Jackson v. Hughes

Opinion

San Francisco Division JEOVANI JACKSON, Case No. 24-cv-02630-LB

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT JUSTIN HUGHES, et al., Re: ECF No. 22 Defendants. Jeovani Jackson, an inmate at the Pelican Bay State Prison who is representing himself, sued correctional officers for their application of handcuffs to his person and for threats of retaliation, allegedly in violation of the Eighth and First Amendments. 1 Defendant correctional officers moved for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 on the grounds that two of plaintiff’s claims are unexhausted, the defendants did not use excessive force when applying handcuffs to plaintiff’s person, and the defendants did not threaten the plaintiff.2 The court grants the defendants’ summary judgment motion.

1 ECF No. 1. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF). 1. March 29, 2024 Incident On March 29, 2024, Mr. Jackson — who was incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) — awoke feeling ill and vomited on his cell floor.3 Mr. Jackson began to “yell[] unintelligibly,” and to “roll[] around in [the] large puddle of vomit.”4 An officer responded to Mr. Jackson’s shouts and “made a Code 1 medical emergency radio call.”5 Staff members responded to the medical call.6 The responding member of medical staff, non- defendant Nurse Hewitt, asked Mr. Jackson to exit his cell so that he could be medically evaluated and Mr. Jackson agreed to do so.7 Non-defendant Sergeant Fillippa informed Mr. Jackson he would need to submit to restraints before exiting his cell. “Mr. Jackson appeared unable to comply with [Sergeant Fillippa’s] order to submit to restraints.”8 Non-defendant Lieutenant Lawrence and Sergeant Fillippa instructed the control booth officer to open the door to Mr. Jackson’s cell, and Sergeant Fillippa ordered Mr. Jackson to turn around so that handcuffs could be applied. Mr. Jackson “at first appeared to comply,” but then “[s]uddenly . . . swung around and forcefully punched Lieutenant Lawrence in the face with a closed left fist.”9 Lieutenant Lawrence sustained a concussion and a chin wound from Mr. Jackson’s punch.10 The responding officers ordered Mr. Jackson to “get down.” When he failed to comply, Sergeant Fillippa and defendant Candela took Mr. Jackson by the shoulders and pushed him to the floor. Mr. Jackson began to “resist[] attempts to restrain him by thrashing his body around, kicking his legs, and . . . keep[ing] his arms near his sides with his hands pinned under his body.” Sergeant Fillippa repeatedly ordered Mr. Jackson to stop resisting, but Mr. Jackson failed to 3 MSJ, Ex. 10 (“Jackson Deposition”) at 22:17-22, 25:1-23. 4 MSJ, Ex. 6 (“Gutierrez Declaration”) at ¶ 3. 5 Id. at ¶ 4. 6 MSJ, Exs. 2–5. 7 MSJ, Ex. 4 (“Hewitt Declaration”) at ¶¶ 7-8. 8 MSJ, Ex. 3 (“Fillippa Declaration”) at 2. 9 Id. at 2-3. comply. Sergeant Fillippa and defendant Hughes brought Mr. Jackson’s arms behind his back, and defendant Hughes applied handcuffs to Mr. Jackson’s wrists. 11 While Sergeant Fillippa and defendant Hughes restrained Mr. Jackson’s arms, defendant Candela held down Mr. Jackson’s legs and called for leg restraints. Once defendant Candela was handed the restraints, he applied them to Mr. Jackson’s ankles. Defendant Candela “used one of [his] thumbs as a spacer to determine the amount of space between [Mr.] Jackson’s skin and the leg restraint cuffs.”12 Defendant Hughes and Sergeant Fillippa helped Mr. Jackson to his feet and assisted him out of the cell. Mr. Jackson was unable to walk and sat down at the top of the stairs outside his cell. The officers tried to put Mr. Jackson on a “medical backboard” so that they could carry him down the stairs, but Mr. Jackson resisted by kicking, thrashing, and screaming. The officers believed Mr. Jackson’s medical issue was too urgent to wait for Mr. Jackson to comply, so they carried him down the stairs, with each of the four officers holding an arm or leg, and placed him on a gurney at the bottom of the stairs. While Mr. Jackson was carried down the stairs, he “continued to make incoherent statements and was moving his body around.” At the bottom of the stairs, Mr. Jackson was secured to the medical gurney and transported to the medical unit.13 Defendant Hughes and non-defendant Nurse Hewitt accompanied Mr. Jackson to the medical unit.14 Defendant Candela did not accompany Mr. Jackson to the medical unit.15 At the medical unit, defendant Hughes was relieved by an unidentified staff member, and Nurse Hewitt performed a medical examination of Mr. Jackson.16 During the examination, Nurse Hewitt “did not . . . find any sign that the restraints had been applied too tightly,” and “was able to raise the handcuff and leg restraint bracelets further up [Mr.] Jackson’s arms and legs so [she]

11 Fillippa Decl. at ¶¶ 10-12. 12 MSJ, Ex. 2 (“Candela Declaration”) at ¶¶ 7-9. 13 Fillippa Decl. at ¶¶ 15-19. 14 MSJ, Ex. 1 (“Hughes Declaration”) at ¶ 12; Hewitt Decl. at ¶ 12. 15 Candela Decl. at ¶ 12. could check his wrists and ankles.”17 Mr. Jackson’s wrists and ankles presented some discoloration, which Nurse Hewitt erroneously transcribed as dislocation and later corrected.18 Both defendants, as well as non-defendants Sergeant Fillippa and Nurse Hewitt, state that at no time did Mr. Jackson say his wrist or ankle restraints were too tight, and at no time did any officer threaten Mr. Jackson or state they did not care about any pain or about his safety.19 In his deposition, Mr. Jackson confirmed that he did not tell any defendant that the restraints were too tight, and that no defendant threatened him or said they did not care about any pain or about Mr. Jackson’s safety.20 Rather, Mr. Jackson testified that after he reached the medical treatment area he complained to an unidentified staff member “about [the] cuffs being too tight,” and that this unidentified staff member said he did not care if Mr. Jackson lost his fingers.21 Mr. Jackson appears only to have complained about the tightness of the wrist cuffs, and not to have mentioned the ankle restraints.22 Mr. Jackson “do[es]n’s know the[] name[]” of the staff member to whom he complained.23 After he was discharged from the medical unit, Mr. Jackson was placed in restricted housing. He claims that while he was in restricted housing, two non-defendant officers threatened him with bodily harm if he complained about the events of March 29, 2024. Mr. Jackson did not file a grievance about this threat.24

17 Hewitt Decl. at ¶ 13; see also Jackson Depo. at 58:22-59:2 (confirming that Nurse Hewitt was able to “move [the restraints] up” on both Mr. Jackson’s wrists and ankles). 18 Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. 19 Hughes Decl. at ¶¶ 14-15; Candela Decl. at ¶¶ 13-14; Fillippa Decl. at ¶¶ 20-21; Hewitt Decl. at ¶ 18. 20 Jackson Depo. at 39:8-17; 47:2-7; 48:18-49:2; 54:22–55:4. 21 Id. at 57:19-58:5. 22 Id. at 57:22-58:5 (stating that Mr. Jackson told the unknown staff member that his “hands [were] starting to become numb” and he “couldn’t . . . feel [his] fingers”). 23 Id. at 58:8. 2. Subsequent Administrative Appeal During the relevant time, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provided inmates with the following administrative remedies, also referred to as the administrative grievance process. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3481.25 There are two levels of review for non-healthcare appeals by inmates, referred to as a grievance and an appeal. At the first level, the inmate submits a form CDCR 602-1 to the Institutional Office of Grievances at the prison or other facility where he is housed. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3482(a), (c). Inmates must “describe all information known and available to the claimant regarding the claim, including key dates and times, names and titles of all involved staff members (or a description of those staff members)” in the originally filed grievance. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3482(c)(2). After an inmate submits his grievance, the facility’s “grievance Coordinator shall ensure that a written grievance decision is completed no later than 60 calendar days after receipt of the grievance.” Id. at § 3483(g). If an inmate is dissatisfied by his facility’s response, he may appeal to the second level of review. Id. at § 3484(b). To do so, the inmate must appeal in writing, within 60 calendar days of the institution’s response, to the Office of Appeals in Sacramento. Id. at § 3484(a). The Office of Appeals’s “appeal Coordinator shall ensure that a written appeal decision is completed no later than 60 calendar days.” Id. at § 3485(g). Administrative remedies are not exhausted where the grievance is rejected. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 3483(g)(6), 3845(g)(6). Mr. Jackson filed a single grievance about the March 29, 2024 incident.26 In it, he stated that “Officer Candela [] maliciously secured the leg irons so tight on [Mr. Jackson’s] ankles that [Mr. Jackson had] no feeling on [his] left heel and toes.” The grievance also complained of “staff misconduct” by non-defendant Lieutenant Lawrence. The grievance did not mention defendant Hughes, nor did it claim that the wrist restraints were too tight. 27

