Jackson v. Tampkins

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 25, 2025
Docket24-4272
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jackson v. Tampkins (Jackson v. Tampkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Tampkins, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLUS JACKSON, No. 24-4272 D.C. No. 5:18-cv-01974-FLA-JC Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

CYNTHIA TAMPKINS, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 17, 2025**

Before: SILVERMAN, OWENS, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Former California state prisoner Carlus Jackson appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal

and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo a sua sponte dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Omar

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Jackson’s action because Jackson

failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible due process or equal protection

claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that, to avoid

dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (explaining that a

prisoner has no protected liberty interest when a restraint neither extends the length

of their sentence nor imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d

1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an equal protection claim requires a

plaintiff to “show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Jackson’s state law claims. See Dyack v. N.

Mariana Islands, 317 F.3d 1030, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of

review and explaining that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims where the district court “has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).

2 24-4272 We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-4272

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Related

Sandin v. Conner
515 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Edward Furnace v. Paul Sullivan
705 F.3d 1021 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Padgett v. Wright
587 F.3d 983 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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Jackson v. Tampkins, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-tampkins-ca9-2025.