IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0960 Filed April 6, 2016
JACK COOPER TRANSPORT CO., INC., and CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CO., Petitioners-Appellants,
vs.
BRUCE JONES, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson,
Judge.
Petitioners appeal the district court ruling affirming the workers’
compensation commissioner’s decision respondent was permanently and totally
disabled. AFFIRMED.
Kent M. Smith of Scheldrup Blades, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Jean Mauss of Schott Mauss & Associates, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ. 2
BOWER, Judge.
Petitioners Jack Cooper Transport Company, Inc. and California
Insurance Company1 appeal the district court ruling affirming the workers’
compensation commissioner’s decision respondent Bruce Jones was
permanently and totally disabled. We find there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the commissioner’s finding Jones sustained permanent
impairment due to an injury on December 6, 2009. We also find the
commissioner’s finding Jones was permanently and totally disabled is not
irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. We affirm the ruling of the district court.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Jones, who was fifty-eight years old at the time of the administrative
hearing, had been employed as a truck driver since 1976. Jones injured his back
on June 19, 2006. An MRI showed a disc herniation compression at the L5 level,
and Jones had back surgery on August 25, 2006. He continued to have back
pain, but was able to return to work without limitations. Jones also sustained a
back injury on April 23, 2009. An MRI at that time revealed a lumbar disc
herniation at the left L3-4 level. He had surgery for this injury on June 15, 2009.
Again, Jones was able to return to work without limitations.
This case involves an injury which occurred on December 6, 2009. Jones
was lifting a skid and felt severe pain in his back. Dr. John Larson examined
Jones on December 23, 2009, and determined the pain appeared to be at the L4-
5 level. Dr. Alexander Bailey examined an MRI and found evidence of
degenerative disc disease at L4-5 and L5-S1, stating “disc bulging is present, but
1 We will refer to these two companies together as the employer. 3
no gross evidence of recurrent disc herniation, spinal stenosis, foraminal stenosis
or other.” Dr. Yuri Tsirulnikov stated the MRI may provide an explanation for
Jones’s pain. Dr. John Ciccarelli found Jones had burning sensations across his
low back and right buttocks area, which were not present when he returned to
work in October 2009. Dr. David Boarini stated he did not believe Jones had any
significant structural abnormality or permanent problem caused by the
December 6, 2009 injury.
Jones had an independent medical examination with Dr. Brent Koprivica,
who determined Jones should be restricted from any squatting, crawling,
kneeling, or climbing. Dr. Koprivica stated Jones could occasionally lift or carry
from twenty up to thirty-five pounds. He stated Jones should avoid frequent
bending, pushing, pulling, or twisting. In addition, Dr. Koprivica restricted Jones
from “whole body vibration or jarring activities such as operating heavy
equipment or commercial driving.” Dr. Koprivica gave the opinion the
December 6, 2009 injury was the direct and prevailing factor in causing further
permanent aggravating injury to Jones’s back.
Jones had left hip replacement surgery on February 24, 2010, which was
not due to his work-related injury. Jones requested Social Security disability
benefits, and he was determined to be disabled. He had right knee replacement
surgery on June 15, 2010. Jones resigned from his employment on
September 15, 2010, stating he was in too much pain to continue working.
Jones filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits on December 5,
2011. After a hearing, a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner
determined Dr. Koprivica’s opinion should be given more weight than Dr. Boarini 4
or Dr. Ciccarelli. The deputy found Jones suffered permanent disability caused
by the December 6, 2009 work injury, noting Jones now had work restrictions,
which he did not have previously. The deputy found Jones was permanently and
totally disabled. The workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed and adopted
the deputy’s decision finding Jones was permanently and totally disabled.
The employer filed a petition for judicial review. The district court found
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s
finding Jones suffered a permanent impairment following the December 6, 2009
injury. The court also found the commissioner’s conclusion Jones suffered an
industrial disability and was permanently and totally disabled was not irrational,
illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. The employer appeals the decision of the district
court.
II. Standard of Review
Our review in this administrative action is governed by Iowa Code chapter
17A (2011). We apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to the
commissioner’s decision and decide whether the district court correctly applied
the law in its judicial review. Des Moines Area Reg’l Transit Auth. v. Young, 867
N.W.2d 839, 842 (Iowa 2015). “If we reach the same conclusions as the district
court, ‘we affirm; otherwise, we reverse.’” Id. (citation omitted).
We will reverse the commissioner’s factual findings only if they are not
supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. Coffey
v. Mid Seven Transp. Co., 831 N.W.2d 81, 89 (Iowa 2013). “Evidence is
substantial if a reasonable mind would find it adequate to reach the same
conclusion.” 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995). 5
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but does not rise to the level of a
preponderance of the evidence.” Etchen v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 574 N.W.2d
355, 359 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
III. Merits
A. The employer claims there is not substantial evidence in the record
to support the commissioner’s finding Jones sustained a permanent injury on
December 6, 2009. It states the medical and factual evidence does not support a
finding Jones sustained any permanent impairment or new pain related to the
December 6, 2009 work injury. The employer claims the opinion of Dr. Koprivica
should be discounted because he did not have all of Jones’s previous medical
records. It also asserts the opinions of all of the other physicians in the record
support a finding Jones did not suffer a permanent injury.
