UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jack Yvars
v. Case No. 24-cv-237-SE Opinion No. 2025 DNH 019 AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP
ORDER
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP terminated Jack Yvars in 2022 when he did not comply
with its mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. Yvars alleges that AstraZeneca violated his
rights under state and federal statute by discriminating against him based on his religion. He also
alleges that AstraZeneca wrongfully terminated him under New Hampshire common law and
improperly withheld his wages. AstraZeneca moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) on the basis that it fails to state a claim.
Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must
make factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if it pleads “factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
To test a complaint’s sufficiency, the court must first identify and disregard statements
that “merely offer ‘legal conclusions couched as fact’ or ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action.’” Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alterations omitted)). Second, the court must credit as true all nonconclusory factual allegations and the reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations,
and then determine if the claim is plausible. See id.
Background
Consistent with this standard of review, the following facts taken from the complaint are
assumed true. Yvars worked for AstraZeneca as a sales representative from October 17, 2011,
until April 29, 2022. In January 2022 during the COVID-19 pandemic, AstraZeneca issued a
mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. Under the policy, AstraZeneca said that it would fire
any employee who was not vaccinated against COVID-19 by a certain date, and had not received
a medical, religious, or otherwise applicable exemption. AstraZeneca required employees to
submit any exemption request by February 28, 2022.
On February 21, 2022, Yvars requested a religious exemption to the vaccination policy.
Yvars listed several reasons in support of his request, including because the COVID-19 vaccine
was either made or tested with aborted human fetal cells.
AstraZeneca denied Yvars’s exemption request in an email dated March 31, 2022. The
email gave Yvars until April 22, 2022, to receive his first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine. The
email added that if Yvars failed to do so, AstraZeneca would terminate his employment effective
April 29, 2022.
Yvars asked AstraZeneca to reconsider its decision. He also asked AstraZeneca to engage
in an interactive process to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs. AstraZeneca
responded that its decision regarding Yvars’s request was final.
Yvars declined to get vaccinated against COVID-19 by April 22, 2022. AstraZeneca
terminated his employment on April 29, 2022. This action followed.
2 Discussion
Yvars’s complaint includes five counts. The first three allege that AstraZeneca violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and New Hampshire
Revised Statute Annotated (“RSA”) § 354-A by discriminating against Yvars on the basis of his
religion: religious discrimination based on a failure to accommodate (Count I); retaliation based
on religion (Count II); and religious discrimination based on harassment/hostile work
environment (Count III). He also asserts a claim for wrongful discharge under New Hampshire
common law (Count IV), and a claim for wrongful withholding of wages in violation of RSA
275 (Count V).1
AstraZeneca moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. After AstraZeneca filed its
motion, Yvars voluntarily dismissed Counts II and III. Doc. no. 18. Also shortly after
AstraZeneca filed its motion, the First Circuit issued Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc.,
113 F.4th 9 (1st Cir. 2024). In that case, the First Circuit held that objections on the basis that
COVID-19 vaccines were “developed using fetal cell lines that originated from aborted fetuses”
were sufficient to plead a religious belief that conflicts with a vaccination policy for the purpose
of a Title VII religious discrimination claim at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 16. In light of
the Bazinet case, AstraZeneca’s reply withdrew its motion to dismiss as it pertains to Count I.
See doc. no. 14 at 1 n.1. Therefore, the court addresses AstraZeneca’s motion to dismiss as it
relates to Counts IV and V only.
1 Although Count V is titled “Wage Claim NH RSA 279 et seq.,” the allegations supporting that count reference RSA 275. See doc. no. 1-1, ¶ 81. AstraZeneca assumes in its motion to dismiss that Yvars intended to bring a wrongful withholding of wages claim under RSA 275 and moves to dismiss that claim. Yvars confirms in his objection that the reference to RSA 279 in his complaint was an error, and that he is asserting a claim under RSA 275 for the wrongful withholding of his wages. 3 I. Wrongful Discharge (Count IV)
Yvars alleges in Count IV that AstraZeneca wrongfully discharged him because of his
refusal to be vaccinated against COVID-19. A wrongful discharge claim under New Hampshire
law contains two elements: “(1) the employer terminated the [plaintiff’s] employment out of bad
faith, malice, or retaliation; and (2) the employer terminated the employment because the
employee performed acts that public policy would encourage or because she refused to perform
acts that public policy would condemn.” Donovan v. S. New Hampshire Univ., 175 N.H. 489,
492 (2022).
