Jackson v. First National Bank of Valdosta

246 F. Supp. 134, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9926
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedSeptember 2, 1965
DocketCiv. A. 647, 671
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 246 F. Supp. 134 (Jackson v. First National Bank of Valdosta) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. First National Bank of Valdosta, 246 F. Supp. 134, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9926 (M.D. Ga. 1965).

Opinion

BOOTLE, Chief Judge.

These are actions seeking a declaration that the defendant bank cannot lawfully operate a drive-in banking facility recently erected by it and an injunction against further operation thereof. Civil Action No. 647 was removed from the Superior Court of Lowndes County, Georgia to this court. The plaintiff in that action is W. M. Jackson, Superintendent of Banks of the State of Georgia, and this court dismissed that suit for “want of a proper party plaintiff”. That ruling was reversed. Jackson v. First National Bank of Valdosta, 349 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. July 22, 1965). 1 *136 Thereafter that plaintiff adopted and now urges the motion for summary judgment filed and urged by the plaintiff in Civil Action No. 671, the First State Bank of Valdosta. By consent, the two cases have been consolidated. The defendant has abandoned its defense of laches pleaded in Civil Action No. 671 so that now the contentions of the two plaintiffs are the same and give rise to the same legal question.

The main banking house of the defendant First National Bank is located at the northwest corner of North Patterson Street and West Hill Avenue — North Patterson Street running north and south and West Hill Avenue running east and west. 2 In May, 1961 the defendant also established in the City of Valdosta a “bank office” at which it does a general banking business. This office is located approximately two miles from the main banking house and is currently in full operation as it has been since the date of its establishment. On July 14, 1964, the defendant established and opened a “drive-in-facility” at the northeast corner of the intersection of West Hill Avenue and North Toombs Street. As shown by the attached plat it is 290.57 feet from the rear wall of the main banking house to the rear wall of the drive-in structure. This “drive-in-facility” is currently in operation and customarily cashes checks and receives deposits. The plaintiffs have no quarrel with defendant’s establishment and operation of the main banking house and the “bank office.” They take umbrage, however, at defendant’s establishment and operation of the “drive-in-facility”. They contend that this facility has been opened and exists in contravention of applicable federal law. This court has before it now the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment with supporting papers, all in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Having been fully advised in the premises by able counsel on both sides, this court now undertakes the task imposed upon it by law — to resolve the conflict presented and to declare the rights of the parties so that they may intelligently chart the course of their future conduct.

Banking so vitally touches the lives of so many that it has long been the policy of the law both federal and state to regulate it in broad outline and also in right much detail. That policy is firmly established. See e. g., Commercial State Bank of Roseville v. Gidney, 174 F.Supp. 770 (D.C.1959). Its wisdom is hardly to be questioned. The broad question which this court must decide is whether the conduct of the defendant in establishing and operating the “drive-in-facility” in question contravenes valid legal proscription. We are forced to conclude that it does.

The exclusive authority for the establishment and operation of a branch or branches by a national banking association is found in 12 U.S.C.A. § 36. Only a portion of § 36 is applicable to the present case — § 36(c) (1) 3 and § 36(f). 4 While it is clear that federal law is controlling in this type case, it is also clear from a reading of § 36(c) (1) that that *137 particular subsection derives its implementation from “the law of the State in question.” Here the federal law makes the state law a part of itself. The Georgia law sets forth and defines four terms which are in some degree germane to the issues involved here. These terms are? (1) Parent bank, 5 (2) branch bank, 6 (3) bank office 7 and (4) bank facility. 8 The main banking house of the defendant fits the definition of “parent bank” and while its existence is in no way dependent on state law, its ability to establish and operate a branch as defined in 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(f) is by Act of Congress, 12 U.S. C.A. § 36, made dependent thereon. It is necessary therefore, for purposes of analysis, to term the main banking house of defendant a “parent bank.” The term “branch bank” as defined by Georgia law is of little interest here since it describes only a place of business in a city other than the city wherein the parent bank is chartered. 9 ******Sections 13-203.1 (a) and (b) of the Georgia Code authorize a “parent bank” to establish and operate a “bank office” and/or a “bank facility”. However, § 13-203.1 (c) contains an important limitation on the extent of this authority. It states as follows:

“Without limitation, on the foregoing and in furtherance thereof, 10 the Superintendent of Banks may approve with respect to any particular city, town, or village now or hereafter having a population of 80,000 or under, according to the 1960 official United States census or any future official United States census, not more than one of either a bank office or bank facility for each population unit of 40,000 or any fraction thereof, according to the 1960 official United States census or any future official United States census for any parent bank or branch bank: Provided, nevertheless, that this limitation shall not apply to parent banks or branch banks in municipalities with a population of more than 80,000 according to the 1960 official United States census or any future official United
States census. * * * ”

It is stipulated by the parties that Valdosta has a population of 30,652 according to the 1960 official United States census — the last official census. With the facts as they are — and no dispute exists as to any material fact — the defendant bank is entitled to only one of either a “bank office” or a “bank facility” if such structure would fall within the definition of “branch” as set out in 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(f). The defendant *138 "parent bank” has, without a doubt, already established and begun operating a “bank office” some two miles from its main banking house. Consequently, if the defendant were a state bank it would not be able to establish and operate another “bank office” or “bank facility” until Valdosta was determined by an official United States census to have experienced the required increase in population. If the defendant’s “drive-in-facility” is a “branch” as defined in 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(f) then such facility is in existence contrary to federal law.

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246 F. Supp. 134, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9926, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-first-national-bank-of-valdosta-gamd-1965.