Jackson v. Lake Mohave Ranchos Fire District

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 17, 2024
• Docket: 3:21-cv-08156
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8

Karen J ackson, ) No. CV-21-08156-PCT-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) Lake Mohave Ranchos Fire District, et ) 12 al., ) 13 ) ) 14 Defendants. )

15 Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Two 16 and Count Three of First Amended Complaint (Doc. 105), Defendant’s Statement of Facts 17 to Support Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Two and Count Three of First 18 Amended Complaint (Doc. 106), Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 19 (Doc. 107), and Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (Doc. 108). The Motions have been fully 20 briefed and are ready for consideration.1 (Docs. 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116). The Court 21 rules as follow. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 This case is based on an employment discrimination dispute. Defendant Lake 24 Mohave Ranchos Fire District (“the District”) provides fire, medical, and community 25 services to residents who live within the District’s boundaries. (Docs. 106 at ¶ 1). The 26

27 1 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 28 Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 1 District is governed by board members (the “Board”), and the Board manages the District’s 2 finances, ensures the District operates within the budget, and employs the Fire Chief. 3 (Docs. 106 at ¶ 2). At relevant times, the Fire Chief was responsible for, among other 4 things, the hiring, equipping, training, oversight, and evaluation of the work of all District 5 personnel. (Doc. 109 at 1). In November 2016, the District employed Plaintiff Karen 6 Jackson to work as the Administrative Assistant. (Docs. 106 at ¶ 8; Doc. 108 at ¶ 1). 7 Plaintiff was an hourly employee and was expected to work at least 32 hours per week in 8 the District office. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 10; Doc. 110 at 1). 9 Plaintiff attributes the following circumstances to the fact that she has long suffered 10 from, and been diagnosed with, anxiety, depression, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 11 (“PTSD”). (Doc. 109 at 2). Plaintiff claims to have a significant mental health history that 12 began when she was only 12, which includes substantial difficulty sleeping, depression, 13 and suicidal ideation. (Id.). In or about 2001, Plaintiff was drugged and raped by someone 14 she met at a bar. (Id.). From about 2004 to 2006, Plaintiff was verbally and physically 15 abused by her former husband; and in 2006, she was raped by this former husband. (Id.). 16 Plaintiff claims that her medical problems affect her ability to groom properly, have sexual 17 relations with her husband, and interact with others. (Id.). It also causes her to experience 18 periods of generalized fear, severe anxiety, mistrust, and several other issues. (Id.). 19 On December 20, 2016, Plaintiff was the only person in the fire station when “a 20 woman ran into the station screaming and bloodied, and told [Plaintiff] that a man was 21 trying to rape her.” (Doc. 110 at 5). In February 2017, the Fire Chief, Tony DeMaio, 22 approved Plaintiff’s request to work from home because Plaintiff was pregnant and felt 23 unsafe working in the office alone. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 11–16; Doc. 110 at 6). In November 24 2017, the Board asked Mr. DeMaio why Plaintiff did not perform her duties in the office, 25 and he expressed that the Board could not ask questions about why Plaintiff worked from 26 home because “it was protected by law.” (Doc. 106 at ¶ 20–23; Doc. 110 at 7). 27 Nevertheless, Mr. DeMaio told the Board that Plaintiff worked at home to “tak[e] care of 28 her baby.” (Doc. 106 at ¶ 20–23; Doc. 110 at 7). The parties dispute whether Mr. DeMaio 1 ever informed the Board that Plaintiff was experiencing medical problems. (Id.). 2 In May 2019, Mr. DeMaio retired as the Fire Chief. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 24; Doc. 110 at 3 1). The fire chief position changed two additional times during Plaintiff’s employment. 4 (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 24, 37; Doc. 110 at 1). The parties agree that Plaintiff told both of the fire 5 chiefs that she worked from home due to a disability. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 25, 38; Doc. 110 at 6 3, 8). The parties, however, dispute whether Plaintiff provided the fire chiefs or the Board 7 with any additional information or documentation pertaining to her disability. (Id.). 8 After November 2019, Plaintiff was still working from home when the Board 9 changed Plaintiff’s title to Administrative Manager and gave her a raise. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 10 29–30; Doc. 110 at 1). But on December 7, 2020, the Board held a special meeting and 11 voted to eliminate the Administrative Manager position. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 45; Doc. 108 at ¶ 12 8). Following this meeting, several members of the public filed complaints with the 13 Arizona Attorney General’s Office (the “AGO”) alleging that the Board violated Arizona’s 14 open-meeting law by voting to eliminate the Administrative Manager position when that 15 issue was not on the agenda. