Jackson v. Land Ass'n

41 S.E. 920, 51 W. Va. 482, 1902 W. Va. LEXIS 116
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedJune 7, 1902
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 41 S.E. 920 (Jackson v. Land Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Land Ass'n, 41 S.E. 920, 51 W. Va. 482, 1902 W. Va. LEXIS 116 (W. Va. 1902).

Opinion

Brannon, Judge:

Minter J. Jackson conveyed a tract of land by the acre as containing one thousand three hundred and seventy-five acres to The Welsh Land Association, a partnership, reserving a lien for a balance of purchase money. Later it was represented to Jackson that upon a survey of the tract it turned out that it contained only one thousand seventy-four acres, and he accepted payment of balance of purchase money on the basis of one thousand and seventy-four acres in the tract, surrendered the purchase money notes and executed a release of the lien as to the one thousand and seventy-four acres. Still, later as the bill states, he learned that in truth there was no such deficiency in quantity, and he brought a suit in equity in the circuit court of Randolph County to recover the purchase money for the alleged [484]*484deficiency of land which had been erroneously alleged to exist and the result of the suit was a decree in Jack sows favor for the difference between one thousand and seventy-four and one thousand three hundred and seventjr-five acres., and W. R. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, partners in the association, took an appeal.

The court overruled a demurrer to the bill. It was based on the idea that as the bill itself showed a settlement between Jackson arid the association, and the surrender of the notes for purchase money and the release of the lien, it presented no case. The bill alleges a mistake of fact .arising from misrepresentation, and a court of equity relieves against such mistake. The bill alleges that Jackson believed the representation as to quantity made to him by a surveyor, and knew not to the contrary, and acted upon a mistake of fact. TJpon this statement the bill is maintainable. I will add that the bill alleges that Jackson, upon that settlement, expressly reserved right to claim the money for the deficiency should it thereafter be ascertained to be non-existent. This only adds further ground for an appeal to equity.

Under this demurrer it is argued that the court erred in overruling it, because the statute of limitations barred a personal decree; but the bill shows that the last purchase money note had not become barred when the suit was instituted. It is not claimed, and cannot be, that limitation affects the lien. The lien was released only as to the one thousand and seventy-four acres; but if it had been a total release, and made under mistake of fact, and especially with that reservation, equity would relieve against it. There is no error in overruling the demurrer.

The vital question in this case is whether the deficiency exists. This being purely a question of fact, we arc not strictly called upon to give any reasons for our conclusion, and certainly not to enter into 'the details which the great volume of evidence would justify. I might write pages upon the evidence upon dozens of lines and dozens of corner trees of the thirty lots into which the well known Davenport Survey of thirtj'’ thousand acres granted June 25, 1794, was divided by Robert Ervin, deputy for Minter Bailey, commissioner of delinquent and forfeited lands of Lewis County in 1839 or 1840, and sold by such lots by decree of the Circuit Superior Court [485]*485of Law and Chancery of Lewis County by said commissioner Bailey in the year 1840. Lot No. 30 in the division of said entire tract came to the hands of Jackson, and he sold it to The Welsh Land Association. The controversy rests on the location of the division lines between lots 30 and 19, and for a small quantity on the division line between lots 29 and 30. This involves, more or less, the ascertainment of all the lines and corners of any or all the other lots. The great amount of surveying done in the Davenport Survey presents many questions of complication. I confess that the case has given me great labor and perplexity from the many lines and corner and line trees and numerous surveys by different surveyors.

Let us take up the division line between lots 19 and 30, the important consideration in this case. I have come to the conclusion that the evidence shows by decided preponderance that a Spruce, sometimes called Hemlock, shown on the plat of Marstellor, surveyor of Bandolph County, at letter M on his plat is an original corner of lots 19, 20, 29 and 30 in the division of the Davenport Survey made by Ervin preparatory to a sale of the land under sáid decree as delinquent or forfeited. That large Spruce is plainly marked for such corner, and its annulation counted 56 years, thus suiting the date of the survey made by Ervin. A Spruce is called for at this point by the deeds from Bailey for a corner of lots 19, 29 and 30, though a Bed Oak is called for, likely by mistake, for lot 20. All those lots must have the same corner. Marks on that tree stamp it as a tree made by Ervin as a corner. From that tree the divisional line of five hundred and fifty poles between lots 19 and 30 is established by many marked threes corresponding in age with Ervin’s survey. A maple and gum are called for at the end of the line running from that spruce between lots 19 .and 30 to the outside line of the Davenport Survey, and it is relied upon with confidence by the plaintiff that the absence of these trees will dispute this line; but James Pickens is positive in his statement that he saw these trees marked as a corner, one of them beginning to fall against another tree, and as a road and tram road have been made just there, the road just where these trees stood, this will plausibly account for their disappearance. What right have we to disregard Picken’s specific statement. And besides this, though these trees be not found, the spruce being indelibly established, we run the [486]*486bearing of Bailey’s ¿leed out to the outside line of the Davenport. So if these, trees had not been seen, I do not see that the fact would militate with any great force against this line. Mathematics tell us where this corner is. Another line from a blazed red oak is claimed, it seems, by the plaintiff for such corner; but that .is not at all established as a comer, the age of. its marks being too yo.uug according to Pickens, the marks being mere blazes, not corner marks. The evidence does not show that it is a corner tree. From- it no line is found marked parallel with that from the spruce to the original outside line of the Davenport, though a line from that red oak would go through timber where we ought to find very- plain marks, numerous ones, as we do find on other lines made by Ervin. So, too, a spruce some distance from the blazed red oak is set up as a corner, and the argument made that this division line between lots ID and 30 should be run from it to the outside line of the Davenport; but no marked line is found from it to the southern line of the Davenport. No line that we can run from the red oak or- the second spruce has an}^ support from marked trees at all. comparable to the evidence of marked trees on the ■line from the other spruce. A corner and line could not be better established than that from the spruce at M to the original line of the Davenport. From that spruce north east we find well marked lines for eight hundred poles .between lots 20 and 29, 21 and 28, suiting the surveying in age; and we find numerous linos well marked running from other parts of the survej'’ to these lines, identifjdng and establishing them, if that were needed to aid the evidence found on those lines themselves.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Winding Gulf Colliery Co. v. Campbell
78 S.E. 384 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1913)
Point Mountain Coal & Lumber Co. v. Holly Lumber Co.
75 S.E. 197 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1912)
Hart v. Larkin
66 S.E. 331 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1909)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
41 S.E. 920, 51 W. Va. 482, 1902 W. Va. LEXIS 116, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-land-assn-wva-1902.