Jackson County v. Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Authority

632 P.2d 1349, 53 Or. App. 823, 1981 Ore. App. LEXIS 3235
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedSeptember 8, 1981
Docket80-090; CA 19535
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 632 P.2d 1349 (Jackson County v. Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson County v. Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Authority, 632 P.2d 1349, 53 Or. App. 823, 1981 Ore. App. LEXIS 3235 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

BUTTLER, P. J.

Petitioners seek judicial review of a determination by the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), invalidating a portion of the comprehensive plan adopted by Jackson County. We reverse and remand.

In 1976, Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Authority (BCVSA), a sanitary district operating within Jackson County, adopted a comprehensive sewer plan. In 1978, Jackson County and BCVSA entered into a cooperative agreement providing that the parties would jointly develop plans relating to levels of sewer service on rural and urban lands. On July 14, 1980, the Jackson County Board of Commissioners adopted by ordinance its comprehensive plan, including a "Public Facilities and Services-Element.” In relevant part, that element contains seven policies establishing levels of sanitary service inside and outside urban growth boundaries.1 BCVSA then sought review [826]*826before LUBA concerning the adoption of those policies, contending that the county exceeded its statutory authority in not conforming its plan to that of the sanitary district, and also violated certain statewide planning goals. LUBA invalidated the adoption of policies I, II, IV, V and VI {supra, n 1) on the sole ground that in adopting them the county had exceeded its statutory authority.2 Petitioners Jackson County, the City of Ashland and three citizens’ groups seek judicial review of LUBA’s final order. The sole question before us is whether the county exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the policies in question. We hold that it did not.

LUBA’s basic rationale is that, although planning policies relating to growth lie outside the authority of the sanitary district, those specifically relating to provision for sanitary services themselves are the exclusive province of the planning responsibilities of the sanitary district. The county is characterized by LUBA primarily as a coordinator of plans, and in the event of conflict between the county and the district in formulating sanitary service policy, the county’s only recourse is to seek an enforcement order from LCDC to make the district’s plan conform to the statewide planning goals. That view of the respective roles of the county and of the special service district in land use [827]*827planning does not require a service district’s plan to conform to the county’s comprehensive plan, and we do not believe it is borne out in the statutory scheme.

The planning authority of sanitary districts derives in part from ORS 450.825,3 promulgated in 1955. Also, under ORS 197.185,4 promulgated in 1973, special districts (a category which under ORS 197.015(10) includes sanitary districts) have plan-making authority. The primary responsibility, however, for enacting comprehensive plans is assigned to cities and counties, both of which are required to enact comprehensive plans. ORS 197.175.5 The city and county are the primary planning units in the land use scheme. See ORS 197.005(3)6; Statewide Planning Goal [828]*8282.7 A special district is directed to adopt "an overall coordinated plan” relating to sewage disposal and treatment, but such a plan is not as all-encompassing as a comprehensive plan defined in ORS 197.015(5),8 which the city or county is required to adopt. It is evident that BCVSA’s sewer plan, while designated by BCVSA as a comprehensive plan, is not comprehensive within the meaning of ORS 197.015(5), because it does not interrelate "all functional and natural systems and activities relating to the use of lands.”

The policies adopted by the county relating to sewer services are, on their face, within the category of policies which the county is empowered to include within its comprehensive plan. ORS 197.015(5) {supra, n 8). The policies are general in that they are not made applicable to specific tracts of land but are couched in "broad categories.” Although LUBA characterizes them as being "fairly specific,” they do not approach a level of specificity inappropriate for comprehensive planning. Furthermore, the policies pertain to a matter required under ORS 197.015(5) and Goal 11 [829]*829(public facilities and services)9 to be included in the comprehensive plan. Finally, no statutory provision has been cited to us, and we have found none, that limits the policy-making power of the county to matters relating "more to regulating or directing growth,” a distinction made by LUBA in its order. ORS 197.015(5) defines a comprehensive plan as a "land use map and policy statement” which interrelates activities "relating to the use of lands,” a broader concept than that of merely regulating growth.

Although both the sanitary district and the county appear to have statutory authority to formulate policy concerning sewer services, we conclude that the sanitary district’s policy-making role is subordinate to that of the county, and that the county was within its statutory authority in adopting the policies in question. We reach that conclusion because ORS 197.185(1) specifically requires special districts to exercise their planning duties "in accordance with state-wide planning goals.” So must counties. ORS 197.175. To avoid a standoff between planning agencies, Goal 2 {supra, n 7) requires that special district plans be consistent with the comprehensive plan of counties.

LUBA’s rationale seems also to be predicated upon an asserted failure by the county to follow the proper procedure. According to LUBA, in the event of conflict over sewer policy between the district and the county, the county’s exclusive remedy is to obtain an enforcement order [830]*830from LCDC under ORS 197.320.10 That may be the case after the county’s plan has been acknowledged, but we do not accept the proposition that it is necessarily the county which must bring the matter before LGDC prior to the acknowledgment of its plan. Here, it is the district which is trying to invalidate part of what the county has adopted as its plan.

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Related

Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Authority v. City of Medford
880 P.2d 486 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1994)
Westside, Etc. v. School Dist. 4j, Etc.
647 P.2d 962 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1982)
Jackson County v. Bear Creek Valley Sanitary Authority
645 P.2d 532 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
632 P.2d 1349, 53 Or. App. 823, 1981 Ore. App. LEXIS 3235, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-county-v-bear-creek-valley-sanitary-authority-orctapp-1981.