Jones testified he was able to return to work without restrictions following
his previous injuries. He stated before the injury he would be “a little bit stiff and
sore” by the end of the day. He testified on December 6, 2009, he was lifting a
skid and felt pain in his back. Jones testified, “Something changed in my back
during that injury. There was a lot more pain.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0960 Filed April 6, 2016
JACK COOPER TRANSPORT CO., INC., and CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CO., Petitioners-Appellants,
vs.
BRUCE JONES, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson,
Judge.
Petitioners appeal the district court ruling affirming the workers’
compensation commissioner’s decision respondent was permanently and totally
disabled. AFFIRMED.
Kent M. Smith of Scheldrup Blades, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Jean Mauss of Schott Mauss & Associates, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ. 2
BOWER, Judge.
Petitioners Jack Cooper Transport Company, Inc. and California
Insurance Company1 appeal the district court ruling affirming the workers’
compensation commissioner’s decision respondent Bruce Jones was
permanently and totally disabled. We find there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the commissioner’s finding Jones sustained permanent
impairment due to an injury on December 6, 2009. We also find the
commissioner’s finding Jones was permanently and totally disabled is not
irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. We affirm the ruling of the district court.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Jones, who was fifty-eight years old at the time of the administrative
hearing, had been employed as a truck driver since 1976. Jones injured his back
on June 19, 2006. An MRI showed a disc herniation compression at the L5 level,
and Jones had back surgery on August 25, 2006. He continued to have back
pain, but was able to return to work without limitations. Jones also sustained a
back injury on April 23, 2009. An MRI at that time revealed a lumbar disc
herniation at the left L3-4 level. He had surgery for this injury on June 15, 2009.
Again, Jones was able to return to work without limitations.
This case involves an injury which occurred on December 6, 2009. Jones
was lifting a skid and felt severe pain in his back. Dr. John Larson examined
Jones on December 23, 2009, and determined the pain appeared to be at the L4-
5 level. Dr. Alexander Bailey examined an MRI and found evidence of
degenerative disc disease at L4-5 and L5-S1, stating “disc bulging is present, but
1 We will refer to these two companies together as the employer. 3
no gross evidence of recurrent disc herniation, spinal stenosis, foraminal stenosis
or other.” Dr. Yuri Tsirulnikov stated the MRI may provide an explanation for
Jones’s pain. Dr. John Ciccarelli found Jones had burning sensations across his
low back and right buttocks area, which were not present when he returned to
work in October 2009. Dr. David Boarini stated he did not believe Jones had any
significant structural abnormality or permanent problem caused by the
December 6, 2009 injury.
Jones had an independent medical examination with Dr. Brent Koprivica,
who determined Jones should be restricted from any squatting, crawling,
kneeling, or climbing. Dr. Koprivica stated Jones could occasionally lift or carry
from twenty up to thirty-five pounds. He stated Jones should avoid frequent
bending, pushing, pulling, or twisting. In addition, Dr. Koprivica restricted Jones
from “whole body vibration or jarring activities such as operating heavy
equipment or commercial driving.” Dr. Koprivica gave the opinion the
December 6, 2009 injury was the direct and prevailing factor in causing further
permanent aggravating injury to Jones’s back.
Jones had left hip replacement surgery on February 24, 2010, which was
not due to his work-related injury. Jones requested Social Security disability
benefits, and he was determined to be disabled. He had right knee replacement
surgery on June 15, 2010. Jones resigned from his employment on
September 15, 2010, stating he was in too much pain to continue working.
Jones filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits on December 5,
2011. After a hearing, a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner
determined Dr. Koprivica’s opinion should be given more weight than Dr. Boarini 4
or Dr. Ciccarelli. The deputy found Jones suffered permanent disability caused
by the December 6, 2009 work injury, noting Jones now had work restrictions,
which he did not have previously. The deputy found Jones was permanently and
totally disabled. The workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed and adopted
the deputy’s decision finding Jones was permanently and totally disabled.
The employer filed a petition for judicial review. The district court found
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s
finding Jones suffered a permanent impairment following the December 6, 2009
injury. The court also found the commissioner’s conclusion Jones suffered an
industrial disability and was permanently and totally disabled was not irrational,
illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. The employer appeals the decision of the district
court.