25 The versions of the regulations in effect between January 5, 2022 and December 31, 2024 control Mr. Jackson’s claims and are quoted and discussed herein. 26 MSJ, Ex. 8 (“Russell Declaration”) at ¶ 6. Mr. Jackson received a response to his grievance. The response stated that, because the grievance accused staff of misconduct, it would be referred to another department “outside the grievance and appeal process.” The response also stated that it “exhausts all administrative remedies available to [Mr. Jackson] for this claim.”28 The facts show that Mr. Jackson failed to exhaust any claim as to defendant Hughes, and that defendant Candela did not inflict excessive force upon Mr. Jackson. Defendants accordingly are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 1. All Claims as to Defendant Hughes Defendants argue that Mr. Jackson’s claim against defendant Hughes fails for want of exhaustion.29 The court agrees. Because the failure to exhaust is fatal to all of Mr. Jackson’s claims against defendant Hughes, the court need not consider defendants’ other arguments against defendant Hughes’s liability. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“Exhaustion should be decided, if feasible, before reaching the merits of a prisoner’s claim.”). “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638-39 (2016) (mandatory language of § 1997e(a) forecloses judicial discretion to craft exhaustion exceptions). All available remedies must be exhausted, and exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). District courts are without discretion to ignore a failure to exhaust. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).

28 Id., Ex. 2 at 9 (emphasis added). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied by filing a “procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules . . . .” Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted). Here, Mr. Jackson was required to satisfy CDCR’s procedural rules to exhaust. CDCR requires inmates to list the “names and titles of all involved staff members (or a description of those staff members).” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3482(c)(2). Inmates must also “describe all information known and available to the claimant regarding the claim.” Id. In addition, a grievance must at minimum “‘alert[] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought’” and “put prison officials on notice of [the plaintiff’s] complaint.” Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 2010). As noted above, Mr. Jackson’s sole grievance regarding the March 29, 2024 incident does not mention defendant Hughes at all. Nor does the grievance mention any tightness in the handcuffs applied by defendant Hughes. Rather, the grievance complains of actions by non-defendant Lieutenant Lawrence, and of the tightness of the leg restraints applied by defendant Candela.30 There thus is no information in the grievance which would alert CDCR to any wrongdoing by defendant Hughes. Because Mr. Jackson did not comply with CDCR’s procedural rule requiring him to identify every wrongdoer in the original grievance, he did not exhaust any claim as to defendant Hughes. Mr. Jackson argues that defendants’ exhaustion argument is “moot” because he mentioned the incident log number in his grievance, and the response to his grievance “declared that [his] administrative remedies were exhausted.”31 Mr. Jackson misunderstands the response. The response stated that he had exhausted the “administrative remedies available to [him] for this claim,” but did not state that the grievance exhausts any claim Mr. Jackson could possibly have relating to the March 29, 2024 incident.32 Nor could the response so entirely dispense with the 30 Russel Decl., Ex. 1 at 5-6. 31 ECF No. 24 (“Opposition”) at 2. exhaustion requirement; both CDCR regulations and Ninth Circuit precedent establish that an inmate must name all wrongdoers and all wrongful events in the original grievance. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 3482 (requiring inmates to name wrongdoers), 3483(l)(2) (stating that “a decision of ‘identified as staff misconduct’” means “the claim was exhausted,” but not stating that any possible claim was exhausted) (emphasis added); Morton, 599 F.3d at 946; Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that grievances must “provide the level of detail required by the prison’s regulations”). Because Mr. Jackson neither named all wrongdoers, nor gave the prison any information which would suggest defendant Hughes behaved improperly, he failed to exhaust any claim as to defendant Hughes. Because Mr. Jackson failed to exhaust any claim against defendant Hughes, defendant Hughes is entitled to summary judgment in his favor. 2. Eighth Amendment Claim as to Defendant Candela The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on a prisoner amounts to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eight Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). To be liable, a defendant must act “with general intent” to cause harm. Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995). In determining whether the use of force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline, or for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; see also Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (guards may use force only in proportion to need in each situation). Mr. Jackson’s Eighth Amendment claim can be broken down into a challenge to defendants’ decision to apply wrist and ankle restraints, and a challenge to how those restraints were applied. As to the decision to apply restraints, the facts show that defendants applied wrist and ankle restraints in a good-faith effort to protect prison staff and Mr. Jackson himself. Staff had perceived Mr. Jackson to be in a state of medical emergency, and so he had to be safely transported to the medical unit for evaluation.33 Mr. Jackson does not dispute this in his opposition and instead appears to agree that he was in a state of medical emergency.34 It thus is undisputed that Mr. Jackson needed to exit his cell for medical evaluation. It also is undisputed that when non- defendants Sergeant Fillippa and Lieutenant Lawrence attempted to extract Mr. Jackson from his cell, Mr. Jackson “forcefully punched Lieutenant Lawrence in the face with a closed left fist,” causing a concussion and a chin wound.35 Thus, before defendant Candela applied restraints to Mr. Jackson’s ankles, other staff had determined that Mr. Jackson needed to be taken out of his cell for a medical evaluation, and Mr. Jackson had battered a member of staff who was trying to extract Mr. Jackson from the cell. Under these circumstances, that application of ankle restraints shows “a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” rather than a “malicious[] and sadistic[] [effort] to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. As to how the restraints were applied, there is no evidence that the ankle restraints were applied too tightly or that defendant Candela had the intent to cause any harm when he applied the ankle restraints. The evidence suggests the opposite. First, defendant Candela declares that he “used one of [his] thumbs as a spacer” to prevent applying the ankle restraints too tightly.36 Mr. Jackson does not dispute that assertion.37 Second, Nurse Hewitt declares, and Mr. Jackson confirmed in his deposition, that the restraints on both his wrists and his ankles were loose enough 33 Jackson Depo. at 22:17-22, 25:1-23; Gutierrez Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 4. 34 Opp. 35 Fillippa Decl. at ¶ 10; Lawrence Decl. at ¶ 11. 36 Candela Decl. at ¶ 9. 37 that Nurse Hewitt “was able to raise the handcuff and leg restraint bracelets further up [Mr.] Jackson’s arms and legs so [she] could check his wrists and ankles.”38 Third, Mr. Jackson testified in his deposition that he did not suffer injury to his ankles or legs.39 Rather, he sustained nerve damage to his fingers and now uses a wrist brace.40 Fourth, Mr. Jackson did not tell defendant Candela that the restraints had been applied too tightly; Mr. Jackson testified in his deposition that he only ever complained about the tightness of the wrist restraints, and that complaint was made to a non-defendant staff member.41 As defendant Candela did not apply the restraints to Mr. Jackson’s wrists,42 any tightness of those restraints cannot show an intent to harm on defendant Candela’s part. Defendants have presented ample evidence, including Mr. Jackson’s deposition testimony, that the ankle restraints were not applied too tightly. Mr. Jackson has failed to produce any evidence that the ankle restraints were too tight, or even to dispute defendant Candela’s assertion that he took steps to ensure that the ankle restraints were not applied too tightly. Because there is no evidence that defendant Candela applied excessive force to Mr. Jackson’s person, defendant Candela is entitled to summary judgment. 3. First Amendment Claim In his Complaint, Mr. Jackson alleged that he filed a grievance about the March 29, 2024 incident, and that defendants subsequently told him he would be beaten if he continued to

