Jackson v. Building Inspector of Brockton

221 N.E.2d 736, 351 Mass. 472, 1966 Mass. LEXIS 677
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedDecember 8, 1966
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 221 N.E.2d 736 (Jackson v. Building Inspector of Brockton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Building Inspector of Brockton, 221 N.E.2d 736, 351 Mass. 472, 1966 Mass. LEXIS 677 (Mass. 1966).

Opinion

Cutter, J.

Jackson operates a large farm (the locus) on Linwood Street, Brockton, in a residence district in which under the zoning ordinance, no ‘' structure . . . shall be used . . . except for” uses which include “[f] arming, truck gardening, nurseries or greenhouses,” and “ [accessory uses customarily incident to the above uses.” The term “accessory use” does not include “[a] business outside the building to which it is accessory ... or which by reason of the appearance of the building or premises, or the emission of odor, smoke, dust or noise or in any other way is objectionable or detrimental to the residential character . . . [of] the neighborhood, or which involves features in design not customary in buildings for the above uses . . .” (emphasis supplied).

The building inspector issued to Jackson a permit dated April 9,1964, to erect a building for ‘ ‘ storage of farm materials— for use on own farm.” An inspector of the board of health and the building inspector called on Jackson at the farm on July 16,1964, and discussed with him the use to which he intended to put the building. The building inspector, by letter dated October 29, 1964, revoked the permit because “the . . . [principal] use for which this building is intended is in fact a violation of the [Brockton] zoning ordinances. ’ ’ This was confirmed on December 2 and 7.

*474 Jackson, after conferences with city officials, appealed from the revocation of the permit. The “appeal was rejected” by the zoning board of appeals. Jackson thereupon filed this petition for a writ of mandamus to require the building inspector to issue a new permit and to refrain from interfering with his use of the farm drying machine hereinafter mentioned. The case was heard on a statement of agreed facts. A judge in the Superior Court ordered the writ to issue. The building inspector appealed.

Jackson proposes to use the building for which the permit is sought to house an Arnold Farm and Ranch Dehydrator or dryer. The machine consists “of a large container into which corn, grain, cranberries, hay, or other edible products as well as manure or other composts can be placed” after which heated air can be “sent through the container” to remove moisture. “Only condensed moisture escapes. In the case of hay, grain, cranberries, and corn, no substantial or offensive odor is given off. Through the use of filters, cocoa compound, and other chemicals, any odor from manure can be disguised or lessened.” Edible “feedstuff after passing through the dryer . . . [may] be eaten by livestock, used, or stored without decay .... In addition, . . . hay, grain, and other farm crops . . . [harvested] before the crop is ripe . . . [are ripened] immediately through the use of the heated air. The feed . . . resulting from this drying process ... is more nutritious . . . and increases the milk product . . . while lowering the cost of the feed. In the case of manure or other compost products a fertilizer or soil conditioner is produced.” The building is in a remote section of Jackson’s farm. “The nearest house ... is approximately 750 feet away and is separated [from this building] by dense trees and thickets. The appearance of the building is satisfactory for zoning purposes, and there is no apparent objection because of smoke, dust, or noise.” Jackson intends to use the dryer (a) to produce edible fodder for his cattle on the locus and on two farms outside of Brockton in which Jackson has an interest, (b) for drying manure from animals on the locus to *475 make it easier to handle and use as plant food for fodder grown on the locus, (c) for the “sale of the excess . . . products in a cooperative enterprise with farmers in the general area of” the locus, and (d) for “the use of the excess generally as a product of the” locus.

1. The meaning of the relevant, everyday terms used in the ordinance, viz. “ [f]arming” and “ [a]ccessory uses customarily incident to” farming, is to be determined “according to the common and approved usages of the language. ’ ’ Moulton v. Building Inspector of Milton, 312 Mass. 195,198. Needham v. Winslow Nurseries, Inc. 330 Mass. 95, 99-101. Kurz v. Board of Appeals of No. Reading, 341 Mass. 110, 112. See annotation, 97 A. L. R. 2d 702. “Farming” has been held to be a more restricted term than “agriculture.” See Lincoln v. Murphy, 314 Mass. 16, 21. Cf. Fidler v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 260, 262-265. The definition of “accessory use,” already quoted, does not include a business which by the “emission of odor ... or in any other way is objectionable or detrimental to the residential character . . . [of] the neighborhood.” This provision is of significance in construing what the ordinance means by “farming,” for it indicates that the element of detriment to the character of the neighborhood is to be taken into account in considering at least what subsidiary uses are permissible as “farming.” See the Moulton case, 312 Mass. 195, 197-198.

Certain dairy operations have been recognized as constituting farming. See the Moulton case, 312 Mass. 195,199; Deutschmann v. Board of Appeals of Canton, 325 Mass. 297, 299-301, which held that the sale as ice cream of dairy products raised on the premises was within a zoning by-law permitting certain sales on farm premises. See also Kimball v. Blanchard, 90 N. H. 298, 300-301. Compare forms of activity held not to be within the concept of farming, Lincoln v. Murphy, 314 Mass. 16, 20-21 (piggery); Mioduszewski v. Saugus, 337 Mass. 140,143-145 (raising greyhounds). Cf. also Fidler v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 260 (" agriculture ’ ’ held to include large turkey farm). We as *476 sume (see the Deutschmann case at p. 298) that the appropriate and reasonable use of “modern equipment for farming” will not prevent a dairy operation from being a farm. The cases already cited and the provisions of the ordinance lead to the conclusion that the propriety of treating the operation of the dehydrating machine as “farming” depends upon (a) whether particular proposed uses of it are of a character ordinarily and reasonably regarded as farming, and (b) whether such of the proposed uses as are subsidiary or accessory to the dairy are detrimental to the residential character of the area.

2. Jackson proposes dehydration of fodder material, wherever produced, and manure for use upon the locus and upon land near the locus (in the same general area) which is in fact operated and controlled by him as part of the same general enterprise. For convenience, such land in the area (including the locus) is hereafter referred to as the “area enterprise land.” Jackson also proposes to dehydrate such fodder materials and manure for general sale of the dried products either directly or through a farm cooperative, or for use on any land in which he has an interest wherever situated.

We construe the Brockton ordinance (see the Moulton case, 312 Mass.

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Bluebook (online)
221 N.E.2d 736, 351 Mass. 472, 1966 Mass. LEXIS 677, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-building-inspector-of-brockton-mass-1966.