Jackson v. Johnson

Court of Appeals of Texas

Jackson v. Johnson

69 S.W.3d 372, 2002 WL 226504

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

DecidedMarch 12, 2002

Docket06-01-00146-CV

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 69 S.W.3d 372 (Jackson v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Jackson v. Johnson, 69 S.W.3d 372, 2002 WL 226504 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).

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Opinion

OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice CORNELIUS.

John Eric Jackson appeals the dismissal of his suit against Gary Johnson, in his capacity as director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ), and Victor Rodriguez, in his capacity as chairman of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. In his petition, Jackson contends he was deprived of credit on his sentence for his pretrial confinement, and he sought credit to his sentence for that time. The trial court dismissed his suit under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 14.003(a), (b) (Vernon Supp.2002), finding that his claim had only a very slight chance of ultimate success, that it had no arguable basis in law or fact, and that Jackson could not prove facts to support it.

The normal procedural mechanism for resolving disputes over time credits when the time for direct appeal has passed has historically been by a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, see Tex. Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp.2002), and more recently, by resorting first to the procedure outlined in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.0081 (Vernon Supp. 2002) before pursuing the writ. See Ex parte Millard, 48 S.W.3d 190, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); see also Ex parte Ruthart, 980 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). Petitions for post-conviction writs of habeas corpus must be filed in the trial court in which the conviction was obtained, made returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. TexCode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07. Courts of appeals have no jurisdiction over post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases. See Id.; Hoang v. State, 872 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); In re Coronado, 980 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding); Maye v. State, 966 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

In fact, we are aware of no case in which such a claim was successfully maintained as part of an ordinary civil action. Consequently, we conclude the trial court was correct in dismissing Jackson’s suit as having no basis in law, as Jackson’s claim was not cognizable in an ordinary civil action. In so concluding, we do not address the underlying merits of Jackson’s claim if properly filed as an application for writ of habeas corpus.

The judgment is affirmed.

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OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice CORNELIUS.

John Eric Jackson appeals the dismissal of his suit against Gary Johnson, in his capacity as director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ), and Victor Rodriguez, in his capacity as chairman of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. In his petition, Jackson contends he was deprived of credit on his sentence for his pretrial confinement, and he sought credit to his sentence for that time. The trial court dismissed his suit under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 14.003(a), (b) (Vernon Supp.2002), finding that his claim had only a very slight chance of ultimate success, that it had no arguable basis in law or fact, and that Jackson could not prove facts to support it.

The normal procedural mechanism for resolving disputes over time credits when the time for direct appeal has passed has historically been by a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, see Tex. Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp.2002), and more recently, by resorting first to the procedure outlined in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.0081 (Vernon Supp. 2002) before pursuing the writ. See Ex parte Millard, 48 S.W.3d 190, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); see also Ex parte Ruthart, 980 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). Petitions for post-conviction writs of habeas corpus must be filed in the trial court in which the conviction was obtained, made returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. TexCode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07. Courts of appeals have no jurisdiction over post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases. See Id.; Hoang v. State, 872 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); In re Coronado, 980 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding); Maye v. State, 966 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

In fact, we are aware of no case in which such a claim was successfully maintained as part of an ordinary civil action. Consequently, we conclude the trial court was correct in dismissing Jackson’s suit as having no basis in law, as Jackson’s claim was not cognizable in an ordinary civil action. In so concluding, we do not address the underlying merits of Jackson’s claim if properly filed as an application for writ of habeas corpus.

The judgment is affirmed.

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