Jackson v. Guzman

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided October 29, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-00475·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ NUGENE JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 20-cv-475-pp

C.O. GUZMAN, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER REOPENING CASE, GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 1) ______________________________________________________________________________

On April 23, 2020, the court dismissed the case without prejudice because the plaintiff had not paid the initial partial filing fee. Dkt. No. 7. The order stated that the plaintiff could submit the fee and move to have the case reopened within twenty-one days of the entry of the order. Id. at 2. The court received the initial partial filing fee on May 4, 2020. The court will reopen the case, grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screen the complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because the plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On March 26, 2020, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $ 3.75. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on May 4, 2020. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and require him to pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff is an inmate at Racine Correctional Institution (“RCI”). Dkt. No. 1. Defendants Guzman and Sabel are correctional officers at RCI. Id. at 2. The plaintiff alleges that on October 4, 2019 at around 1:00 p.m., he was walking on the right side of the county road eastbound from his unit. Id. at 2. He says that Officer Sabel was driving a golf cart down the center line of the county road, traveling in the same direction that the plaintiff was walking. Id. C.O. Guzman was in the cart with Sabel. Id. at 3. He asserts that Sabel drove up behind him—the plaintiff did not see Sabel approaching and because of the “noise from the cart” did not hear him. Id. at 2. The plaintiff says that as Sabel tried to drive past him, Guzman opened the right-side door; the door hit the plaintiff, injuring his left leg. Id. The plaintiff describes limping back to the housing unit to report the incident to his unit sergeant, who reported the incident to his supervisor. Id. at 2-3. The plaintiff was seen by Nurse Street and photos were taken of his leg. Id. at 3. The plaintiff says that his left leg was “swollen, bruised and scar[r]ed,” and that he suffered pain throughout the situation. Id. at 3. He says it was hard for him to do simple tasks, like getting to the phone, using the bathroom and walking through the line for meals; he had to get help from other inmates. Id. The plaintiff explains that his right leg has been amputated, so he only had one “good” leg for mobility. Id. at 3. He says that at the time he wrote his complaint—four months later—he still was having problems, such as pain in the leg and the need to use a wheelchair. Id. He was scheduled to see a doctor March 3, 2020. Id. For relief, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 4. C. Analysis To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The plaintiff alleges that Guzman hit the plaintiff’s leg with a golf cart door. He does not explain why he believes this violated his constitutional rights. To state a claim for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, for example, a plaintiff needs to show that the person applying the force—in this case, Guzman—“evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” McCottrell v. White,

Jackson v. Guzman, (E.D. Wis. 2020).

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