Jackson v. Grissom

94 S.W. 263, 196 Mo. 624
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedMay 30, 1906
StatusPublished

This text of 94 S.W. 263 (Jackson v. Grissom) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Grissom, 94 S.W. 263, 196 Mo. 624 (Mo. 1906).

Opinion

LAMM, J.

—Mary A. Jackson claims to be the owner of tbe hereinafter mentioned realty, and at tbe September term, 1900, of tbe Stoddard Circuit Court, instituted a "suit against twenty-five defendants, tbe object and general nature of wbicb was to try, ascertain and determine tbe estate, title and interest of tbe plaintiff and defendants, respectively, in 213 acres of land in said county, described as follows: tbe southeast quarter of tbe northeast quarter and tbe northeast quarter of tbe southeast quarter of section 11, and tbe south half of tbe northwest quarter and tbe north half of tbe southwest quarter, and thirteen acres in the west part of the southwest quarter of tbe northeast quarter of section 12, township 28, range 10, excepting three acres situate in said northeast quarter of southwest quarter of section 11, which excepted land is described [626]*626by references to conveyances therein pleaded by date and record.

Of this aggregation of defendants, only two made defense, to-wit, Milton A. Grissom and David A. Glenn, and their answer was a general denial coupled with affirmative pleas, one being that they owned the fee in the premises, another being the Statute of Limitations, and for a further defense the answer set forth a state of facts best shown by itself, as follows:

“And for another and further answer defendants' allege that plaintiff and these answering defendants claim under John II. Horner, deceased, as the common source of title; that these defendants claim under the will of said deceased, duly admitted to probate in the probate court of Stoddard county, Missouri, and by conveyances from the devisees therein, and that the pretended claim of this plaintiff is based upon an instrument of writing purporting to have been executed on the 26th day of June, 1885, by the heirs and devisees of said John II. Horner to one Andrew W. Hunt, and recorded in the land records of Stoddard county in book 8 at page 342, under and by virtue of which the said Hunt pretended to be the owner of said premises. And that these answering defendants further state that the said instrument of writing of June the 26, 1885, is without consideration and fraudulent and void, and was procured by said Hunt by -fraud, imposition and deception. That at the time of the execution thereof there was pending in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern Division of the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri, an action brought by the heirs at law of the said John II. Horner, deceased, residing in Tennessee, against the legatees and devisees under his will, to contest said will and to have the paper purporting to be the last will and testament of said deceased declared not to be his last will and testament.
“That the said Andrew W. Hunt, who was then a practicing attorney in Stoddard county, Missouri, for [627]*627the purpose of inducing said devisees and heirs of John H. Horner, deceased, to execute to him the aforesaid instrument of writing fraudulently promised and represented to them that, if they would furnish him $1,000 in money, he would go to the State of Tennessee and compromise with the Tennessee heirs of said Horner and obtain from them a deed of conveyance or release to said devisees under said will of all the property devised to them by said will and a dismissal of said will contest.
"That thereupon, in view of such undertaking of said Hunt, and relying upon his promises and representations, the mother of said devisees, Mary J. Whit-well, paid over to said Hunt the sum of $1,000 for the purpose aforesaid, and the devisees were induced by him to execute the aforesaid paper of June 26, 1885, upon the pretense and representation that the same was executed to secure the said Mary J. Whitwell for the money she had advanced.
"That the parties executing said paper had the utmost confidence in said Hunt and relied implicitly upon his statements and representations and did not know until long afterward that said Hunt pretended to claim any interest to said land by virtue of said instrument.
"And defendants further state that the said A. W. Hunt used the money so. advanced to him by the said Mary J. Whitwell in compromising with the Tennessee heirs, but instead of taking a conveyance or release to the devisees under said will, fraudulently took such conveyance to himself and placed the same of record in the land records of Stoddard county.
"And these defendants further state that the said A. W. Hunt subsequently executed a conveyance or conveyances to H. H. Bedford who thereupon executed deeds to E. J. Jackson from whom this plaintiff pretends to have acquired title.
"That the said H. H. Bedford, E. J. Jackson and this plaintiff at the time of receiving the several con[628]*628veyanees under which they claimed, had full knowledge and notice of the deceit and fraud practiced by said Hunt as aforesaid, in procuring his pretended title, and that the conveyance from the said R. J. Jackson to this plaintiff, Mary A. Jackson, is a voluntary conveyance without consideration. Wherefore defendants pray judgment for all proper relief.”

To this answer, plaintiff replied by general denial.

The cause was tried in March, 1903, and the court found against plaintiff and all the defendants except David A. Glenn. As to said Glenn, it found him the owner in fee of the premises and entered its decree accordingly, from which plaintiff appealed.

This was an equity case and rule 7 of this court requires that in cases of equitable jurisdiction the whole of the evidence shall be embodied in the bill of exceptions, provided, however, that it shall be sufficient to state the legal effect of documentary evidence where there is no dispute as to the admissibility or legal effect thereof.

Appellant’s abstract somewhat violates the foregoing rule and does not comply with another rule of this court, in that, say, 54 pages of it are set in nonpareil type — a kind of type quite too small to read with either comfort or certainty with the natural eye, or by artificial aids, in daylight. With artificial light the difficulty is aggravated in the case at bar by using, instead of rough or antique finished paper, a paper known to the trade as “machine finished,” or “sized and super-calendered” paper — a glazed paper torturing to the human eye by gas or electric light and out of place in brief work.

Our rules require abstracts shall be printed in “fair type” (rule 13). The statutes, out of tenderness to the professional eye, and that of the general reader, require our reports to be published in a type equal in size to the fortieth volume of Iowa reports (R. S. 1899, sec. 1658) i. e., “long primer.” Out of [629]*629tenderness to the legislative eye and to that of the general reader, the statutes require that hills, reports, communications and other legislative documents and reports he printed in “small pica.” [E. S. 1899, secs. 9015 and 9016.] Now, the type used here is five points smaller than “small pica” and four points smaller than “long primer,” nor is it “fair type” (in any fair sense), and its use seems precluded by several rules; for instance, by rule 13, supra, by the legislative rule, supra, by the rules of comity, as well as the rules of safety. Because, if its use be indulged, then, to the dangers now recognized as incident to every lawsuit there will be added an insidious and (possibly) new

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Bluebook (online)
94 S.W. 263, 196 Mo. 624, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-grissom-mo-1906.