STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
CA 18-176 consolidated with CA 18-169
ELLIS JACK, JR.
VERSUS
CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 20072494 HONORABLE SHARON D. WILSON, DISTRICT JUDGE
SYLVIA R. COOKS JUDGE
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John D. Saunders, and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
Pickett, J., concurs for the reasons assigned in 18-169, Bowling v. CITGO Petroleum Corp.
Robert E. Landry Patrick D. Gallaugher Kevin P. Fontenot Scofield, Gerard, Pohorelsky, Gallaugher & Landry 901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 900 Lake Charles, LA 70601 (337) 433-9436 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Citgo Petroleum Corporation Craig Isenberg Kyle W. Siegel Joshua O. Cox Barrasso Usdin Kupperman Freeman & Sarver, LLC 909 Poydras, 24th Floor New Orleans, LA 70112 (504) 589-9700 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Citgo Petroleum Corporation
Wells T. Watson Jake D. Buford Baggett, McCall, Burgess, Watson & Gaughan P. O. Drawer 7820 Lake Charles, LA 70606-7820 (337) 478-8888 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Ellis Jack, Jr.
Richard Elliott Wilson Somer G. Brown Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, LLC 723 Broad Street Lake Charles, LA 70601 (337) 436-6611 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Ellis Jack, Jr. COOKS, Judge.
For the reasons assigned by this court in Bowling v. CITGO Petroleum Corp.,
18-169 (La.App. 3 Cir. __/__/__), ___ So.3d ___, the judgment of the trial court
finding the damages alleged by Ellis Jack, Jr. were caused by the air release and/or
slop oil is reversed, as are the damages in the amount of $27,700.00 awarded to Mr.
Jack.
REVERSED AND RENDERED. STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
CA 18-169 consolidated with CA 18-170, CA 18-171, CA 18-172, CA 18-173, CA 18-174, CA 18-175, CA 18-176, & CA 18-179
PATRICK BOWLING, ET AL.
Pickett, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written reasons.
A court of appeal will not set aside the findings of fact of a trial court unless
it determines the trial court’s finding were manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.
Stobart v. State, through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). In reviewing the entire
record, the appellate court must find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for
the trial court’s finding and that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous)
in order to reverse a trial court finding based on factual determinations. Mart v. Hill,
505 So.2d 1120 (La.1987). When reviewing an issue of law, though, we review the
record de novo to determine if the trial court’s legal conclusions are correct, without
deference to the trial court’s findings. Foti v. Holliday, 09-93 (La. 10/30/09), 27
So.3d 813.
Causation
CITGO argues that nine plaintiffs failed to prove that their injuries were
caused by exposure to either slop oil or the air release. In addition to specific
arguments about each of the nine plaintiffs, CITGO re-urges the argument it made
unsuccessfully in Bradford v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 17-296 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1/10/18), 237 So.3d 648, writ denied, 18-272 (La. 5/11/18), namely that expert
testimony is required to prove both general causation and specific causation in a
toxic tort case. “General causation” refers to whether a toxic substance can cause a
particular harm in the general population, while “specific causation” refers to
whether the toxic substance caused a specific person’s injury or condition. Knight 1 v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2007). This court rejected
that argument. See Bradford, 237 So.3d at 659-660. The panel in Bradford found
that while expert testimony is required to prove causation, it is sufficient that there
is expert testimony to prove general causation and medical testimony to establish
specific causation. I agree with that conclusion.
Dr. Barry Levy, a physician and epidemiologist, testified via deposition to
establish general causation in this case, as he has done in numerous previous CITGO
cases. Frank Parker, an industrial hygienist, also testified via deposition to establish
general causation. Dr. Steve Springer, a family medicine doctor, testified as to the
specific causation of each of the twenty-six plaintiffs in this case. This court went
on in Bradford, though, to evaluate not only the medical testimony as to specific
causation, but also the circumstances of the exposure as related by individual
plaintiffs and evidence as to the spread of the oil slop from CITGO in the days
following the release. Keeping in mind these principles, my review of the evidence
provided in this case leads me to a different conclusion than the majority regarding
five of the plaintiffs about whether these plaintiffs met their burden of proving
specific causation.
