Jackson v. Ford County Detention Center

CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedMarch 29, 2023
Docket5:23-cv-03048
StatusUnknown

This text of Jackson v. Ford County Detention Center (Jackson v. Ford County Detention Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Ford County Detention Center, (D. Kan. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

TYREE TEVIN JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 23-3048-JWL

FORD COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Tyree Tevin Jackson, a state prisoner who is housed at the Ford County Detention Center (FCDC) in Garden City, Kansas, filed this pro se civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.. (Doc. 1.) The Court has reviewed the complaint and has identified deficiencies, as set forth below, which leave the complaint subject to dismissal in its entirety. The Court will allow Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint on court-approved forms that cures those deficiencies. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff names as Defendants the FCDC and Sheriff’s Master Deputy Gerald Boron. (Doc. 1, p. 1-2.) As the factual background for this complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his paid-for dictionary was taken during a shakedown, he has been the victim of “police brutality,” and “guards keep stealing [his] commissary.” Id. at 2. In Count I of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges “police brutality” based on Defendant Boron, who was not in uniform at the time, placing Plaintiff in a choke hold when he came to take pictures. Id. at 3. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges “stolen commissary,” stating that he is missing “a lot of commissary” and that his mother has proof of his purchases. Id. at 3. As relief, Plaintiff requests (1) the return of his missing commissary items, (2) an order that pending charges against him be dropped, and (3) the entry of a settlement. Id. at 5. II. Screening Standards Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, the Court is required by statute to screen his complaint and to dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof that is frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). During this screening, the Court liberally construes

a pro se complaint such as this one and holds it to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, the Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff’s behalf.” See Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988)

(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). “[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Furthermore, a pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted.) The Court must determine whether Plaintiff has “nudge[d] his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not met his or her burden. Robbins v. Okla., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)(citing Twombly, at 550 U.S. at 570).

III. Discussion This action is subject to dismissal because it fails to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. “[T]o state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed (the plaintiff); and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). Count I asserts “police brutality” by Defendant Boron, who allegedly put Plaintiff in a chokehold. But the complaint does not explain when this incident occurred, the surrounding

details, whether Plaintiff suffered any harm from the chokehold, or what legal right Plaintiff believes was violated. The assertion that Defendant Boron committed police brutality is the sort of conclusory statement that is insufficient to support a claim for relief; Plaintiff must provide additional details about the incident. Similarly, Count II asserts that someone is stealing Plaintiff’s commissary items. Plaintiff has not identified the federal constitutional right he believes was violated by the theft, and he fails to explain when the theft or thefts occurred, what items were stolen, or who he believes stole the items. In order to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must identify a named defendant who committed the alleged violation; simply referring to “guards” is not sufficient. Next, this action is subject to dismissal as it is brought against the FCDC. A jail facility is not a proper defendant because it is not a “person” subject to suit for money damages under § 1983. See Davis v. Bruce, 215 F.R.D. 612, 618 (D. Kan. 2003), aff’d in relevant part, 129 Fed. Appx. 406, 408 (10th Cir. 2005). Finally, to the extent that Petitioner seeks an order from this Court directing that the charges pending against him be dropped and he be released, such relief

cannot be granted in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A petition for writ of habeas corpus is a state prisoner’s sole remedy in federal court for a claim of entitlement to immediate or speedier release. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). IV. Conclusion As explained above, it appears that this action is subject to dismissal in its entirety because Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Davis v. Bruce
129 F. App'x 406 (Tenth Circuit, 2005)
Anderson v. Blake
469 F.3d 910 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents
492 F.3d 1158 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Smith v. United States
561 F.3d 1090 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Davis v. Bruce
215 F.R.D. 612 (D. Kansas, 2003)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Northington v. Jackson
973 F.2d 1518 (Tenth Circuit, 1992)

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Jackson v. Ford County Detention Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-ford-county-detention-center-ksd-2023.