Jackson v. Greene

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 9, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00461
StatusUnknown

This text of Jackson v. Greene (Jackson v. Greene) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Greene, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

TOMMY EDWARD JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-cv-461-pp

DISTRICT ATTORNY GREENE, L. LASES, and J. FOSS DAVIS,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2), SCREENING COMPLAINT AND DISMISSING CASE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

On April 4, 2022, plaintiff Tommy Edward Jackson, who is incarcerated at the Brown County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights when they brought what he asserts were unfounded charges against him. Dkt. No. 1. He also filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Dkt. No. 2. This order resolves the motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and screens the complaint. This case previously was assigned to Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph. Because the court has not yet ordered the complaint to be served on the defendants, they don’t know that the plaintiff has sued them, and they haven’t had a chance to decide whether to consent to Judge Joseph’s authority to decide the case. The clerk’s office reassigned the case to this district judge to consider whether to dismiss the case. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed Without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On April 14, 2022, the plaintiff filed the motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Dkt. No. 2. On April 29, 2022, the court waived payment of the initial partial filing fee. Dkt. No. 6. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. He must pay the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint

A. Federal Screening Standard The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when his case was removed to federal court. The PLRA requires courts to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon

2 which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798

(7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 3 B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that three Brown County district attorneys—Greene, L. Lases and J. Foss Davis—violated his constitutional rights. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. He asserts that Lases “bond[ed] [him] over without an [sic] witness or

investigation on some he[a]rsay that never happen[ed] that cause[ed] [him] 11 months of lost time.” Id. at 2. He claims that Greene charged him with a false crime and false imprisonment on “fake charges of intimidation of a witness and comtempting [sic] court order, which is a lie.” Id. He says that Greene could not prove “without a reasonably [sic] doubt” that the plaintiff violated a court order. Id. Finally, he alleges that J. Foss Davis “bond [him] over” on allegations that were not 100% true. Id. The plaintiff marked the box on the complaint that indicated he was

suing under state law in a case where he was a citizen of a different state from the defendants and the amount in controversy was $3.5 million dollars. Id. at 3. He asks the court to terminate the duty “of these people’s for lack of professional work,” emphasizing the emotional and physical toll the alleged false charges have had on him. Id. C. Analysis The plaintiff’s claims, and the timing of his complaint, imply that he may

have been charged in state court. The public docket shows that on July 8, 2021, the plaintiff was charged in Brown County Circuit Court with misdemeanor battery, disorderly conduct, criminal damage to property and bail jumping related to a domestic violence incident. State v. Jackson, Case No. 4 2021CM000562 (Brown County Circuit Court), available at https://wcca.wicourts.gov/caseDetail.html?caseNo=2021CM000562&countyN o=5&index=0&mode=details. On the date of the plaintiff’s initial appearance in that case (July 8, 2021), the special prosecutor who appeared on behalf of the

state was “Lawrence Lasee.” Id. That case remains pending; there is a plea hearing scheduled for September 15, 2022 at 3:30 p.m. Id.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Forrester v. White
484 U.S. 219 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
SKS & Associates, Inc. v. Dart
619 F.3d 674 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Robert Simpson v. Tim Rowan
73 F.3d 134 (Seventh Circuit, 1995)
Peter Gakuba v. Charles O'Brien
711 F.3d 751 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
United States v. Graf
784 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2015)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Gilbertson v. Albright
381 F.3d 965 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Jackson v. Greene, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-greene-wied-2022.