Jackson v. Marshall's Administrator

5 N.C. 323
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJuly 5, 1809
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 5 N.C. 323 (Jackson v. Marshall's Administrator) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Marshall's Administrator, 5 N.C. 323 (N.C. 1809).

Opinion

Weight, Judge,

delivered the following opinion, as the opinion of the Court in both of the preceding cases:

It is rather a singular circumstance, that claims, such as the present bills set up, are made at this day, and at *329 tempted to be enforced without theiauthority of a single adjudged case to support them. That conveyances like those set forth, made* under similar agreements, have before occurred, there can be little doubt; and it is equally certain, that if these agreements had ever been considered as entitled to the assistance of a Court of Equity, the diligence and industry of the Complainant’s counsel would have discovered the cases in which application to enforce them had been sustained, and relief granted. The silence of the Books on the subject, would seem oi‘ itself to affordwstrong presumptive evidence, that the Complainants are not entitled to the relief which they seek. But although such presumption exists, yet if they eould have shewn, that under the influence of any of those principles which direct the decisions of our Courts of Equity, they were entitled to relief, the Court would feel bound to grant it, notwithstanding it might seem to militate against the policy of the statutes which have been, from time to time, made for the protection and security of creditors. It is believed, that so far from granting relief to the Complainants, not only the statute against fraudulent conveyances, but every principle and rule which has been adopted and matured in Courts of Equity, for the purpose of suppressing fraud and of inculcating a course of fair and honest dealing among men, directly forbid 'it. The'* Complainants’ counsel rested their arguments much on the nature of trusts in the Civil Law, from which they have been taken and adopted into our Jurisprudence by the Courts of Equity; and cases were cited to shew, that by that Law, they were enforced, although they had originated in fraud on the part of the cestui que trust. To this it is a sufficient answer to say, that although the Courts of Equity may have derived. their idea of a trust from the Civil Law, yet that that Law lias no binding force or authoritative influence on these Courts, _twhich are guided altogether by a set of rules and. principles, peculiarly their own, that have gifown out of the condition and positive institutions ®f *330 the country where they have been established. The Com‘plainants’ claim will derive very little w eight from the consideration that it would have been enforced by a Roman Praetor, if it 'be opposed by'any of these rtiles or principles. Some reading is also cited from Saunders on Uses, and Reeves's History of the English Law, to shew that trusts originated in covin, and that on their first introduction, they were applied to what might be deemed fraudulent purposes; that is, to avoid the statutes of mortijhaifti. But it is to be observed, that the clerical Chancellors who presided in the Courts of' Equity at that time, did not consider these conveyances as dishonest or against conscience, and rather leaned in favor of them, and enforced the secret trusts which arose out of them, and which produced a variety of acts of Parliament that were deemed necessary to prevent the fraudulent purposes to which they were applied : among others,. the 13th aiid 27 th of Elizabeth •, of the former, our act of. 1715 is nearly a copy. The Complainants’ counsel, however, contend, that although the statute makes the conveyances to which it. alludes void, yet that it does not give validity to any thing, and hence an inference is drawn, that when a'debt is discharged, to delay the payment of which a conveyance or secret trust is made,'the conveyance ceases to be binding, and the debtor becomes entitled to a reconveyance. But this argument is cer-' tainly unsound $ for although the statute does not validate any thing in express terms, it does by a very strong implication. It declares, “ that all "and every feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain and conveyance of lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods and chattels,” &c. made for the purposes, or with the intent stated in the preamble, shall henceforward be deemed and taken “ only as against that person or persons, his or their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, and every of them, whose fictions, suits, debts, accompts, damages, penalties and forfeitures, shall release by such cóviuous or fraudulent devices and practices, as is aforesaid, or shall *331 er^ngbt be in any wise disturbed, hindered, delayed or defrauded, to be clearly and utterly void, frustrate and of.no effect; any pretence, colour, feigned consideration, expressing of use, or any matter or thing to the contrary notwithstanding.” As to the parties themselves, therefore, it must mean, that it shall be taken to be good ; for that which would otherwise be1 good, and is declared void only as to a certain intent, remains good to all other intents 5 and that such has been the construction- which the statute has heretofore received, may be gathered not only from the opinion of elementary writers on the subject, but from adjudged cases in the English Courts, and in our own—2 Bac. Mr. 605-Fonblanque on Equity, 139 —Roberts on Fraudulent Conveyances, 643 —Cro. Jac. 270 —1 Ch. Ca. 59—2 H ayw. 348. In the case cited from Cro. Jac. the alienee was permitted to recover at Law from the executors of the debtor, the property conveyed, on the ground, that although the conveyance was void as to creditors, (it being made to defraud them of their debts) yet that it was good as against the person making it, and his representatives. But supposing.no adjudged casp or elementary opinion could be- found in support of such -a construction, yet the object and spirit of the Law would seem evidently to require it. ...The.design and intention of the act was the protection and security of creditors 5 this can only be effected by destroying all confidence between the parties to secret agreements ; by multiplying the difficulties which fraudulent debtors would have to-encounter in attempting to defeat their clai^ft; and denouncing every species of, forfeiture and risfc against such attempts, which can be .raised up against them in a Court of Equity. The act of Assembly, therefore, would seem a complete answer to the claims of the Complainants. But independent of the act, the claims are in direct opposition to some of the ím>St fundamental maxims which direct and influence the conscience of a Chancellor. He who hath done iniquity, shall not have Equity „• He who requires the aid of a Court *332 of Equity, must disclose a fair and honest transaction „• are maxims which have never been departed from, aud ar,e |n ti¡rect hostility to the claims of the Complainants. It is true, that Francis, in his exposition of the first maxim, says that the iniquity must be done to the Defendant himself, and this exposition was much relied on by the Complainants’ counsel. But this exposition is certainly incorrect, nor does the case cited by Francis for the purpose, prove it.

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Bluebook (online)
5 N.C. 323, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-marshalls-administrator-nc-1809.