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 50; Doc. 110 at 1). On December 9, 2020, 16 Plaintiff emailed the Fire Chief stating that she understood the Board’s actions to mean her 17 employment was terminated, and the Fire Chief confirmed that her understanding was 18 correct. (Doc. 31 at ¶ 55). 19 On December 17, 2020, the Board held a subsequent meeting with a new agenda for 20 the purpose of ratifying the votes taken on December 7, 2020. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 50–53; Doc. 21 108 at ¶¶ 13–15). On January 28, 2021, the Board received a letter from the AGO regarding 22 the open-meeting law complaints, and the Board responded that it had ratified the actions 23 from December 7, 2020. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 54–55; Doc. 110 at 1). On October 29, 2021, the 24 Board received another letter from the AGO stating it had concluded that open-meeting 25 law violations had occurred in December 2020. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 56; Doc. 108 at ¶¶ 18–19). 26 On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff served Defendant a Notice of Claim. On May 13, 27 2022, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging three causes of action 28 against the District and individual members of the Board. (Doc. 109 at 9). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine 3 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden 5 of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 6 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party can satisfy its burden by demonstrating that 7 the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential 8 to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. When 9 considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the factual record and draw 10 all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Leisek v. 11 Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). When parties file cross-motions for 12 summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately, giving the nonmoving 13 party for each motion the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Eat Right Foods Ltd. v. 14 Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 880 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Both parties are moving for partial summary judgment with respect to Counts Two 17 and Three asserted within the FAC. (Doc. 31). In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that 18 Defendant discriminated against her under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 19 (the “ADA”) by eliminating the Administrative Manager position. (Doc. 31 at 8–9). In 20 Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Arizona’s Employment Protection 21 Act by terminating her from her employment. (Doc. 31 at 9). The Court will address the 22 claims individually. 23 A. Count Two: Disability Discrimination Claim Under The ADA 24 The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating “against a qualified individual 25 on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “To withstand a motion for summary 26 judgment on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must either provide sufficient direct evidence of an 27 employer’s discriminatory intent, or give rise to an inference of discrimination by 28 satisfying the burden-shifting test from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 1 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Mickealson v. Cummins, Inc., 792 F. App’x 438, 2 440 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted). “To establish a prima facie case for 3 disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) [s]he is disabled, 4 (2) [s]he is qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] position, and (3) [s]he 5 suffered an adverse employment action because of [her] disability.” Id. 6 i. Defendant Is An “Employer” Under The ADA 7 As an initial matter, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment to establish that 8 Defendant is an employer as defined by the ADA. (Doc. 107 at 11). The ADA defines an 9 “employer” as a person “engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more 10 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or 11 preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111. During discovery, Defendant produced a 12 list of individuals who were employed at the District in some compacity from January 2016 13 through December 2020. (Doc. 108-1 at 2–3). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was 14 terminated in December 2020, therefore, 2019 and 2020 are the relevant years for 15 calculating Defendant’s employees. 16 Plaintiff argues that “the District had employment relationships with 20 employees 17 for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in 2020, and had employment 18 relationships with 26 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks 19 in 2019.” (Doc. 107 at 12). Defendant raises no factual dispute concerning the list that 20 Plaintiff relied on to reach this total, however, Defendant objects to the method that 21 Plaintiff used to calculate the total number of employees. (Doc. 111 at 13). Plaintiff argues 22 that the total number of employees include all employees that were on Defendant’s payroll 23 in 2019 and 2020. (Docs. 107 at 12). But Defendant argues that the total should not include 24 part-time and sporadic employees who did not actually work for Defendant every week 25 during the year. (Doc. 111 at 13). Defendant’s method for calculating the total is incorrect 26 because “[an individual] is counted as an employee for each working day after [the 27 individual’s] arrival and before [the individual’s] departure,” and not the number of 28 individuals compensated on a given day. