Jackie B. Carr v. Dr. Kaye Stripling, General Superintendent of the Houston Independent School District, and the Board of Education of the Houston Independent School District

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 18, 2004
• Docket: 13-03-00248-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-03-248-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JACKIE B. CARR,                                                                       Appellant,

v.

DR. KAYE STRIPLING, GENERAL

SUPERINTENDENT OF THE

HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL

DISTRICT, AND THE BOARD OF

EDUCATION OF THE HOUSTON

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,                                         Appellees.

On appeal from the 11th District Court of Harris County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Hinojosa, Yañez, and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez

          In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, appellant, Jackie B. Carr (“Carr”), seeks reversal of the trial court’s order abating his case against appellees, Dr. Kaye Stripling, General Superintendent of the Houston Independent School District, and the Board of Education of the Houston Independent School District, pending Carr’s exhaustion of his administrative remedies pursuant to section 7.057 of the Texas Education Code. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057 (Vernon Supp. 2004). In three issues, Carr contends the trial court erred in abating his case because: (1) the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is inapplicable in this case; (2) he will suffer irreparable harm and lacks an adequate remedy at law; and (3) there are no questions of fact, but only a question of law concerning whether appellees deprived Carr of due process or exceeded their authority by punishing him after he was exonerated by the hearing examiner and after appellees adopted the hearing examiner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because we conclude appellant’s appeal is moot, we dismiss the appeal.

          On August 24, 2004, a decision was issued by the Designee of the Commissioner of Education in this matter. The letter accompanying the decision notes that the “decision is final unless a motion for rehearing is granted.” On September 10, 2004, Carr filed a motion for rehearing with the Commissioner of Education. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.146(a) (Vernon 2000). On October 8, 2004, the motion was overruled by operation of law. Id. § 2001.146(c). Thus, the decision became final on that date. Id. § 2001.144(a)(2)(B) (if motion for rehearing is filed in a contested case, a decision becomes final when motion is overruled by operation of law).

           We hold that Carr has exhausted his administrative remedies. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057 (Vernon Supp. 2004); Tex. Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.3d 88, 90 (Tex. 1992); Jones v. Clarksville Indep. Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2001, no pet.). The trial court’s order at issue in this appeal abates Carr’s action “pending the outcome of his appeal to the Commissioner of Education.” That decision is now final. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

                                                          LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ

                                                                    Justice

Memorandum opinion delivered and filed this

the 18th day of November, 2004.