Jackson v. Jackson

14 N.E.2d 271, 294 Ill. App. 552, 1938 Ill. App. LEXIS 618
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedMarch 31, 1938
DocketGen. No. 9,273
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 14 N.E.2d 271 (Jackson v. Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Jackson, 14 N.E.2d 271, 294 Ill. App. 552, 1938 Ill. App. LEXIS 618 (Ill. Ct. App. 1938).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Wolfe

delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee, Laura May Jackson, filed her complaint for divorce in the circuit court of Will county, November 25,1936, in which she alleges the date of her marriage to be September 14, 1936, and that she and her husband lived together until November 25,1936.

The fourth paragraph of the complaint is as follows: 1 ‘ That since said marriage and during all the time plaintiff lived and cohabited with the said defendant she has treated him kindly and affectionately, and in all things at all times conducted herself toward the said defendant in a manner well becoming a good, true and virtuous wife. ’ ’ The fifth paragraph is as follows: 1 ‘ That subsequently to their intermarriage, and wholly regardless of his marriage vows and obligations as a husband, the defendant has been guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty toward the plaintiff; that is to say, on divers days and times since their marriage, the defendant has beaten, struck, kicked and choked the plaintiff, and particularly on, to-wit, the month of October, at Joliet, Illinois, the defendant, without provocation and in anger struck the plaintiff on her face and body with his fists, hurting her severely, causing bruises and the blackening of her eyes; and on, to-wit, the 25th of November, A. D., 1936, without provocation and in anger shoved, pushed, struck and beat the plaintiff, and ordered said plaintiff from their home, and on each of said occasions and numerous other occasions has used toward the plaintiff the most obscene, profane and opprobrious language, rendering her life miserable and placing her in fear of her natural life.”

The bill then prays that the parties may be divorced, and that the defendant be ordered to pay the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, and that he pay alimony to the wife.

To this complaint the defendant filed an answer denying that he at any time struck, beat, or choked the plaintiff, or otherwise mistreated her. The defendant also denied that his wife had always conducted herself kindly and affectionately toward him, and had been a good, true and virtuous wife; but charged that frequently she stayed out all night away from their home; that she, without cause, had frequently left his home and stayed away 2 or 3 days at a time and refused to tell her husband where she had been.

The defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff and asked for a divorce from her on the ground of adultery, and also acts of extreme and repeated cruelty by the wife toward himself. He charges that on one occasion she twisted his arms severely and broke his little finger on his right hand, causing him great pain and suffering; that she threw the receiver of the telephone at him and struck him on the head causing a cut an inch or an inch and a half long over his left eye; that on October 31,1936, his wife had been absent from their home for several days, and that the defendant sought to find her but could not; that the plaintiff violently shoved the defendant and knocked him down, causing him to strike one of his elbows against the railing of the bed; that it bled profusely and bruised the tissues; that on October 28, 1936, in a fit of anger, and without any reasonable cause, she seized a pestle and hit the defendant on the back of his head, cutting his head and causing it to bleed profusely; that the said blow caused a scar which was still visible at the time of filing the counterclaim. He alleges that in the month of September, 1936, Laura May Jackson, committed adultery — the name of the man was unknown to the defendant — and that he did not learn of the act of adultery until subsequent to the time that the plaintiff deserted him on November 25,1936.

The plaintiff filed her answer to the cross-complaint. The case was heard by the court, who found the issue in favor of the plaintiff, and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim, and granted the plaintiff a divorce. He allowed her $1,500 as support money, and $1,000 as attorney’s fees. It is from this judgment that the case is brought to this court for review.

Laura May Jackson was called as a witness in her own behalf, and testified that she and the defendant were married on August 14, 1936; that she lived with her husband until November 25, 1936; that there were no children born to the marriage: “As a wife I was true to my husband and good to Mm”; that after their marriage, the first trouble she had with her husband was in October, when he woke up at 3:00 o’clock in the morrnng and Mt her. “He Mt me in my face and it made a bruise on my face. I had a black-eye for two weeks; it sure did cause a discoloration. There was no discoloration on my body. He Mcked me and I was compelled to leave my bed and room on account of it. He ordered me out of the bed and I got out of my bed and spent the rest of the Mght in my living room. I slept in there. Another occasion when I had trouble with Dr. Jackson was on October 31, 1936.” She then told in detail about some trouble she had with the doctor in which he threatened to shoot her, but no act of physical violence was detailed on this occasion.

She further testified that he — meaning Dr. Jackson — on the 25th of November, “woke me up at three o’clock in the morrnng and made me get out of bed. I could not very well go then because I did not know where to go, so I slept in the living-room until six o ’clock. He wolcó me up and I left then, and came back at eight o’clock to get my clothes, and we had a quarrel.” She.details about going to call the police, and concludes with the statement: “As to the reason for the fight that night of November 25, he was mad and pushed me and beat me and Mcked me out of bed. I was sick and he was drunk and he wanted to mess around. That is the reason he wanted me to get out of the bed. I left that day; I have not lived with him since. ’ ’

With the exception of the corroboration of appellee’s testimony as to what happened on the night of October 31, in which the shooting episode was narrated, there was no testimony in the record whatever to corroborate Mrs. Jackson in the charge of cruelty by the husband. The bruises that she claimed were inflicted upon her by her husband, no one saw. On the night of November 25, in which she stated her husband pushed, beat, and kicked her out of bed, there is no evidence whatsoever that she was injured in any particular. In her direct testimony she says that on the occasion when her husband beat her and that she had a black eye for two weeks, and “it sure did cause a discoloration.” In her cross-examination she states positively that she did not have a black eye.

It will be observed from the reading of the bill of complaint that there are only two acts of cruelty charged against the defendant. There is no charge that the defendant attempted to kill the plaintiff. The question arises, whether the plaintiff established her case, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her husband was guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty as described in our Divorce Act. In the case of Moore v. Moore, 362 Ill. 177, the plaintiff, Hazel Moore, sued her husband Lloyd Moore for a divorce on the charge of extreme and repeated cruelty. It seems to us the facts in the Moore case make out a stronger charge of cruelty than Mrs. Jackson has made against her husband in her divorce suit.

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Bluebook (online)
14 N.E.2d 271, 294 Ill. App. 552, 1938 Ill. App. LEXIS 618, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-jackson-illappct-1938.