The Louisiana Pigment Employees
Mr. Doucet, Ms. McZeal, Mr. Mumford, and Mr. Smith were employees of
Louisiana Pigment Company when they claim they were exposed to chemicals
released from CITGO. Louisiana Pigment is located to the northeast of the CITGO
plant. To support their claim of exposure, these plaintiffs rely on Mr. Parker’s
opinion about the amount of hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide released from
CITGO’s stacks, and a chart purporting to show the wind direction at the time of the
thirteen-hour release, beginning at 3 a.m. on June 19, 2006. We note that the map
and wind direction chart introduced in the record in this case, exhibit seven to Mr.
Parker’s deposition, has print so small as to be illegible. Further, Mr. Parker’s
2 testimony indicates that the map is color-coded, yet the copy introduced into the
record before us is black and white. Thus, we can rely on Mr. Parker’s testimony
that the wind was generally calm on June 19, 2006, and when it did blow it went
from the southeast to the northwest. Exhibit 8 to Mr. Parker’s deposition shows the
911 calls made that day, with most of the calls made within a mile radius of CITGO
and to the northwest of the facility. Mr. Parker testified that there were no calls from
the northeast of CITGO. Mr. Parker also testified that employees of Firestone
Polymers, a company directly across the street from CITGO, were exposed to the air
release. See Albarado v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 17-823 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/16/18),
247 So.3d 818, where the plaintiffs were employees of Firestone Polymers.
The plaintiffs’ brief argues that a plaintiff in Bradford, Clara Espree, was east
of Louisiana Pigment when she was found to have been exposed to the air release.
The majority relies on this allegation in reaching its conclusion pertaining to
causation. Ms. Espree’s location is not in the trial court record before us, and
because in issues of fact we are confined to the evidence entered in the record before
us, the majority improperly considered her location in this appeal. The specific
testimony of these four plaintiffs, and of Dr. Springer about each of these four
plaintiffs, must be examined to determine if there is sufficient evidence in this record
to support the judgment of the trial court.
Albert Doucet, Jr.
Mr. Doucet testified that he was an operator at Louisiana Pigment in June
2006. Mr. Doucet testified that he was on break and remembered a strong smell. He
did not remember specifically what day his exposure occurred. He remembers his
eyes burning and his throat burning. He claimed at the trial that he still had
headaches that would come and go. While he testified that he saw his personal
doctor for his symptoms, there were no records of this appointment and Mr. Doucet
does not remember when this appointment occurred. Mr. Doucet did not see any oil
3 or come in contact with any oil. Mr. Doucet did not receive any documented
treatment for his injuries related to the exposure until he saw Dr. Springer on January
22, 2007.
Dr. Springer testified that Mr. Doucet suffered several days of eye pain, sore
throat, nausea, and sinus irritation from exposure to chemicals, and approximately
seven months of increased headaches related to exposure of either slop oil or
hydrogen sulfide. Dr. Springer did not have an opinion on whether Mr. Doucet was
exposed to slop oil or the air release.
The trial court found that Mr. Doucet was exposed to the air release. I find
manifest error in that conclusion. There is no evidence in the record to show what
day Mr. Doucet smelled the strong odor which allegedly caused his injuries. There
is no contemporaneous record of Mr. Doucet seeking medical treatment for these
injuries at the time he suffered them. There is no evidence he was actually at work
on the day of the release. I would reverse the trial court’s finding that Mr. Doucet’s
injuries are related to exposure to the air release from CITGO. I would also reverse
the damages awarded to Mr. Doucet.
Debra McZeal
Ms. McZeal testified that she was at work at Louisiana Pigment on the day of
the release. She was on a break outside when she noticed a strong smell. Her eyes
started burning, her throat hurt, and she became nauseated. She retreated inside. She
never saw any oil on the water or came in contact with oil. Dr. Springer treated Ms.
McZeal for her injuries in August 2006. At the time of the trial, she had forgotten
about her exposure in June 2006.
Dr. Springer testified that in his medical opinion, one to two days of nausea,
sore throat, and eye burning, and nine months of headaches, sinus congestion, and
pain related to sinus congestion were caused by Ms. McZeal’s exposure to chemicals
4 from CITGO. Dr. Springer testified that he did not know the details of Ms. McZeal’s
exposure, except that she was at Louisiana Pigment at the time.