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enterprises, Inc., 519 1 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1997) (finding that the ultimate touchstone for defining employer is the 2 number of employment relationships that exists). Therefore, Defendant is an employer 3 under the ADA because it maintained employment relationships with at least fifteen 4 employees in 2019 and 2020. (See Doc. 108-1 at 2–3). For the following reasons, however, 5 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Court Two is nevertheless denied 6 as moot. 7 ii. Disability Discrimination 8 Defendant moves for summary judgment to dismiss Count Two because Plaintiff 9 fails to establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination under the ADA. (Doc. 105 10 at 8). “To bring a successful ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must first prove that 11 [s]he is disabled as defined by the ADA.” Higley v. Rick’s Floor Covering, Inc., 400 F. 12 App’x 244, 245 (9th Cir. 2010). The ADA provides that a person is deemed disabled if that 13 person has (1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 14 life activities,” (2) “a record of such an impairment,” or (3) is “regarded as having such an 15 impairment.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1). Under the first prong, “major life activities” include, 16 but are not limited to, “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, 17 sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, 18 concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A). 19 “‘Substantially limited’ means that a person is ‘significantly restricted as to condition, 20 manner or duration under which [she] can perform [the] particular major life activity as 21 compared to . . . [an] average person in the general population.’” Ravel v. Hewlett-Packard 22 Enter., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. 23 Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2004). 24 The second prong, a “record of such an impairment” may be established “if the 25 individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical 26 impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 27 1630.2(k)(1). To prove a disability exists under the “regarded as” prong, a plaintiff must 28 show that her employer mistakenly perceived her as having either “a physical impairment 1 that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or . . . an actual, nonlimiting 2 impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Coons, 383 F.3d at 886 3 (citation omitted); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(3). Stress, depression, panic attacks, and PTSD 4 can all be considered mental impairments under the ADA. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. 5 Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to show that she has a disability under 7 the first prong. (Doc. 105 at 9). Defendant explains that Dr. Tsanadis completed an 8 independent medical examination of Plaintiff and noted that “there is no compelling 9 evidence in the available documentation to indicate that she had any functional impairment 10 after [the incident with the woman at the District office.]” (Doc. 106-3 at 28–29). 11 According to Dr. Tsanadis, Plaintiff reported that “she has a significant history of mental 12 health treatment and conditions as well as a significant trauma-related history.” (Doc. 106- 13 3 at 28). Ultimately, Dr. Tsanadis concluded that “due to evidence of over-reporting of 14 symptoms, an accurate diagnosis is not possible.” (Doc. 106-3 at 29). Dr. Tsanadis’ final 15 diagnostic impressions were that Plaintiff had “PTSD (per history),” “Unspecified 16 Depressive Disorder,” and “Unspecified Anxiety Disorder.” (Doc. 106-3 at 30). Defendant 17 also argues that Plaintiff failed to put forth any evidence to support her claims that she was 18 previously diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and PTSD by a medical professional. 19 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Tsanadis’ diagnostic impressions are enough to cast doubt 20 and survive summary judgment. (Doc. 109 at 12). At her deposition, Plaintiff alleged that 21 she was first diagnosed with PTSD in 2017 by Dr. Kenneth Jackson (no relation to Plaintiff 22 Karen Jackson). (Doc. 106-1 at 82). She further alleged that Dr. Jackson diagnosed her 23 with “something related to the anxiety, PTSD, and depression.” (Doc. 106-1 at 80). The 24 only medical evidence Plaintiff provided to support that she has been diagnosed with 25 anxiety, PTSD, and depression are three doctors’ notes that state Plaintiff should work from 26 home due to one or more of these conditions. (Doc. 110-1 at 67–71). But each of the three 27 doctors confirmed that they never diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety, PTSD, and depression. 28 (Docs. 106-2 at 83, 106-3 at 4, 11). Instead, the doctors wrote the notes based on 1 information that they received from Plaintiff. (Docs. 106-2 at 77–81, 106-3 at 4, 16). More 2 importantly, during his deposition, Dr. Jackson stated that he has “never personally 3 diagnosed anybody with PTSD.” (Doc. 106-2 at 83) (emphasis added). Even assuming the 4 doctors’ notes are evidence showing that Plaintiff has been diagnosed with a mental 5 impairment, the notes make no comment about whether Plaintiff’s impairment 6 substantially limit any major life activities. (Doc. 110-1 at 67–71). And while Plaintiff 7 asserts that her alleged mental impairments have a “negative affect” on major life activities, 8 she does not offer any further details or claims that these “negative affects” are any greater 9 than that of the average person. See Coons, 383 F.3d at 886. 10 For these same reasons, Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a record of any 11 mental impairments that substantially limited any major life activity. See id. (finding that 12 plaintiff did not introduce a record of an impairment substantially limiting any major life 13 activity where the only evidence proffered was a letter from his doctor stating that he 14 suffered from various impairments without referencing its effect on major life activities). 15 Lastly, Plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that Defendant regarded her as having 16 any mental impairments that substantially limited a major life activity. 17 Because the Court finds there is no question of material fact as to whether Plaintiff 18 was disabled, the claim for disability discrimination cannot survive. Summary judgment 19 will be granted on this claim in favor of Defendant. 20 B. Count Three: Wrongful Termination Claim Under The AEPA 21 Pursuant to the Arizona Employment Protection Act (the “AEPA”), “[a]n employee 22 has a claim against an employer for termination of employment only if,” in relevant part, 23 “[t]he employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in violation 24 of a statute of this state.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). However, “[i]f the statute provides a 25 remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an employee 26 for a violation of the statute are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute or 27 the public policy set forth in or arising out of the statute.” Id. 28 Plaintiff alleges that during the special meeting on December 7, 2020, Defendant 1 wrongfully terminated her under the AEPA by violating Arizona’s open-meeting law at 2 A.R.S. § 38-431.02(H) (the “Open Meeting law”). (Doc. 31 at 9). The Open Meeting law 3 provides that when a public body hosts a meeting, it shall provide a public notice which 4 includes an agenda that “list[s] the specific matters to be discussed, considered or decided 5 at the meeting.” A.R.S. § 38-431.02(H). Moreover, “[t]he public body may discuss, 6 consider or make decisions only on matters listed on the agenda and other matters related 7 thereto.” Id. There is no genuine dispute that the agenda for the December 7th meeting 8 failed to specify that the Board would discuss, consider, and decide to eliminate the 9 Administrative Manager position in violation of the Open Meeting law. (Doc. 105 at 13– 10 14; Doc. 107 at 6). However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the 11 AEPA’s exclusive-remedy provision and the statute of limitations. 12 i. Exclusive Remedy 13 The parties dispute whether the Open Meeting law provides Plaintiff with an 14 exclusive remedy that bars Plaintiff from bringing a claim under the AEPA. The Open 15 Meeting law provides that any person affected by the statute may commence a suit in the 16 superior court “for the purpose of requiring compliance with, or the prevention of 17 violations” of the statute. A.R.S. § 38-431.07. Civil penalties awarded pursuant to the Open 18 Meeting law shall not to exceed $500 for the second offense and $2,500 for the third and 19 subsequent offenses. Id. Any civil penalties awarded under the statute, “shall be deposited 20 into the general fund of the public body concerned.” Id. “The court may also order payment 21 to a successful plaintiff in a suit brought under this section of the plaintiff's reasonable 22 attorney fees.” Id. 23 Plaintiff cites to Chen v. Cozzoli, LLC, to argue that the Open Meeting law does not 24 provide a remedy for wrongful termination. In Chen, the plaintiff asserted a wrongful 25 termination claim under the AEPA asserting that the defendant violated criminal theft and 26 assault statutes. Chen v. Cozzoli LLC, No. CV-21-01025-PHX-DWL, 2022 WL 5169236, 27 at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 5, 2022). The defendant moved to dismiss the claim and argued that 28 the AEPA’s exclusive-remedies provision “bars AEPA claims premised on Arizona’s 1 criminal theft and assault statutes because they have their own remedial scheme[s] (i.e., 2 prosecution).” Id. This Court held that the exclusive-remedy provisions are applicable to 3 one particular category of statutes—those that regulate the employee-employer 4 relationship. See id at *6. The Court explained that the “exclusive-remedy provisions make 5 sense ‘in the employment relationship, [where] overlapping theories of recovery . . . make 6 the calculation of damages uncertain.’” Id. at *7 (quoting Cronin v. Sheldon, 991 P.2d 231, 7 241 (Ariz. 1999)). The Court also added that this concern is inapplicable where the statute 8 does not present uncertainty concerning the amount that the plaintiff can recover under 9 AEPA. Id. 10 Defendant argues that the facts in Chen are distinguishable because unlike the 11 criminal statutes in discussed in Chen, “[t]he Open Meetings laws provide [Plaintiff] with 12 a remedy