Jablonski v. Jablonski

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Jablonski v. Jablonski

155 A.2d 614, 397 Pa. 452, 1959 Pa. LEXIS 476

CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedNovember 24, 1959

DocketAppeal, 111

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 155 A.2d 614 (Jablonski v. Jablonski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jablonski v. Jablonski, 155 A.2d 614, 397 Pa. 452, 1959 Pa. LEXIS 476 (Pa. 1959).

Pincite

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Cohen,

We allowed this appeal from the Superior Court to dispel any confusion which may exist as to the shifting of the burden of proof in divorce cases alleging desertion.

In a footnote in Larsen v. Larsen, 392 Pa. 609, 611, 141 A. 2d 353 (1958), we said: “When one spouse withdraws from the matrimonial domicile and the resulting separation continues for the required statutory period, the burden is upon the absenting spouse to prove consent to the withdrawal. Duncan v. Duncan, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 69, 73, 90 A. 2d 357 (1952). And, the failure of the deserted spouse either to object to the withdrawal or request the absenting spouse to return does not establish that the withdrawal was consented to. Procopio v. Procopio, 174 Pa. Superior Ct. 157, 160, 100 A. 2d 115 (1953).”

This footnote and the cases cited therein might lead one to believe that when the plaintiff produces oral evidence that the defendant withdrew from the marital domicile and the withdrawal was for two continuous years, without more the burden of proof shifts to the *454 defendant to prove consent; and if consent is not proved a legal desertion is established to the extent that such a ruling may be made in favor of the plaintiff as a matter of law. This is not correct. See Nanty-Glo Boro. v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 Atl. 523 (1932). It is necessary for the plaintiff, in order to establish desertion, to show that the withdrawal from the domicile was both wilful and malicious and was persisted in for the required statutory period without reasonable cause; then if defendant produces testimony showing consent of the plaintiff to the withdrawal, this evidence may or may not overcome the plaintiff’s evidence of wilfullness and maliciousness in the mind of the fact-finder. The Superior Court applied the proper test in arriving at its conclusions.

Judgment affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Cohen,

We allowed this appeal from the Superior Court to dispel any confusion which may exist as to the shifting of the burden of proof in divorce cases alleging desertion.

In a footnote in Larsen v. Larsen, 392 Pa. 609, 611, 141 A. 2d 353 (1958), we said: “When one spouse withdraws from the matrimonial domicile and the resulting separation continues for the required statutory period, the burden is upon the absenting spouse to prove consent to the withdrawal. Duncan v. Duncan, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 69, 73, 90 A. 2d 357 (1952). And, the failure of the deserted spouse either to object to the withdrawal or request the absenting spouse to return does not establish that the withdrawal was consented to. Procopio v. Procopio, 174 Pa. Superior Ct. 157, 160, 100 A. 2d 115 (1953).”

This footnote and the cases cited therein might lead one to believe that when the plaintiff produces oral evidence that the defendant withdrew from the marital domicile and the withdrawal was for two continuous years, without more the burden of proof shifts to the *454 defendant to prove consent; and if consent is not proved a legal desertion is established to the extent that such a ruling may be made in favor of the plaintiff as a matter of law. This is not correct. See Nanty-Glo Boro. v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 Atl. 523 (1932). It is necessary for the plaintiff, in order to establish desertion, to show that the withdrawal from the domicile was both wilful and malicious and was persisted in for the required statutory period without reasonable cause; then if defendant produces testimony showing consent of the plaintiff to the withdrawal, this evidence may or may not overcome the plaintiff’s evidence of wilfullness and maliciousness in the mind of the fact-finder. The Superior Court applied the proper test in arriving at its conclusions.

Judgment affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

155 A.2d 614, 397 Pa. 452, 1959 Pa. LEXIS 476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jablonski-v-jablonski-pa-1959.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack