Jackson Civil Township v. Darrow

134 N.E. 779, 192 Ind. 136, 1922 Ind. LEXIS 47
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 17, 1922
DocketNo. 23,717
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 134 N.E. 779 (Jackson Civil Township v. Darrow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson Civil Township v. Darrow, 134 N.E. 779, 192 Ind. 136, 1922 Ind. LEXIS 47 (Ind. 1922).

Opinion

Ewbank, C. J.

A petition was filed in the superior court of Laporte county, Indiana, asking to widen and deepen an existing dredged ditch along the course of the Kankakee river on the boundary line between Starke and Laporte counties a distance of twenty miles or more northeastwardly from the Porter county line, and to widen and deepen the channel of Yellow river from a point near the town of Knox to its junction with the Kankakee, and to build levees on each side of the proposed ditches thus to be dug, and also to construct a lateral ditch ten miles long in Laporte county, emptying into the Kankakee river below its junction with Yellow river. What purported to be a remonstrance by two-thirds of the landowners affected was filed July 24, 1915, on which the court found against the remonstrators. On June 6, 1919, within twenty days after an amendment of §3 of the drainage law (Acts 1919 p. 433) took effect, another remonstrance was filed, signed by 3,300 landowners who claimed to be two-thirds of those affected.

[138]*138"The court struck out the latter remonstrance, to which appellants excepted, and have assigned the ruling as error.

1. That part of the act of 1919, supra, relied on by appellants reads as follows: “Provided, that in cases pending at the time of taking effect of this act where a two-thirds remonstrance has not been filed, such remonstrances may be filed to the report of the drainage commissioners, except” in certain cases not here involved (Our italics). Acts 1919 p. 433.

As such a remonstrance had been filed in this proceeding in 1915, a second one filed in 1919 was not authorized by the language quoted, even though the latter was signed by persons not originally named by the petition as parties. Therefore it is not necessary to consider and we do not decide whether or not the fact that the later act was merely a re-enactment of language contained in the act of 1907, there used with reference to drainage proceedings begun under an earlier statute which did not provide for filing a “two-thirds remonstrance,” would have prevented such language from having any application, even if a prior remonstrance had not been filed.

Appellant, Samuel A. Craigmile, was not a party to the original petition, but was first brought in as a party by a report of the drainage commissioners, filed November 30, 1918. On December 10, 1918, he (as well as others) filed a remonstrance. On December 27, 1918, said Craigmile filed a verified “motion to dismiss proceedings,” which-alleged that certain other actions for the construction of proposed drainage improvements were pending in the circuit courts of Starke and Laporte counties, respectively, at the time the petition in this action was filed, and that because of such facts those courts had prior jurisdiction over so much of the work of drainage reported by the commissioners in this action [139]*139as deprived the Laporte Superior Court of jurisdiction to proceed. Certain other appellants who had previously filed remonstrances also filed similar verified motions. After hearing evidence for two weeks the court overruled all of these motions, and exceptions were reserved, and this ruling is assigned as error.

2,3. These “motions to dismiss” were based wholly upon matters in abatement. Having previously pleaded in bar of the action by filing remonstrances, the appellants were not entitled to plead matters in abatement, and the court might have struck out and rejected the “motions” without error. §371 Burns 1914, §365 R. S. 1881; Watts v. Sweeney (1891), 127 Ind. 116, 126, 26 N. E. 680, 22 Am. St. 615; Carmien v. Cornell (1897), 148 Ind. 83, 89, 47 N. E. 216. Therefore no reversible error was committed by refusing to sustain them, after hearing evidence.

The statute under which this proceeding was begun, and as it has been amended, expressly authorizes the drainage commissioners, in laying out a system of drainage, “to determine that the method of drainage shall be by removing obstructions from a natural or artificial watercourse; or diverting such watercourse from its channel, by deepening, widening or changing the channel of such watercourse; by constructing an artificial channel, with or without arms or branches; * * * by constructing levees or dykes; or by any or all of such methods combined” (Our italics). §6142 Bums 1914, Acts 1907 p. 508; Acts 1919 p. 433; See Acts (Sp. Sess.) 1920 p. 26. And the power of the court to consolidate with the original petition any supplemental petitions asking for additional drainage improvements which, when completed, will constitute part of the same system of drainage is expressly recognized by the statute. §6148- Burns 1914, Acts 1907 p. 508, §8.

The original petition asked for the drainage of the [140]*140lands along the Kankakee and Yellow rivers, for some distance above and five or six miles below their confluence, by constructing dredge ditches of a designated size along the course of their existing channels, so as to widen and deepen them, and building a “continuous and unbrokendevee without any openings therein” for a considerable distance on either side of the channels as thus constructed, and running an arm into .the main channel from the north, below the point of confluence. The plan, as reported by the drainage commissioners and established by the judgment appealed from, provides for, (a) an unbroken levee on the northwest side and within a short distance from the main channel of the Kankakee river, from a point four or five miles above where the Yellow river flows into it from the east to the proposed “outlet,” five or six miles below their confluence; (b) digging a diversion ditch immediately outside of that levee, parallel with the channel of the Kankakee river, only a few rods from that channel, and inside the “meander line” of the river basin as run by the United States survey, which diversion ditch will empty into the existing channel of the Kankakee river at the “outlet” of the proposed “system,” five or six miles below the confluence of the two rivers; (c) building certain arms flowing into this diversion ditch from the north and west; (d) the construction of a new channel for the Yellow river from a point about eight miles above such confluence to a point within the “meander line” of the Kankakee river basin, and thence parallel with the existing channel of that river, less than half a mile from it, following the general course of the “meander line” which bounds its original basin on the southeast, five or six miles to the “outlet,” where it will join the channel of the Kankakee river; (e) building a levee immediately east of and parallel with this chan[141]

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
134 N.E. 779, 192 Ind. 136, 1922 Ind. LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-civil-township-v-darrow-ind-1922.