she can pursue as a private citizen without relying upon prosecutor discretion to 13 pursue criminal charges.” (Doc. 111 at 9). This is true; however, the Open Meeting law 14 does not regulate the “employee-employer relationship.” Moreover, if Plaintiff’s claim 15 prevails, there will be no overlapping theories of recovery. As the Open Meeting law 16 provides, Plaintiff’s recovery would be limited to reasonable attorney’s fees, and any civil 17 penalties recovered will go directly to the “general fund of the public body.” See A.R.S. § 18 38-431.07. Therefore, the exclusive-remedy provisions are not applicable here. See also 19 Smith-Florez v. City of Nogales, No. CV 09-139-TUC-FRZ, 2010 WL 11515521, at *4 (D. 20 Ariz. May 18, 2010) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss an AEPA claim asserting that 21 plaintiff was wrongfully terminated for reporting violations of Arizona’s open-meeting 22 laws). 23 ii. Statute of Limitations 24 The parties agree the statute of limitations in this case is one year from the date of 25 accrual. See A.R.S. § 12–541(4); (Doc. 105 at 14–15; Doc. 109 at 15). The parties also 26 agree that accrual is subject to the discovery rule, meaning the limitations period does not 27 begin running until “the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 28 know the facts underlying the cause.” Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. 1 of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 898 P.2d 964, 966 (1995) (See Doc. 105 at 15; Doc. 109 at 16). 2 Plaintiff “need not know all the facts underlying a cause of action” because accrual is 3 triggered when Plaintiff possesses at least a “minimum requisite of knowledge sufficient 4 to identify that a wrong occurred and caused injury.” Cruz v. City of Tucson, 401 P.3d 5 1018, 1021 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 961 (Ariz. 1998)). 6 Generally, determining whether an action has accrued is a question of fact, however, 7 “[a]ccrual can be decided as a matter of law when ‘there is no genuine dispute as to facts 8 showing the plaintiff knew or should have known the basis for the claim.’” Strojnik v. State 9 ex rel. Brnovich, No. 1 CA-CV 20-0423, 2021 WL 3051887, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 20, 10 2021) (quoting Humphrey v. State, 466 P.3d 368, 375 ¶ 25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020)). 11 Here, there is no genuine dispute as to the facts showing that Plaintiff’s claim 12 accrued by December 7, 2020, when Defendant eliminated Plaintiff’s position in violation 13 of the Open Meeting law. First, Plaintiff admits that she understood the Board’s actions on 14 December 7, 2020, to mean that her employment was terminated. (Doc. 107 at 3). 15 Moreover, Plaintiff alleges in her FAC that: 16 79. The Board took legal action during its meeting on 17 December 7, 2020, including passing a motion to terminate Jackson’s employment with the District, in violation of 18 Arizona’s open meeting law at A.R.S. § 38-431.02(H). 19 (Doc. 31 at 9) (emphasis added). Plaintiff also states in her Motion that there is “no genuine 20 dispute that [Defendant] violated A.R.S. §§ 38-431.02(A) and (H) at its meeting on 21 December 7, 2020.” (Doc. 107 at 6). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that she was aware that, 22 under the advice of its legal counsel, Defendant scheduled an additional meeting on 23 December 17, 2020, to ratify its decision to terminate her employment. (Doc. 107 at 10). 24 Nevertheless, Plaintiff objects that the accrual date is December 7, 2020, because 25 she did not know Defendant failed to ratify its decision to terminate her employment, and 26 therefore did not know that Defendant violated the Open Meeting law, until after October 27 29, 2021, when the AGO sent its letter to Defendant. (Id.). In other words, without any 28 legal authority, Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s attempt to correct its failure to follow the 2| Open Meeting law tolled her claim until the AGO confirmed whether the ratification was proper. In response, Defendant argues that “it is irrelevant for accrual purposes whether the 4| District Board in fact violated the Open Meeting laws.” (Doc. 105 at 16). The Court agrees. Pursuant to Arizona’s open-meeting laws, “[a]ny person affected by an alleged violation” 6 | of the open-meeting laws has standing to commence a suit. A.R.S. § 38-431.07 (emphasis 7 | added). Therefore, Defendant’s belief that it complied with the law or later ratified its 8 | decision had no impact on the accrual date. Accordingly, as a matter of law, □□□□□□□□□□□ 9 | claim is time barred. For the same reasons, Plaintiff's claim that her termination is null and 10 | void also fails. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 In reviewing the record, motions, and responsive briefings, the Court has found no 13 | issues of material fact or law on any of Plaintiff's claims. The Court found Defendant met its burden of proof on each claim to prevail on its Motion. The Court further found 15 | Plaintiff's Motion is moot as to Count Two and found in favor of Defendant as to Count 16| Three. Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 107) 18 | is denied. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary 20 | Judgment on Count Two and Count Three of First Amended Complaint (Doc. 105) is granted. 22 Dated this 16th day of January, 2024. 23

United States District didge 26 27 28