While the evidence is paltry, the fact that Ms. McZeal testified that she was at
Louisiana Pigment “on the day of the release” constitutes sufficient evidence for the
trial court to determine that she was exposed on June 19, 2006. Thus, I concur with
the majority that there is no manifest error in the trial court’s conclusion that Ms.
McZeal was exposed to the air release on June 19, 2006.
Tommy Mumford
Mr. Mumford testified that he was working at Louisiana Pigment on the day
of the release. Mr. Mumford noticed a distinct smell, and he recalled his supervisor
instructing him to make sure it was not emanating from their site. He suffered some
nausea, a little eye irritation, and some sinus issues as a result of the exposure. He
did not come in contact with any oil or see any oil. He admitted that he had sinus
trouble before the exposure that was irritated by the exposure. He did not seek
medical treatment for the symptoms related to his alleged exposure.
Dr. Springer testified that he believed Mr. Mumford suffered several days of
nausea, nosebleeds, and other sinus issues and more than three months of headaches
as a result of exposure to chemicals released by CITGO. He testified that he never
examined Mr. Mumford, though he was around when Mr. Mumford went to his
office for a Pulmonary Function Test. His opinion did not include the specific
exposure, slop oil or air release, to which Mr. Mumford was exposed.
The trial court found that Mr. Mumford was exposed to the slop oil and the
air release. I concur with the majority’s conclusion it was manifestly erroneous for
the trial court to conclude that Mr. Mumford was exposed to the slop oil.
Nevertheless, I agree there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that he was
exposed to the air release.
5 John Smith
Mr. Smith did not smell anything out of the ordinary on the day he claims he
was exposed to the chemicals released from CITGO. He only came to believe he
was exposed when it became a topic of conversation at the plant. At that point, he
got concerned and contacted a law firm. He claimed to have no symptoms that lasted
more than a few days. Nevertheless, Dr. Springer testified that, in addition to three
days of diarrhea and one to two days of nosebleed and eye irritation, Mr. Smith
suffered nine months of skin irritation as a result of exposure. Dr. Springer clarified
that the skin irritation would only be caused by exposure to slop oil, not to the air
release. Dr. Springer also testified that he does not know if Mr. Smith was exposed
to the slop oil or to the air release.
I find manifest error in the trial court’s conclusion that Mr. Smith was exposed
to the air release or to slop oil. Mr. Smith, by his own admission, cannot recall his
exposure. I concur with the majority that there is no evidence that he was exposed
to slop oil. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court finding Mr. Smith’s
injuries were caused by CITGO, as well as the award of damages to Mr. Smith.
Leslie Mouton
I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that Ms. Mouton was exposed to the air release.
Yvonne Glasgo and Ricky Matthews
CITGO argues that there is no evidence that the slop oil from CITGO reached
the 210 beach, which was 3.6 miles upriver from CITGO, by June 20, 2006. The
plaintiffs argue that this court, in Bradford, affirmed a judgment finding that four
attendees of the Richard family event were exposed to slop oil, and Ms. Glasgo and
Mr. Matthews were at the same Richard family event. They argue the findings of
fact in Bradford constitute sufficient proof of exposure in this case. I disagree.
6 The plaintiffs, through their brief, reference findings of fact in Bradford which
they argue support the trial court’s findings of causation in this case. Proof of a fact
in one lawsuit does not constitute proof of a fact in a totally separate suit. This court
is confined to a review of the record before us as to a review of causation. The
plaintiff must provide proof in this record that harm suffered by the plaintiffs before
us was caused by the named defendant. Causation cannot be presumed. While a
factual issue may be common to two suits, a court’s factual determination in a suit
involving one person is not res judicata or binding in another suit involving a
different party or parties. State, through Dept. of Highways, 215 So.2d 142 (La.App.
3 Cir. 1968), citing Knighten v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 121 So.2d 344 (La.App. 1
Cir. 1960); see also La.R.S. 13:4231 (“a valid and final judgment is conclusive
between the same parties”).
