Jackson v. Bishop

268 F. Supp. 804, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8276
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedJune 3, 1967
DocketPB-66-C-64, PB-66-C-74 and PB-66-C-99
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 268 F. Supp. 804 (Jackson v. Bishop) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8276 (E.D. Ark. 1967).

Opinion

*806 MEMORANDUM OPINION

OREN HARRIS and GORDON E. YOUNG, District Judges.

These are suits in equity brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 by three inmates of the Arkansas State Penitentiary against O. E. Bishop, Superintendent of the Penitentiary. The cases first became known to the court through handwritten petitions filed by each of the prisoners seeking various forms of relief. The court allowed the petitions to be filed in forma pauperis and treated each one as a complaint for equitable relief under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Counsel was appointed for the prisoners, and after investigation an amended complaint was filed seeking an injunctive relief and making the cases class actions. Although one of the cases was assigned to Judge Harris and the other two to Judge Young, they were consolidated for trial due to the similarity of "the issues presented, and both judges sat as a panel of two for the trial.

The plaintiffs make several alternative claims or contentions for themselves and other prison inmates:

First, they contend that the infliction of corporal punishment in any form constitutes cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable by the Fourteenth Amendment to the States.

Secondly and alternatively, they contend that the use of the strap or “hide” as a means of punishing inmates in the Penitentiary under any circumstances is cruel and unusual so as to be unconstitutional.

Thirdly, they contend that the imposition of administrative rules or regulations concerning the use of the strap does not make it a constitutionally permissible method of prison discipline.

Plaintiffs’ fourth contention is actually twofold: (1) they claim that the rules concerning corporal punishment adopted by the Arkansas State Penitentiary Board do not adequately protect the prisoners from unconstitutional treatment nor do they conform to the requirements that this court set out in the Talley 1 decision; and (2) the rules which have been promulgated by the Prison Board have been violated in the administration of corporal punishment upon the inmates.

Finally, each of the plaintiffs contends that although he has some physical impairment which would prevent him from doing the work of an average man, he nevertheless is classified as “average” for prison work purposes, is required to perform difficult physical labor, and is whipped when he fails to perform. Each claims that this is contrary to his constitutional right to due process and equal protection of the law and that it is also unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment.

The defendant denies that corporal punishment per se or use of the strap as carried out by prison officials is cruel and unusual in the constitutional sense. He relies primarily upon this court’s earlier decision in the Talley case and upon the rules and regulations adopted by the Penitentiary Board pursuant to that decision. He admits that certain rule violations and other unlawful acts occurred at the Penitentiary but claims that these matters have been remedied by administrative action. Defendant denies that any injunctive relief for these plaintiffs or anyone in their class is necessary or justified.

The court appointed Edward L. Wright of Little Rock and William S. Arnold of Crossett, both highly respected and experienced members of the Arkansas Bar, to represent the plaintiffs without *807 charge. They have done so most capably, and the court thanks them for their services.

That the court has jurisdiction and that these are proper cases to be brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is not questioned by either party. These matters are fully discussed in the Talley decision supra at 686. However, at the outset we want to point out that the court is especially conscious of the limitations of its function in cases of this kind.

It is'well' settled that the administration of state prison discipline is the primary responsibility of state officials, and federal courts have an extremely limited area in which they may act pertaining to the treatment of prisoners confined to state penal institutions. State officials must of necessity have wide discretion and control over disciplinary measures in order to properly maintain the prison system as well as to protect the public. Wright v. McMann, 257 F.Supp. 739 (D.C.N.Y.1966). United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7 Cir. 1956). Talley v. Stephens, supra (and cases cited therein). Therefore this court cannot and will not become appellate in nature and review each prison administration decision to punish a prisoner.

However, it is equally well settled that there are exceptions to these rules when special circumstances exist and constitutional rights are involved. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030; Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4 Cir. 1963); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034; Talley v. Stephens, supra.

As was said in Talley, page 686 of 247 F.Supp., “Although persons convicted of crimes lose many of the rights and privileges of law abiding citizens, it is established by now that they do not lose all of their civil rights, and that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment follow them into the prison * * * ”

We feel that the complaints in these cases raise several constitutional questions which merit the court’s attention.

In order to understand the issues in their proper perspective, it is necessary to set out some of the facts about, and the recent history of the Arkansas State Penitentiary.

The Arkansas Penitentiary System is under the general supervision of a five-man honorary commission known as the State Penitentiary Board but actual supervision is by them delegated to a Superintendent.

The plant of the System consists of two farms. One is known as Cummins Farm and contains approximately 15,500 acres, with 8,200 acres being under cultivation. Cummins Farm is located near Grady, Arkansas, and normally houses approximately 1,600 inmates; Superintendent O. E. Bishop resides at Cummins Farm. The other farm is known as Tucker Farm and contains approximately 4,500 acres, with approximately 3,000 acres being under cultivation. Tucker Farm is situated at Tucker, Arkansas, and normally houses approximately 275 inmates. Cummins Farm and Tucker Farm are approximately fifty miles apart by highway.

Personnel, other than inmates under sentence, at Cummins Farm consists of the Superintendent and 25 paid employees, with 20 being supervision wardens; and at Tucker Farm consists of an assistant superintendent and five paid employees, but only three supervision wardens. Customarily both farms make use of inmates, called trusties, in supervisory and overseeing capacities in the fields, in the barracks, and as security guards.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
268 F. Supp. 804, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8276, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-v-bishop-ared-1967.