JACKSON v. DEPUTY WARDEN REGINALD CLARK

District Court, M.D. Georgia·Decided May 2, 2025·No. 5:23-cv-00333·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

JOHNNIE DEMOND JACKSON, : : Plaintiff, : : v. : Case No. 5:23-cv-333-TES-AGH : Deputy Warden REGINALD CLARK, : : Defendant. : _________________________________ : ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court are Plaintiff Johnnie Demond Jackson’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 103), motion to compel (ECF No. 100), motion in limine and for judicial notice (ECF No. 105), motion for sanctions (ECF No. 106), motion seeking to supplement under the Administrative Procedures Act (ECF No. 113), motion to supplement Plaintiff’s list of witnesses (ECF No. 114), and second motion in limine (ECF No. 117). For the following reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied. Plaintiff’s additional motions are denied. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s claims arise from his confinement at Baldwin State Prison (“BSP”) in Hardwick, Georgia. Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff contends that, in November or December 2022, he was taken to the infirmary after passing out in his cell due to excruciating pain. Id. While waiting for a pain shot that had been prescribed by a nurse, Defendant Deputy Warden Reginald Clark jammed a taser into Plaintiff’s collarbone and demanded that Plaintiff get up. Id. When Plaintiff explained he could not get up, Defendant ordered another inmate to grab Plaintiff’s legs, while Defendant grabbed the collar of Plaintiff’s prison uniform, choking Plaintiff and causing Plaintiff to nearly pass out. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff contends that Defendant

threw Plaintiff to the other side of the infirmary room table and that after the nurse gave Plaintiff the pain shot, Defendant threw Plaintiff into a wheelchair. Id. at 6. As a result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff asserts that he was unable to walk normally because he needed a back brace and a cane. Id. Plaintiff primarily seeks damages as a result. Id. at 7. The Court received Plaintiff’s complaint on September 5, 2023 (ECF No. 1). After preliminary review, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant was

allowed to proceed for further factual development. Order & R. 8, Nov. 17, 2023, ECF No. 13; Order, Dec. 5, 2023, ECF No. 19 (adopting recommendation). Defendant filed a timely answer (ECF No. 49). On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 103). Defendant filed a response to the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 111), to which Plaintiff filed a reply (ECF No. 119).

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I. Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the

outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal quotation marks omitted). If the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, or that the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 324-26. This evidence must consist of more than conclusory allegations. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). In sum, summary judgment must be entered

“against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. II. Discussion Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on his claim of excessive force against Defendant Clark. But, as explained in more detail below, genuine issues of material fact exist on this claim such that summary judgment is inappropriate. Plaintiff’s motion should consequently be denied. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant physically assaulted him while waiting for,

and after receiving, a pain shot in BSP’s medical infirmary. He supports his allegations with his deposition testimony. See Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 51, at 45, 52, 62-63, 66-70, ECF No. 103-51. Defendant responds to Plaintiff’s allegations with his own declaration and the declaration of an alleged witness, CERT Officer Havior. Clark Decl., ECF No. 111-3; Havior Decl., ECF No. 111-4. Defendant denies Plaintiff’s allegations and avers, in contrast, that he was assisting Plaintiff as Plaintiff got into the wheelchair following the pain shot. Clark Decl. 2-3. Officer

Havior similarly declares that she never witnessed Defendant assault Plaintiff and that she does not recall even being present at the time of the alleged assault. These statements directly conflict with Plaintiff’s sworn testimony that Officer Havior was present when Defendant assaulted Plaintiff. Havior Decl. 2; Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 51, at 45. In short, there is a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Defendant used

excessive force against Plaintiff. “This action is . . . no more than a swearing contest between” the parties. Joassin v. Murphy, 661 F. App’x 558, 560 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1357 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015)). Summary judgment is, thus, inappropriate, and the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 103) be denied. PLAINTIFF’S ADDITIONAL MOTIONS I. Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions Plaintiff again seeks to compel the production of CERT Officer Havior’s body

cam footage (ECF No. 100).1 Plaintiff also seeks sanctions against Defendant for the failure to produce the body cam footage (ECF No. 106). The Court directed Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery request for Officer Havior’s body cam footage. Order 2, Jan. 10, 2025, ECF No. 88. Defendant responded that no such body cam footage exists. Def.’s Resp. to Mots. to Compel and for Sanctions 3, ECF No. 110. Additionally, Officer Havior declares that she was never issued body cam equipment. Havior Decl. 2. Simply put, a party cannot

produce what does not exist. Plaintiff may not like the response he received to his discovery request, but that does not entitle him to an order compelling the production of non-existent camera footage or to sanctions. West v. Temple, No. 5:14-CV-86- MTT-MSH, 2016 WL 4087108, at *2 (M.D. Ga. July 29, 2016) (“The Court cannot compel a person or entity to create a document that does not exist. Defendants similarly cannot be compelled to produce something that does not exist.”).

Consequently, Plaintiff’s motions to compel (ECF No. 100) and for sanctions (ECF No.

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