38 Hewitt Decl. at ¶ 13; see also Jackson Depo. at 58:22-59:2 (confirming that Nurse Hewitt was able to “move [the restraints] up” on both Mr. Jackson’s wrists and ankles). 39 Opp., Ex. 8 at 63:18-65:23 (discussing Mr. Jackson’s continuing finger pain, but not discussing continuing ankle or leg pain), 66:15-22) (“Q: . . . And you’ve spoken about pain in your left hand. What other injuries to you currently still suffer from, if any? A: That’s pretty much it, sur, just the nerve damage. Q: Do you have any pain or injuries in your feet or ankles? A: No, sir.”), 69:1-3 (“Q: [Is] there any other pain or injury other than your left hand as you sit here today? A: No, sir.”). 40 See id.; see also Opp. at 3. 41 Hughes Decl. at ¶¶ 14-15; Candela Decl. at ¶¶ 13-14; Fillippa Decl. at ¶¶ 20-21; Hewitt Decl. at ¶ 18; Jackson Depo. at 39:8-17; 47:2-7; 48:18-49:2; 54:22–55:4, 57:19-58:5. ] complaint about the incident. The court therefore concluded that Mr. Jackson had pleaded a 2 cognizable retaliation claim against defendants. 4 3 In his deposition, Mr. Jackson admitted that he never filed a grievance regarding the alleged 4 threat.*° Any First Amendment claim is thus unexhausted. Moreover, Mr. Jackson conceded that 5 he was threatened by two different officers who were not named as defendants to this action, and 6 that neither defendant threatened him.*° Thus, even if this claim had been exhausted, it would fail 7 {| on the merits. 8 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on Mr. Jackson’s retaliation claim. 9 11 Mr. Jackson has not identified any evidence to support his claims. In view of defendants’ 12 undisputed evidence, including Mr. Jackson’s own statements, no jury could find for Mr. Jackson. 13 The court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 14 The court directs the Clerk to close the file.

a 16 IT ISSO ORDERED. 17 Dated: September 5, 2025 LAE 18 LAUREL BEELER 19 United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 || © ECF No. | at 3-4. “ECE No. 10 at 3. 27 4s Jackson Depo. at 75:15-18. 28 4° Jd. at 75:2-6.