Jackson 326394 v. Shinn

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedSeptember 30, 2024
Docket3:22-cv-08216
StatusUnknown

This text of Jackson 326394 v. Shinn (Jackson 326394 v. Shinn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jackson 326394 v. Shinn, (D. Ariz. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Randolph A. Jackson, Jr., No. CV-22-08216-PCT-JJT (ESW)

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 David Shinn, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 At issue is the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 33, “R&R”) submitted by United 16 States Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett, addressing Randolph Jackson’s Amended 17 Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 14). Petitioner has 18 challenged his convictions in Arizona state court for transportation of narcotic drugs for 19 sale, possession or use of drug paraphernalia and resisting arrest. In the R&R, Judge Willett 20 analyzed Petitioner Jackson’s seven stated grounds for relief and concluded that Ground 7 21 does not present a cognizable federal claim and must be dismissed; Grounds 4 and 5 are 22 procedurally defaulted without excuse or cause and so must be dismissed as well; and 23 Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 6 fail on their merits and should be denied on that basis. Petitioner has 24 filed Objections to the R&R (Doc. 43) and Respondents have filed a Reply thereto 25 (Doc. 44). 26 Also at issue are two Motions to Stay proceedings (Docs. 25, 42) that Petitioner has 27 filed, as well as another R&R (Doc. 29) entered by Judge Willett addressing the first of 28 those Motions, to which Petitioner filed no objection. Finally, the Court will address two 1 Motions to Strike (Docs. 39, 48) filed by Respondents and seeking to strike two filings by 2 Petitioner, both entitled “Judicial Notice Under Federal Rules of Evidence Article Rule 3 201 (Docs. 35, 47). 4 In the R&R, Judge Willett correctly concluded that Grounds 4 and 5 are 5 procedurally defaulted. Petitioner never exhausted those claims—for ineffective assistance 6 of trial, advisory and appellate counsel—by fairly presenting them to the Arizona state 7 courts. In his Objections, Petitioner states that he did present at least Ground 5, but points 8 to no actual information in the record to challenge Respondent’s supported assertions to 9 the contrary; rather, he simply repeats his own conclusory assertions. As Respondents point 10 out in their Reply, this is insufficient for the Court to sustain an objection, both as to 11 Grounds 4 and 5, and as set forth below, the other grounds as well. Petitioner’s lengthy 12 Objections are long on repetition of conclusory assertions but lack either support or 13 specifics. And Petitioner fails to satisfy the standard for excusal of procedural default as 14 set forth in Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 Judge Willett also correctly noted Ground 7—a claim of unlawful sentence under 16 Arizona criminal law—is not a cognizable claim for habeas relief. Ground 7 merely 17 challenges the application of Arizona state sentencing law. It does not implicate or 18 articulate any violation of federal law, constitutional or otherwise. 19 And Judge Willett’s conclusion that Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 6 fail on their merits is 20 correct. None of the decisions underlying those grounds were contrary to or involved an 21 unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; nor were those four decisions 22 based on an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the 23 state fora. As to Grounds 1 through 3, Judge Willett noted the Arizona Court of Appeals 24 ruling, which she quoted in pages 6 and 7 of the R&R, supported her conclusion that under 25 the circumstances presented in this case, the trial court’s decisions to 1) deny rescission of 26 Petitioner’s waiver of counsel mid-trial; 2) deny a continuance mid-trial to allow him to 27 seek new counsel; and 3) not appoint new counsel at that point, were not unreasonable 28 applications of federal law. The Court of Appeals opinion cited to the record to make clear 1 that the trial court had been very patient with Petitioner as he obtained several continuances 2 of trial, sought and obtained multiple changes of counsel, fully advising Petitioner on the 3 risks and consequences of representing himself, and warned Petitioner the court would not 4 brook further delay or gamesmanship. This Court shares the conclusion of the Arizona 5 Court of Appeals that on the record before it, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 6 denying Petitioner’s requests for continuance or for appointment of new counsel mid-trial, 7 after the state had rested, and after the warnings Petitioner had received. 8 Similarly, Judge Willett correctly concluded that Ground 6—the asserted Brady 9 violation arising from Deputy Evers’s conflicting statements about why no dash-cam 10 recordings of critical moments of his encounter with Petitioner were made—also fails on 11 its merits. As the Court of Appeals found, nothing in the record indicates undisclosed 12 exculpatory evidence was withheld from the jury, and evidence of Deputy Evers’s 13 inconsistent statements about why there was no recording, as well the results of the 14 investigation into his conduct and his resignation as the negative findings were coming out, 15 all were disclosed and the jury was aware of his potential reliability issues. The Arizona 16 court’s decisions on this issue are neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 17 federal law in the form of the Brady rule. 18 Judge Willett also correctly concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary 19 hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides that where a petitioner has failed to develop a 20 factual basis of a claim in state court proceedings, this Court cannot hold an evidentiary 21 hearing unless such claim rests upon a new and retroactive change to federal constitutional 22 law, or “a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the 23 exercise of due diligence.” Petitioner does not argue any change in constitutional law 24 underlies his potential claim. Rather he asserts new evidence, as noted in his filings of 25 judicial notice. But none of it meets the definition of new evidence, as discussed briefly 26 below, and Judge Willett’s conclusion that the record is adequately developed already is in 27 any event correct. 28 1 The Court also will deny as moot Petitioner’s first Motion to Stay (Doc. 25). 2 Petitioner sought the stay to allow the Arizona Court of Appeals to review the trial court’s 3 denial of his fifth petition for state PCR review. On December 12, 2023, that court granted 4 review but denied relief. The stay request is therefore moot. 5 While all of the above were pending, Petitioner filed another Motion for Stay 6 (Doc. 42), to which Respondents filed a Response in opposition (Doc. 45). The Court will 7 deny this motion as well. Petitioner asserts in his motion that he has discovered “new 8 evidence” discussed above, which justifies staying this matter or continuing it for a year. 9 In their Response, Respondents list several reasons why the motion is unsupported in 10 habeas law, to include that the evidence is not new and was available well before trial in 11 the state matter and that Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), does not authorize a stay, 12 The Court agrees. Moreover, were the Court to reach the merits, the purported ground upon 13 which Petitioner seeks the stay is futile. The “evidence” upon which Petitioner would 14 ground his claim is the absence of an affidavit that the car he was apprehended in by law 15 enforcement was stolen. A.R.S.

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Related

Rhines v. Weber
544 U.S. 269 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Smith v. Baldwin
510 F.3d 1127 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)

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Jackson 326394 v. Shinn, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jackson-326394-v-shinn-azd-2024.