II. Standard of Review
Our review in this administrative action is governed by Iowa Code chapter
17A (2011). We apply the standards of section 17A.19(10) to the
commissioner’s decision and decide whether the district court correctly applied
the law in its judicial review. Des Moines Area Reg’l Transit Auth. v. Young, 867
N.W.2d 839, 842 (Iowa 2015). “If we reach the same conclusions as the district
court, ‘we affirm; otherwise, we reverse.’” Id. (citation omitted).
We will reverse the commissioner’s factual findings only if they are not
supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. Coffey
v. Mid Seven Transp. Co., 831 N.W.2d 81, 89 (Iowa 2013). “Evidence is
substantial if a reasonable mind would find it adequate to reach the same
conclusion.” 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995). 5
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but does not rise to the level of a
preponderance of the evidence.” Etchen v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 574 N.W.2d
355, 359 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
III. Merits
A. The employer claims there is not substantial evidence in the record
to support the commissioner’s finding Jones sustained a permanent injury on
December 6, 2009. It states the medical and factual evidence does not support a
finding Jones sustained any permanent impairment or new pain related to the
December 6, 2009 work injury. The employer claims the opinion of Dr. Koprivica
should be discounted because he did not have all of Jones’s previous medical
records. It also asserts the opinions of all of the other physicians in the record
support a finding Jones did not suffer a permanent injury.
Jones testified he was able to return to work without restrictions following
his previous injuries. He stated before the injury he would be “a little bit stiff and
sore” by the end of the day. He testified on December 6, 2009, he was lifting a
skid and felt pain in his back. Jones testified, “Something changed in my back
during that injury. There was a lot more pain. It was more intense. I don’t know
if it was more localized or not, but I know it was just more of a sharper pain.” He
stated, “that pain has continued, even to this day.”
Dr. Koprivica gave the opinion the December 6, 2009 injury was the direct
and prevailing factor in causing further permanent aggravating injury to Jones’s
back. The issue of medical causation is essentially within the domain of expert
testimony. Dunlavey v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 853 (Iowa
1995). The commissioner, as the finder of fact, determines the weight to be 6
given expert testimony. Id. Also, Dr. Ciccarelli assigned an additional permanent
impairment rating of two percent to Jones based on the December 6, 2009 injury.
While there is contrary evidence in the record, “[w]e do not consider the
evidence insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from
the record.” Coffey, 831 N.W.2d at 89. “On appeal, ‘our task is not to determine
whether the evidence supports a different finding; rather, our task is to determine
whether substantial evidence . . . supports the findings actually made.’” Mike
Brooks, Inc. v. House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2014) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted). We determine there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the commissioner’s finding Jones sustained a permanent injury on
December 6, 2009.
B. The employer claims the commissioner’s finding Jones was
permanently and totally disabled was irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. It
states three physicians gave the opinion Jones sustained a minor back strain on
December 6, 2009, and did not require any permanent work restrictions. The
employer claims Jones voluntary retired after December 6, 2009, due to his other
unrelated medical issues.
The issue of industrial disability is a mixed question of law and fact. Neal
v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 525 (Iowa 2012). We review the
commissioner’s findings of fact for substantial evidence. Id. “Because the
challenge to the agency’s industrial disability determination challenges the
agency’s application of law to fact, we will not disrupt the agency’s decision
unless it is ‘irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.’” Id. at 526 (citation
omitted). 7
“Industrial disability goes beyond body impairment and measures the
extent to which the injury impairs the employee’s earning capacity.” Second
Injury Fund v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Iowa 1994). The commissioner
considers all of the factors bearing on a claimant’s actual employability, including
the employee’s “age, intelligence, education, qualifications, experience, and the
effect of the injury on the claimant’s ability to obtain suitable work.” Id. at 815
(citation omitted).
The deputy found:
The record reflects that the claimant has significant permanent restrictions that preclude him from performing the only work that he has known. The claimant has no work experience that would be relevant to his education, which is now stale. There is no reason to believe, based on this record, that the claimant is going to return to the workforce. The reason that he is not able to return is a direct result of his work injury. The claimant is permanently and totally disabled.
The deputy stated, “Total disability does not mean a state of absolute
helplessness. Permanent total disability occurs where the injury wholly disables
the employee from performing work that the employee’s experience, training,
education, intelligence, and physical capacities would otherwise permit the
employee to perform.” The commissioner affirmed the finding Jones was
permanently and totally disabled.
The commissioner properly considered the facts and the law in finding
Jones was permanently and totally disabled. The evidence supports the finding
Jones was not able to return to work due to the injury he received on
December 6, 2009. All of Jones’s previous work experience was as a truck
driver. Dr. Koprivica restricted Jones from “whole body vibration or jarring 8
activities such as operating heavy equipment or commercial driving,” meaning he
could no longer drive a truck. We conclude the commissioner’s decision on this
issue is not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.
We affirm the district court decision, which affirmed the ruling of the
workers’ compensation commissioner.
AFFIRMED.