Jackson v. Combs
Opinion
This is an action for mesne profits. Judgment was recovered by default in ejectment. The defendant is precluded from setting up any defence of which he might have availed himself in the *original action Consequently, he cannot be permitted to prove he was not in possession when the declaration was served. 3 John. 481; 2 Burr. 668.
Ho writ of hah. fac. poss. was executed ; but the defendant abandoned the premises before judgment; and the grantee of the lessor entered and took possession. This entry enured to the benefit of the plaintiff, and rendered the writ unnecessary. When a recovery is against the person in possession, it is sufficient to prove the judgment; because, by entering into a consent rule, the defendant is estopped. But when judgment is aganst the casual ejector, [38] an actual entry must' be proved. It is usual to produce the writ of possession executed ; but this is not indispensable. In Calvart v. Horsfall, (4 Esp. Rep. 167,) Lord Ellen-borough held, that if the plaintiff has been let into possession by the defendant, it is sufficient. And vid. 2 Selwyn’s N. P. 784, and notes.
The liability of the defendant for rents and profits, be fore the lessor attained the age of twenty-one, depends on the question whether the father had, by law, a right to receive them as guardian by nature. Blackstone says he must account to his child for the profits; which implies a right to receive. 1 Bl. Com. 488. Coke’s Littleton is referred to. It does not, however, support this proposition, as applied to guardian by nature j but to guardian in socage, which ceases when the infant arrives at the age of fourteen, so far as to entitle the infant to enter and take the land to himself. But if no other guardian succeeds, this guardianship will continue. 5 John. 67. The doctrine is critically examined in Butler & Hargrave’s Notes to Co. Litt. Lib. 2, ch. 5, sec. 134, note (12.) They observe, it extends no farther than the custody of the infant’s person j a peculiarity they did not sufficiently advert to in a preceding note, which was unguardedly expressed as if receiving the profits of land might be a part of the office of guardian by nature. In this capacity, then, the father had no authority to receive rents from the tenant. By the common law, guardian in socage must be a person to whom the inheritance cannot descend. As the father may inherit under our statute, *the guardianship does not devolve on him; and no guardian appears to have been appointed in this case. The tenant is, therefore, liable in this action to pay damages during the time he occupied. The nonsuit must be set aside.
New trial granted.
Footnotes
7 Cow. 36 (Jackson v. Combs) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.