Under New Hampshire law, an “employer’s bad faith or malice may be established where
(i) an employee is discharged for pursuing policies condoned by the employer, (ii) the record
does not support the stated reason for the discharge, or (iii) disparate treatment was administered
to a similarly situated employee.” Hidalgo-Semlek v. Hansa Med., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 236, 268
(D.N.H. 2020) (quotations omitted). “Bad faith can also be discerned from the course of events
surrounding an employee’s discharge, ‘the manner in which the plaintiff was discharged,’ or
shifting reasons for an employee’s termination.” Id. (quoting Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 121 N.H. 915, 921 (1981)).
AstraZeneca makes several arguments in favor of dismissal, including that Yvars does
not allege that AstraZeneca fired him out of bad faith, malice, or retaliation. The court agrees
that the complaint contains no allegations that could satisfy this element of a wrongful discharge
claim. The complaint alleges that AstraZeneca implemented the vaccination policy, Yvars did
not comply with the policy and, as a result, AstraZeneca fired him. Yvars alleges no facts that
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Jack Yvars
v. Case No. 24-cv-237-SE Opinion No. 2025 DNH 019 AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP
ORDER
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP terminated Jack Yvars in 2022 when he did not comply
with its mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. Yvars alleges that AstraZeneca violated his
rights under state and federal statute by discriminating against him based on his religion. He also
alleges that AstraZeneca wrongfully terminated him under New Hampshire common law and
improperly withheld his wages. AstraZeneca moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) on the basis that it fails to state a claim.
Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must
make factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if it pleads “factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
To test a complaint’s sufficiency, the court must first identify and disregard statements
that “merely offer ‘legal conclusions couched as fact’ or ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action.’” Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alterations omitted)). Second, the court must credit as true all nonconclusory factual allegations and the reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations,
and then determine if the claim is plausible. See id.
Background
Consistent with this standard of review, the following facts taken from the complaint are
assumed true. Yvars worked for AstraZeneca as a sales representative from October 17, 2011,
until April 29, 2022. In January 2022 during the COVID-19 pandemic, AstraZeneca issued a
mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. Under the policy, AstraZeneca said that it would fire
any employee who was not vaccinated against COVID-19 by a certain date, and had not received
a medical, religious, or otherwise applicable exemption. AstraZeneca required employees to
submit any exemption request by February 28, 2022.
On February 21, 2022, Yvars requested a religious exemption to the vaccination policy.
Yvars listed several reasons in support of his request, including because the COVID-19 vaccine
was either made or tested with aborted human fetal cells.
AstraZeneca denied Yvars’s exemption request in an email dated March 31, 2022. The
email gave Yvars until April 22, 2022, to receive his first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine. The
email added that if Yvars failed to do so, AstraZeneca would terminate his employment effective
April 29, 2022.
Yvars asked AstraZeneca to reconsider its decision. He also asked AstraZeneca to engage
in an interactive process to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs. AstraZeneca
responded that its decision regarding Yvars’s request was final.
Yvars declined to get vaccinated against COVID-19 by April 22, 2022. AstraZeneca
terminated his employment on April 29, 2022. This action followed.
2 Discussion
Yvars’s complaint includes five counts. The first three allege that AstraZeneca violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and New Hampshire
Revised Statute Annotated (“RSA”) § 354-A by discriminating against Yvars on the basis of his
religion: religious discrimination based on a failure to accommodate (Count I); retaliation based
on religion (Count II); and religious discrimination based on harassment/hostile work
environment (Count III). He also asserts a claim for wrongful discharge under New Hampshire
common law (Count IV), and a claim for wrongful withholding of wages in violation of RSA
275 (Count V).1
AstraZeneca moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. After AstraZeneca filed its
motion, Yvars voluntarily dismissed Counts II and III. Doc. no. 18. Also shortly after
AstraZeneca filed its motion, the First Circuit issued Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc.,
113 F.4th 9 (1st Cir. 2024). In that case, the First Circuit held that objections on the basis that
COVID-19 vaccines were “developed using fetal cell lines that originated from aborted fetuses”
were sufficient to plead a religious belief that conflicts with a vaccination policy for the purpose
of a Title VII religious discrimination claim at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 16. In light of
the Bazinet case, AstraZeneca’s reply withdrew its motion to dismiss as it pertains to Count I.