According to Harvey Yee, an employee of CITGO who was on the internal
team who investigated the events of June 19, 2006, the release of slop oil into the
Indian Marais, a navigable channel that flows into the Calcasieu River and is
adjacent to the CITGO facility, occurred between 4:45 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on June
19, 2006. According to a timeline attached to the deposition of Darryl O’Bryant,
despite efforts to contain the spill by deploying booms, the evidence in the record
before us shows that the first time there was a report of slop oil in the Calcasieu
River was at 7:50 p.m. on June 20, 2006. This was several hours after Ms. Glasgo
and Mr. Matthews claim to have been exposed at the 210 beach. There is no credible
evidence to suggest that the slop oil traveled 3.6 miles upriver to the 210 beach
during the daytime hours. The slop oil had to travel upriver to reach the beach. The
only evidence in the record before us is that it reached the river late on that same
day. Notably, Mr. Parker, when asked in his deposition, testified that he had no
opinion about whether the slop oil reached the 210 beach on June 20, 2006. In fact,
7 the only evidence before us is that it was not possible for the slop oil to have reached
the beach at the time the plaintiffs say they were there.
The plaintiffs point to no evidence that the slop oil reached that location
except Dr. Springer’s testimony that “The court in Bradford v. CITGO established
that the Richards and Ms. Glasgo were at the 210 beach on June 20th and that the oil
had reached that area by that time.” Dr. Springer clearly solely relied on a court
ruling in another case to conclude exposure, not any medical finding. This circular
logic does not constitute proof of a tort. Unlike Angelina Richard in Bradford, there
is no contemporaneous visit to the doctor to complain of symptoms. In fact, Ms.
Glasgo went to the emergency room on June 22, 2006, complaining of boils on her
skin, but did not make any mention of exposure to slop oil. Her first complaint of
symptoms was when she saw Dr. Arimura in August 2006. Mr. Matthews first saw
a physician for symptoms he alleged were related to the CITGO release of slop oil
in September 2006. Mr. Matthews was also unclear on whether he was at the beach
on June 19 or June 20. Mr. Matthews’ records from Dr. Arimura’s office state he
was exposed to benzene a week after the June 19 or 20 exposure.
Given that there is no evidence in the record that the slop oil from CITGO
reached the 210 beach by June 20, 2006, and in fact the evidence reflects it could
not have, Yvonne Glasgo and Ricky Matthews failed to meet their burden of proving
exposure to CITGO slop oil. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court to the
contrary and the award of damages to Ms. Glasgo and Mr. Matthews.
Odelia Dowling
Ms. Dowling died before the trial of this matter, and before her deposition
could be taken. The only evidence of her is exposure is her statement to Dr. Jason
Morris on July 31, 2006, complaining of headaches, severe sinus congestion, severe
post nasal drainage, a dry cough, and an upset stomach with intermittent bouts of
diarrhea for five weeks. She told Dr. Morris that she delivered lunch to her
8 daughter’s fiancée on June 20, 2006. Dr. Springer, who did not examine Ms.
Dowling, opined that her symptoms were related to exposure of chemicals from
CITGO. The trial court found she was exposed to the air release from CITGO and
that exposure caused her injuries. It is undisputed, however, that the air release
ended on the afternoon of June 19, 2006. The air release had completely ceased
twenty hours before she was at the plant. I would find that the trial court committed
manifest error in finding Ms. Dowling was exposed to the air release and in awarding
damages to Ms. Dowling.
Ellis Jack
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Jack failed to prove causation
and with the reversal of the award of damages to Mr. Jack.
General damages for future injury
For the reasons assigned by the majority, I concur in the reversal of the award
for general damages for fear of future injury to Leslie Mouton, Donald Mouton,
Ebony Mouton Jack, John Thibodeaux, Tommy Mumford, Michael Colletta, and
Ellis Jack. Because I find that Albert Doucet, John Smith, Ricky Matthews, and
Yvonne Glasgo failed to prove exposure as outlined above, I would also reverse their
awards for fear of future injury.
General damages for fear loss of enjoyment of life
In its third assignment of error, CITGO argues that the loss of enjoyment of
life damages to twenty-four of the twenty-six plaintiffs are unsupported by the
evidence. The awards for loss of enjoyment of life to Mr. L’Hoste and Mr.
