Jackson v. Tampkins
This text of Jackson v. Tampkins (Jackson v. Tampkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLUS JACKSON, No. 24-4272 D.C. No. 5:18-cv-01974-FLA-JC Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
CYNTHIA TAMPKINS, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 17, 2025**
Before: SILVERMAN, OWENS, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Former California state prisoner Carlus Jackson appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal
and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a sua sponte dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Omar
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s action because Jackson
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible due process or equal protection
claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that, to avoid
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (explaining that a
prisoner has no protected liberty interest when a restraint neither extends the length
of their sentence nor imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d
1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an equal protection claim requires a
plaintiff to “show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to
discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Jackson’s state law claims. See Dyack v. N.
Mariana Islands, 317 F.3d 1030, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims where the district court “has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
2 24-4272 We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 24-4272
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