discussed factor ten, and Jackson has not

17 Id. at 645, 647. 18 Id. at 647. 12

identified any evidence relevant to the “aging out” question that the court failed to

consider. The court performed the necessary inquiry when it reviewed Jackson’s

“personal circumstances” in the two decades following his offense and found that

Jackson had continued to commit violent and other serious crimes throughout that

period, even as he turned forty years of age; that (contrary to the unsubstantiated

opinion of his sister) Jackson had not matured during his decades in prison; and that

he had not taken substantial steps to rehabilitate himself or prepare himself for re-

entry into the community. These findings plainly signified that Jackson had not

“aged out” of crime. This meant that while the mitigating quality of Jackson’s

immaturity when he committed his offense was a point in his favor (which the court

recognized explicitly), it was outweighed by Jackson’s failure thereafter to reform

and age out of crime—a failure that evinced his continuing dangerousness as a full

adult and hence counted against granting his IRAA motion for a reduction of his

sentence. Thus, the evidence, the court’s findings, and the applicable law all

supported the court’s specific conclusion respecting factor ten, which was that—

based only on the “mitigating factors of youth”—factor ten “favors a reduction in

[Jackson’s] sentence, although not to a significant degree.” In reaching that

conclusion, the court hardly needed to repeat the detailed findings it already had 13

made that Jackson had not aged out of crime, a failure that limited the applicability

of factor ten. 19

B. Factor Nine

Factor nine also was amended by the Council in 2021. 20 Prior to the

amendment, factor nine directed the court to consider “[t]he extent of the defendant’s

role in the offense and whether and to what extent an adult was involved in the

offense” (emphasis added). The amended version substituted the words “another

person” for “an adult.” The trial court was aware of the amended language—it

accurately quoted that language during Jackson’s IRAA hearing. In its written order,

though, the court mistakenly quoted the pre-amendment version. Jackson seizes on

this mistaken citation to assert that the court failed to consider properly the role of

Jackson’s co-defendant Ashley in the commission of the murder, to Jackson’s

detriment. Jackson speculates that in the absence of any evidence Ashley was an

adult, the court might have believed his involvement was not relevant in assessing

19 Cf. Bishop, 310 A.3d at 644 (“[A] trial court’s decision not to robustly discuss every piece of evidence under each relevant factor might not, by itself, warrant reversal.”). This is not a case, like Bishop, in which a remand was necessary because the trial court “both cited outdated statutory language and neglected to discuss the considerations reflected in the current version of the statute” or particular personal circumstances that supported a sentence reduction. Id.

See Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Amendment Act of 2020, D.C. Law 20

23-0274, 68 D.C. Reg. 4792 (2021); see also D.C. Council, Report on Bill 23-0127, at 18 (Nov. 23, 2020). 14

Jackson’s own culpability. 21 But Jackson provides no support for this speculation,

and the record refutes it.

The record does not disclose whether Ashley was an adult or a minor. Jackson

himself did not suggest this was relevant to his IRAA motion; he did not contend,

for example, that he was motivated to participate in the offense by peer pressure (or

Ashley’s influence in any way). 22 However, the court did not ignore, minimize, or

extenuate Ashley’s role in the murder of Larry Smith to the detriment of Jackson in

any manner. The court considered the different roles of Jackson and Ashley, and its

analysis and conclusion fully complied with the requirements of factor nine. The

court did not find that this factor was irrelevant or weighed against Jackson on the

supposition that Ashley was not an adult.

The relevant facts were not in question. The court recognized that it was

Ashley who personally committed the murder, and that Jackson was “not at the scene

and did not shoot” Smith himself. But it was Jackson who directed Ashley to “take

21 Cf. Henny v. United States, 321 A.3d 621, 628 n.4 (D.C. 2024) (trial court mistakenly applied the pre-amendment version of factor nine and “counted that as a factor against Henny’s release because there was no evidence that any of Henny’s accomplices in [the decedent’s] murder were adults” who might have swayed the younger defendant). 22 Cf. Bryant v. United States, 341 A.3d 586, 593 (D.C. 2025) (holding that factor nine requires courts to consider mitigating circumstances underlying the crime, including any provocative actions by other involved persons). 15

care” of Smith so that Jackson could continue to sell crack cocaine where he wished.

That was why, in addressing factor nine, the court found “there can be little doubt

that [Jackson] had a substantial role in causing the death of Larry Smith.” There

were no mitigating or extenuating circumstances—no claim or indication, for

example, that Jackson was subjected to pressure of any kind from Ashley. (If

anything, it was evidently Jackson who pressured Ashley to commit the crime.) And

as the court noted, Jackson himself admitted in his IRAA motion that his

participation in the murder was “significant,” and “he took responsibility for his

actions in open court” at the hearing on the motion.

The misquotation of factor nine thus did not lead the court to misapprehend

the facts or otherwise err in assessing Jackson’s role in the offense. The court

properly found that Jackson had a substantial (indeed, motivating) role in the murder

and permissibly weighed factor nine against his motion for an early release from

prison.

Although we find the trial court’s analysis of factors nine and ten to have been

adequate in the instant case, we think a cautionary admonition may be in order. It is

fair to say that the court’s analysis of factors nine and ten was rather concise; it was

not unduly conclusory only because it was well grounded in the discussion and

findings the court previously had reached and articulated in its opinion. In general, 16

our case law indicates that a fuller, more explicit discussion of factors nine and ten

would have been the better and safer course for the trial court to follow. Our cases

have emphasized that, in evaluating IRAA petitions, the trial court must make clear

in its opinion “how the statutory factors inform[] its determinations regarding

dangerousness and the interests of justice” to ensure that this court can review the

opinion adequately. 23 Thus, the trial court should take care to specify explicitly the

entire factual foundation underlying its assessment of each factor so that there is no

ambiguity or uncertainty about the adequacy of the court’s consideration and the

basis for the court’s determination with respect to any factor—even though that may

necessitate repeating what the court has already said in addressing other factors.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Superior Court denying

appellant’s motion under the IRAA for a reduction of his sentence.

So ordered.

23 Bishop, 310 A.3d at 637 (emphasis added); see also Doe v. United States, 333 A.3d 893, 911 (D.C. 2025) (noting the fact-intensive inquiry in assessing sentencing and the specific consideration required for each enumerated factor).