Lambright are not challenged in this assignment of error. CITGO argues that the
testimony of the remaining plaintiffs does not show that the exposure to chemicals
resulted in “detrimental alterations of a person’s life or lifestyle or a person’s
inability to participate in the activities or pleasures of life that were formerly
9 enjoyed.” McGee v. A C and S, Inc., 05-1036, p. 3 (La. 7/10/06), 933 So.2d 770,
774. In the plaintiffs’ brief, they argue that these twenty-four plaintiffs testified
about the symptoms that they suffered from as a result of their exposure to CITGO’s
release of chemicals, that they continued to live and work while suffering with these
maladies, and that the trial court properly found they suffered a disruption in their
normal quality of life. The plaintiffs also argue that it was wholly appropriate for
the trial court to make general damage awards for both pain and suffering and loss
of enjoyment of life, citing McGee. CITGO concedes that distinct general damage
awards for ‘pain and suffering’ and ‘loss of enjoyment of life’ are appropriate, but
only when there is sufficient proof to support each type of loss.
In McGee, 933 So.2d 770, 774-75, the supreme court recognized loss of
enjoyment of life as an element of general damages, stating:
La. C.C. art. 2315 authorizes a tort victim to be compensated for the damage sustained as a result of the delict, including those for loss of enjoyment of life, if proven. Moreover, this court has clearly defined general damages to include loss of enjoyment of life. Consequently, loss of enjoyment of life is a compensable component of general damages under both La. C.C. art. 2315 and this court’s existing definition of general damages. Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether loss of enjoyment of life may be separated from other elements of general damages, such as mental and physical pain and suffering, and whether that separation may be reflected by having a line for loss of enjoyment of life on a jury verdict form. See Joseph v. Broussard Rice Mill, Inc., 00-0628, p. 1 (La.10/30/00), 772 So.2d 94, 106-107 (Victory, J., assigning additional reasons) (stating “this Court has never squarely addressed the issue of awarding hedonic damages for loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages”).
As established above, loss of enjoyment of life is a component of general damages and therefore loss of enjoyment of life is not separate and distinct from general damages. Nevertheless, general damages in Louisiana are routinely dissected. Courts commonly list different elements of general damages, including mental anguish and physical pain and suffering, both past and future, separately. In addition, general damages for permanent scarring and/or disfigurement are often listed separately. See, e.g., Joseph, 00-0628 at p. 17 (La.10/30/00), 772 So.2d at 106-107, n. 6; Degruise v. Houma Courier Newspaper Corp., 95-1862, p. 9 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 689, 694. Thus, allowing a separate award for loss of enjoyment of life would not offend the existing concept of general damages and would reflect the accepted method of listing elements of general damages separately.
10 Moreover, loss of enjoyment of life is conceptually distinct from other components of general damages, including pain and suffering. Pain and suffering, both physical and mental, refers to the pain, discomfort, inconvenience, anguish, and emotional trauma that accompanies an injury. Loss of enjoyment of life, in comparison, refers to detrimental alterations of the person’s life or lifestyle or the person’s inability to participate in the activities or pleasures of life that were formerly enjoyed prior to the injury. In contrast to pain and suffering, whether or not a plaintiff experiences a detrimental lifestyle change depends on both the nature and severity of the injury and the lifestyle of the plaintiff prior to the injury.
This court, citing McGee, recently explained that a factfinder must consider
the nature and severity of the injury to the plaintiff and the lifestyle he enjoyed prior
to the injury when determining whether he sustained a loss of enjoyment of life.
Minton v. GEICO Casualty Co., 16-592 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/8/17), 215 So.3d 290. The
trial court, in its written reasons for judgment, stated that each of the plaintiffs
“suffered an interruption of his normal quality of life.”
This court awarded damages of $30,000.00 for loss of enjoyment of life to a
plaintiff who, as a result of injuries suffered in a car accident, could not care for her
aged mother, needed her son’s help in doing household chores, and could no longer
participate in activities she enjoyed, particularly dancing and running. Clement v.