See doc. no. 14 at 1 n.1. Therefore, the court addresses AstraZeneca’s motion to dismiss as it
relates to Counts IV and V only.
1 Although Count V is titled “Wage Claim NH RSA 279 et seq.,” the allegations supporting that count reference RSA 275. See doc. no. 1-1, ¶ 81. AstraZeneca assumes in its motion to dismiss that Yvars intended to bring a wrongful withholding of wages claim under RSA 275 and moves to dismiss that claim. Yvars confirms in his objection that the reference to RSA 279 in his complaint was an error, and that he is asserting a claim under RSA 275 for the wrongful withholding of his wages. 3 I. Wrongful Discharge (Count IV)
Yvars alleges in Count IV that AstraZeneca wrongfully discharged him because of his
refusal to be vaccinated against COVID-19. A wrongful discharge claim under New Hampshire
law contains two elements: “(1) the employer terminated the [plaintiff’s] employment out of bad
faith, malice, or retaliation; and (2) the employer terminated the employment because the
employee performed acts that public policy would encourage or because she refused to perform
acts that public policy would condemn.” Donovan v. S. New Hampshire Univ., 175 N.H. 489,
492 (2022).
Under New Hampshire law, an “employer’s bad faith or malice may be established where
(i) an employee is discharged for pursuing policies condoned by the employer, (ii) the record
does not support the stated reason for the discharge, or (iii) disparate treatment was administered
to a similarly situated employee.” Hidalgo-Semlek v. Hansa Med., Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 236, 268
(D.N.H. 2020) (quotations omitted). “Bad faith can also be discerned from the course of events
surrounding an employee’s discharge, ‘the manner in which the plaintiff was discharged,’ or
shifting reasons for an employee’s termination.” Id. (quoting Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 121 N.H. 915, 921 (1981)).
AstraZeneca makes several arguments in favor of dismissal, including that Yvars does
not allege that AstraZeneca fired him out of bad faith, malice, or retaliation. The court agrees
that the complaint contains no allegations that could satisfy this element of a wrongful discharge
claim. The complaint alleges that AstraZeneca implemented the vaccination policy, Yvars did
not comply with the policy and, as a result, AstraZeneca fired him. Yvars alleges no facts that
could allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that his termination was motivated by bad
faith, malice, or retaliation.
4 Yvars has not sufficiently alleged the first element of a wrongful discharge claim and
AstraZeneca is therefore entitled to dismissal of that claim. Because Yvars does not sufficiently
allege the first element of the claim, the court does not address AstraZeneca’s other arguments in
favor of dismissal.
II. Wrongful Withholding of Wages (Count V)
Yvars alleges that AstraZeneca violated RSA 275:48 when it fired him without paying
him an $8,000 bonus that he had earned prior to his termination. RSA 275:48, “generally
speaking, prohibits employers from withholding or diverting any portion of an employee’s wages
unless authorized by law or by written agreement of the employee.” Camp v. Bimbo Bakeries
USA, Inc., No. 18-CV-378-SM, 2018 WL 6606243, at *4 (D.N.H. Dec. 17, 2018).
AstraZeneca argues that the wage claim should be dismissed because the allegations
supporting the claim are conclusory. It argues that Yvars does not allege any basis for his
entitlement to a quarterly bonus or any details regarding the bonus program. Yvars is not
required to include such detail at this stage. Accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations
in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in Yvars’s favor, Yvars alleges that he
was due an $8,000 quarterly bonus that AstraZeneca withheld without a proper basis. Therefore,
the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to make out a claim for the wrongful withholding
of wages. Whether Yvars has any evidentiary support for his allegations is a separate issue, one
that is better addressed in a motion for summary judgment.
5 Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint (doc. no. 4) is
granted as to Count IV and is otherwise denied.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________ Samantha D. Elliott United States District Judge February 19, 2025
cc: Counsel of Record