Citron, 13-63 (La.App. 6/19/13), 115 So.3d 1260. In Minton, 215 So.3d 290, this
court awarded $75,000.00 for loss of enjoyment of life damages for a plaintiff who
could no longer umpire or bowl as a result of his injuries, and whose activities with
his grandchildren and at church were limited. In Stutes v. Greenwood Motor Lines,
Inc., 17-52, 17-567, 17-568 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/22/17), 234 So.2d 75, this court
affirmed an award of $6,000,000.00 for loss of enjoyment of life damages to a
plaintiff rendered a paraplegic when a tractor-trailer crossed the center line and
collided with his vehicle. Mr. Stutes introduced evidence that he needed assistance
with his bodily functions, had little privacy, and he can no longer dress or feed
himself. He also testified that he enjoyed hunting, fishing, gardening, and
11 woodworking before the accident. He also expressed sadness that he would not be
able to play with his expected grandchild as he would have had he not been injured.
Each of the plaintiffs in these three cases introduced evidence to support the award
of damages for loss of enjoyment of life.
In this case, there was testimony from each of the plaintiffs about their pain
and suffering related to their exposure to chemicals released by CITGO, as outlined
by the majority. The trial court granted damages for pain and suffering. We can
find no evidence, testimonial or documentary, to show how any one of the plaintiffs
suffered a detrimental change in their lifestyle. There was no evidence adduced that
any plaintiff was unable to perform any task or enjoy any pleasure or any activity
before June 19, 2006, that they could not perform after their exposure to the chemical
released by CITGO. In fact, what evidence that was elicited from plaintiffs shows
that they did not suffer any damages related to a loss of enjoyment of life. Several
plaintiffs testified that they did not miss any work because of their exposure. Only
three plaintiffs specifically testified about potential loss of enjoyment of life
damages. Mr. Mumford testified under cross-examination that his exposure to slop
oil fumes did not interfere with daily activities outside of work. Ms. Glasgo, whose
damages we reverse because she failed to prove causation, testified under cross-
examination that her symptoms did not prevent her from doing any hobbies or
activities. This testimony does not support a finding that these two plaintiffs are
entitled to damages for loss of enjoyment of life. Mr. Daigle, during redirect
examination, testified that his headaches and sinus issues for one or two months had
a major impact on his life, but he did not say how. Mr. Crewell, in a deposition
taken before he died, stated that he missed one day of work because of a migraine
headache approximately six weeks after the exposure. This testimony, given the
lack of specific details about how either of these men’s lives were affected, is
insufficient to support an award for loss of enjoyment of life damages.
12 I would find that of those plaintiffs who proved exposure to either the CITGO
release of slop oil or of hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide, the evidence presented
in this record supports the claims for pain and suffering awarded to the plaintiffs.
However, I find those plaintiffs failed to prove entitlement to damages for loss of
enjoyment of life, and the trial court erred in making an award for loss of enjoyment
of life damages. Thus, I would reverse the following monetary awards: in docket
number 18-169, to Mr. Bowling, $10,000.00; to Mr. Colletta, $5,000.00; to Mr.
Crewell, $10,000.00; to Mr. Daigle, $3,500.00; to Mr. Forsyth, $3,000.00; to Mr.
Judice, $5,000.00; to Mr. Martin, $4,000.00; to Mr. McCoy, $10,000.00; to Mr.
Paggen, $5,000.00; to Mr. Spikes, $3,500.00; to Mr. Timpa, $10,000.00; to Mr.
Young, $10,000.00; in docket number 18-170, to Mr. Mouton, $3,500.00; to Ms.
Jack, $5,000.00; in docket number 18-173, to Ms. Mouton, $3,500.00; in docket
number 18-174, to Mr. Thibodeaux, $5,000.00; and in docket number 18-179, to Ms.
McZeal, $10,000.00 and to Mr. Mumford, $5,000.00.
CONCLUSION
As it relates to the plaintiffs in docket number 18-169, I concur that the
judgment of the trial court awarding $10,000.00 to Michael Colletta for general
damages for fear of developing disease should be reversed. I dissent from the
majority opinion and would reverse the judgment of the trial court awarding
$10,000.00 to Patrick Bowling, $5,000.00 to Mr. Colletta, $10,000.00 to Michael
Crewell, $3,500.00 to Dustin Daigle, $3,000.00 to Zachary Forsyth, $5,000.00 to
Chris Judice, $4,000.00 to Larry Martin, $10,000.00 to Richard McCoy, $5,000.00
to Robert Paggen, $3,500.00 to Corey Spikes, and $10,000.00 to Alton Young for
general damages for loss of enjoyment of life. I would amend Mr. Timpa’s damage
award to $43,350.00. In all other respects, the I concur that judgment of the trial
court in docket number 18-169 should be affirmed.
13 As it relates to the plaintiffs in docket number 18-170, I concur with the
majority that the judgment of the trial court awarding $10,000.00 to Donald Mouton
and $10,000.00 to Ebony Mouton Jack for general damages for fear of developing
disease should be reversed. I dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse
the judgment of the trial court awarding $3,500.00 to Mr. Mouton and $5,000.00 to
Ms. Jack for general damages for loss of enjoyment of life. In all other respects, I
concur that the judgment of the trial court in docket number 18-170 should be
affirmed.
As it relates to the plaintiff in docket number 18-171, I dissent from the
majority opinion and would reverse the judgment of the trial court finding the
damages alleged by Odelia Dowling were caused by the release of hydrogen sulfide
or sulfur dioxide into the air by CITGO and would reverse the damages in the amount
of $13,200.00 awarded to Ms. Dowling.
As it relates to the plaintiff in docket number 18-172, I dissent from the
majority opinion and would reverse the judgment of the trial court finding the
damages alleged by Ricky Matthews were caused by exposure to slop oil released
by CITGO and would reverse the damages in the amount of $45,732.00 awarded to
Mr. Matthews.
As it relates to the plaintiff in docket number 18-173, I concur in the opinion
of the majority that the judgment of the trial court finding Leslie Mouton’s damages
were caused by exposure to hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide released into the air
by CITGO. I agree that the judgment of the trial court awarding $10,000.00 to Ms.
Mouton for fear of developing disease should be reversed. I dissent from the
majority opinion and would reverse the judgment of the trial court awarding
$3,500.00 to Ms. Mouton for general damages for loss of enjoyment of life. In all
other respects, I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
14 As it relates to the plaintiff in docket number 18-174, I agree that the judgment
of the trial court awarding $10,000.00 to John Thibodeaux for fear of developing
disease should be reversed. I dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse
the judgment of the trial court awarding $5,000.00 to Mr. Thibodeaux for general
damages for loss of enjoyment of life. In all other respects, I agree that the judgment
of the trial court should be affirmed.
As it relates to the plaintiff in docket number 18-175, I dissent from the
majority opinion and would reverse the judgment of the trial court finding the
damages alleged by Yvonne Glasgo were caused by exposure to slop oil released by
CITGO and would reverse the damages in the amount of $23,925.00 awarded to Ms.
Glasgo.
As it relates to the plaintiff in docket number 18-176, I agree with the majority
that the judgment of the trial court finding the damages alleged by Ellis Jack, Jr.
were caused by exposure to hydrogen sulfide or sulfur dioxide released into the air
by CITGO should be reversed, as well as the damages in the amount of $27,700.00
awarded to Mr. Jack.
As it relates to the plaintiffs in docket number 18-179, I dissent from the
majority and would reverse the judgment of the trial court finding the damages
alleged by Albert Doucet, Jr. were caused by exposure to hydrogen sulfide or sulfur
dioxide released into the air by CITGO and the damages in the amount of $35,450.00
awarded to Mr. Doucet. I dissent from the majority and would reverse the judgment
of the trial court finding the damages alleged by John Smith were causes by exposure
to the air release by CITGO or to slop oil released by CITGO and the damages in
the amount of $45,459.00 awarded to Mr. Smith. I concur that the judgment of the
trial court finding Debra McZeal’s damages were caused by exposure to hydrogen
sulfide and sulfur dioxide released into the air by CITGO should be affirmed. I
dissent from the majority and would reverse the judgment of the trial court awarding
15 $10,000.00 to Ms. McZeal for general damages for loss of enjoyment of life. I
concur with the majority in affirming the judgment of the trial court finding Tommy
Mumford’s damages were caused by exposure to hydrogen sulfide and sulfur
dioxide released into the air by CITGO but the trial court’s finding that Mr.
Mumford’s damages were caused by exposure to slop oil released by CITGO should
be reversed. I agree with the majority opinion that the judgment of the trial court
awarding $10,000.00 to Mr. Mumford for general damages for fear of developing
disease should be reversed. I dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse
the judgment of the trial court awarding $5,000.00 to Mr. Mumford for general
damages for loss of enjoyment of life. In all other respects, I would find the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.